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ABSTRACT 
 
Current customary tenure has negative implications for the sustainable environmental 
management of common resources in Swaziland in that it perpetuates free-for-all scenarios 
that result in unabated environmental degradation by all and with none held responsible. The 
lack of a land policy to provide a framework for land use regulation is a significant driver of 
common resource destruction, as is the inability of customary tenure to evolve with the times.  
The cleavage between customary and statutory tenure has led to informal land markets which, 
if uncontrolled, could wreck not only the environment but the integrity of the traditional 
Swazi community.  
 
The study calls for inclusive politics which would encourage democratised public 
participation. After all, it is only after this fact that relevant and acceptable environmental 
policy can be synthesised. It also calls for the regulation of customary tenure and suggests 
that there is advantage in mono-ethnicity that can be exploited in trying to chart a more 
sustainable and morally fair management of common resources in the country. 
 
Key words: Common resource governance, property rights, customary land tenure, 
population growth, migration, sustainable livelihood, Swaziland 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Huidige tradisionele grondbesit het negatiewe implikasies vir die volhoubare 
omgewingsbestuur van gemeenskaplike hulpbronne in Swaziland omdat dit  scenario‟s vestig 
waar almal volgens eie voorkeur optree. Dit kan tot knaende omgewingsaftakeling deur almal 
lei sonder dat iemand daarvoor verantwoordelik gehou word.  Die gebrek aan ‟n grondbeleid 
wat as raamwerk vir die regulering van grondgebruik kan dien, en die onvermoë van 
tradisionele grondbesit om oor tyd te ontwikkel is belangrike dryfvere vir die vernietiging 
van gemeenskaplike hulpbronne. 
 
Die gaping tussen tradisionele en statutêre grondbesit het informele grondmarkte laat 
ontstaan wat tot die ondergang van nie net die omgewing nie, maar die integriteit van die 
tradisionele Swazi-gemeenskap kan lei as dit nie beheer word nie. Die studie bepleit 
inklusiewe politiek wat gedemokratiseerde openbare deelname sal aanmoedig.  Dit is per slot 
van sake net hiervolgens wat ‟n relevante en aanvaarbare omgewingsbeleid daargestel kan 
word.  Die studie pleit ook vir die regulering van tradisionele grondbesit en suggereer dat die 
ontginning van mono-etnisiteit voordelig kan wees om ‟n meer volhoubare en moreel 
regverdige bestuur van gemeenskaplike hulpbronne in die land te verkry. 
 
Sleutelwoorde:  Beheer en bestuur van gemeenskaplike hulpbronne, eiendomsregte, 
tradisionele grondbesit, bevolkingstoename, migrasie, volhoubare lewenswyse, Swaziland. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 PREFACE 
There is a growing body of scholarship that suggests that the environment would significantly 
benefit from clearly defined property rights, that when people have a sense of ownership over 
a resource they are likely to use it sparingly (Stroup & Baden, 1983:8; Hatcher & Bailey, 
2011:3; Mabuza, Sithole, Wale, Ortmann & Darroch, 2012:71). The most valued resource in 
African societies is land. It is after all a form of actualisation and being part of a community 
is still revered, particularly in rural settings.  
 
Rural settings are predominantly customary land tenure and residents rely heavily on the 
environment and ecosystem services as they cannot access remote resources. Ecosystems are 
invaluable to rural residents and the State alike. The former benefits from direct and 
inexpensive access of ecosystem services, and the latter benefits by alleviated expenses as 
they do not have to subsidise these services for the rural folk (Monadjem & Nkosi, 2001:3). 
However, the rural poor continue to experience harsh environmental conditions caused by 
rising consumption, even though they are minority consumers as set out in the United Nations 
Human Development Report Overview (UNDP, 1998:4). 
 
At the crux of the poverty and environmental degradation dilemma is population growth. As 
people live longer, with family planning being sporadic and reverse migration occurring, the 
rural population expands. As a result natural resources come under strain for farming stands, 
grazing and in some cases deforestation to create more space for people to live in (UNDP, 
1998:5). Clay and Reardon (1998:1) point out that this presents an enormous challenge 
because sustainability and population growth are inextricably linked and therefore require a 
simultaneous solution. 
 
There is general consensus that land tenure reform that promotes sustainable resource use and 
ensures access to land could be the panacea for environmental degradation (Ostrom, 2010:1). 
There is, however, uncertainty in tenure systems that hinder this. The Swaziland Environment 
Authority (SEA) has identified this problem, saying that unclear tenure results in non-existent 
enforcement to protect biodiversity. Residents, bereft of exclusive rights to their resources, 
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are unable to keep others away from the limited resources to ensure sustainable use of natural 
resources (Monadjem & Nkosi, 2001:60). 
 
Also, customary land tenure is often mistaken for communal ownership as both tenures 
require a formal admittance of new members and land acquisition in both can be through 
inheritance. But chiefs are the true powers that be in customary tenure versus all members in 
communal ownership. Stroup and Baden (1983:7-8) say that the fallacy usually is that all 
residents gain from public land when in actual fact decision-making usually rests with certain 
individuals who promote their self-interests. Politicians and bureaucrats are infamous for 
using institutional discretion for personal benefits. 
 
In Swaziland, tenure is broadly divided into three types, namely crown land, freehold and 
customary tenure (Mabuza et al., 2012:71). Crown (government or state land) and freehold 
(where people buy land and get title deeds issued) are of least interest to this study. 
Customary land, the bulk of Swaziland that accommodates the rural population, is the focus 
of the study, and how its reform could impact the sustainability of common resources. 
 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
According to the United Nations Population, Environment and Development: The Concise 
Report, (UNPED, 2001:15), global ecosystems are under pressure. In 2007, the Fourth 
Assessment Report, compiled by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
reinforced the fact that there was a rise in global temperatures as a result of human activities 
driven by incessant consumption (Swilling & Annecke, 2012:31). This consumption is, 
according to the United Nations Human Development Report Overview (UNDP, 1998:1-5), 
skewed towards the wealthy and statistics show that the wealthiest 20 per cent of people 
consume up to 86 per cent, and the poor are left to suffer with 20 per cent of the latter, 
accounting for only 1, 3 per cent of the total global consumption.  
 
It then follows that the growing population in rural areas across developing countries 
continues to magnify the scale of environmental management challenges. This growth is due 
to a typically higher rural fertility rate  (Irin News, 2012) and reverse migration, a 
phenomenon where people emigrate from urban areas either because of  high living costs or, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Page | 3  
 
for the financially fit, a change of scenery, as Connell and McManus (2011:27-28) assert. The 
result of this is a rural population expansion that shrinks available land (Coleman, 2011).  
Although evidence suggests that communities can devise robust systems to manage their 
resources, especially when the affluent among them support the cause (Ostrom, 2010:6), the 
elite rural immigrants alluded to by Connell and McManus (2011:27-28) can disintegrate 
prevailing institutional arrangements (Brown & Wardwell, 1980:51-53; Stroup & Baden 
1983:9; Falk, Schulman & Tickamyer 2003:340). Ostrom and Hess (2008:5) and Stroup and 
Baden (1983:23) agree that leaders may receive incentives from the wealthy to bias decisions 
in their favour and add that others may deliberately water down efforts geared towards 
change because it may be divorced from their self-interest even if such change is for the 
collective good of the community. This raises the question of whether land tenure can be used 
as an instrument to ease poverty and protect the poor‟s livelihoods by giving them a voice 
and defending the resources on which they solely depend. 
 
It is against this background that the study endeavours to assess whether changes in the 
Swaziland land tenure system promote the sustainable use of common resources or not. 
 
 
1.3 SOME POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO, 2002:7) land tenure can be 
described as the set of rules outlining the rights and responsibilities in natural resource 
allocation. It specifies who owns what, to what extent and in what capacity.  
 
There are varying interests associated with land tenure, namely:  
1. Overriding – when the State makes and enforces the final decision with regard to a 
resource.  
2. Overlapping – when different groups have rights to the one area, but for different 
purposes.  
3. Complementary interests – when different groups share the same rights to a resource 
for the same use.  
4. Interests can also be competing, like when different groups all lay claims to an area 
for the same utility (FAO, 2002:7-8). 
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The FAO further classifies land tenure into four, namely:  
a. Private – where an individual or a corporation or specific family have exclusive rights 
to a resource. 
b. Communal – where the community has rights to a resource, for example to a pasture. 
Community members are authorised to prohibit unacknowledged people from using 
their resources. 
c. Open access – free for all and no one has a right to keep the next person away from 
that resource.  
d. State-owned – where rights to property are given to the Government (FAO, 2002:8). 
 
Land rights under customary tenure include but are not limited to: the freedom to build and 
continuously improve on a dwelling place; to farm and lay the dead to rest; to bequeath land 
to descendants and to protect it from intruders. Governments are needed to uphold and 
administer these rights (Adams, Sibanda & Turner, 1999).  Adams et al. (1999) describe land 
tenure reform as an attempt to alter the rules and provisions of land allocation with intent to 
protect people‟s claim to land and curtail landlessness. This is a prerequisite for local 
investment and sustainable use of land. This exercise must contend with overpopulation of 
communal areas, linked rights to land, abuse of the system by traditional leaders and 
politicians and non-existent budgets to facilitate reform. 
 
  
1.4 POPULATION GROWTH 
Growth in population compromises quality of life as it accelerates damage to natural 
resources and decreases biodiversity and, by extension, ecosystem services on which human 
kind, especially rural dwellers, significantly depend. According to Hinrichsen and Robey 
(2014) population growth is overtaking food supplies in 64 out of 105 countries. Two billion 
hectares of cultivable land has already been degraded. Freshwater, a finite resource is 
projected to be scarce sooner rather than later. In 2025, when the global population will be an 
estimated 8 billion people, about 48 countries – home to about 3 billion people – will deal 
with freshwater scarcity (Hinrichsen & Robey, 2014). 
 
Combined with improved technologies, population growth exerts pressure on the 
environment (Stroup & Baden, 1983:8). A link between population, development and 
environment was declared at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
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Development (UNCED) and reiterated two years later at the International Conference on 
Population and Development. Following the declaration of this link, developing countries 
created frameworks for preventing poverty-induced environmental degradation. 
Environmental policies continually engage a participatory approach to indigenous people and 
states in South America, Southeast Asia and South Central Asia have pioneered this 
movement (UNPED, 2001:16-18).  
 
Although population growth is a significant factor in deforestation and influences overall per 
capita consumption and pollution, commercial logging surpasses it by far. However, when 
overpopulation occurs next to a protected area, it becomes significant, in which case 
governmental institutions are needed to limit settlement. This is not without its complexity as 
some of the people occupying the land may be indigenous to the area and possess some use 
rights to that resource (UNPED, 2001:16-18, 25-26). Wenner (2013) asserts that 
overpopulation is the principal ecological dilemma.   
 
 
1.5 PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Property rights are the rules and regulations governing the relationship between people and 
property (Investopedia, 2014). They can be held in private, be communal or public or there 
can be state ownership. When private, property rights are specific, exclusive, transferable and 
enforceable (Hodge, 1995:32-39). Public property or open-access resources are, by contrast, 
characterised by absent ownership and non-existent regulation. Open-access resources are 
typically overused because all users tend to overharvest and pollute the resource in the 
absence of any form of regulation (Monbiot, 2003:374). Hardin (1968:1243-1248) foretold of 
a tragedy of the commons, a situation that arises when people possess property rights to a 
common resource. In his example of a common pasture he said that the pastoralists would in 
no time start adding their number of livestock, quickly overtaking the carrying capacity of the 
common pasture. The pasture would eventually collapse under the pressure of extra livestock 
to the peril of all pastoralists. From this narrative he erroneously concluded that privatising 
property rights and entrusting their regulation to the State were the only ways to avert the 
tragedy. At the core of his argument Hardin (1968:1243-1248) said that people were 
inherently self-serving at the cost of co-owners to a resource. His main flaw, however, was in 
likening common property resource to open access when it is in fact an aspect of private 
property (Hodge, 1995:32-39). 
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Common resource management has also been frowned upon by traditional economists 
because of its low productivity and high transaction costs (Ostrom & Hess, 2008:6). 
However, the view that privatising property was the only remedy to the common resource 
management problem, was vehemently denied by, among others, Cox (1985:49-61), Monbiot 
(2003:373-374) and Ostrom (1990:14-16; 1999:1; 2010:1-9) for the reason that the premise 
of his argument, a commons and not an open-access area, was wrong. 
 
Although these authors concede that where there is a lack of social mechanisms to control 
resource use, environmental degradation occurs, Stroup and Baden (1983:20) assert that 
setting up clear property rights in previously misused resources controls the problem of 
overuse.  
Examples of property rights are: 
1. The right to manage, indicating how and to what extent a resource may be used, 
clarifies the terms of use. 
2. Exclusion rights, which allow deserving property rights owners to keep away or 
remove from their resource people who are not mandated to benefit from that 
resource. This right also encompasses the procedures on how to cede or transfer rights 
to other individuals should the need arise. 
3. Alienation rights provide steps to how a property owner can lease or sell his or her 
property, although this does not include inheritance (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:251). 
 
Extensive work by the likes of Ostrom challenged Hardin‟s conclusions. It became clear that 
where people had access to a resource but had no relationship with each other, they would 
most likely create a tragedy as opposed to when they had some camaraderie and were thus 
driven by group interests. Patriotism alone, however, cannot yield collective best interest. 
This realisation exposes the need for collaboration of affected communities and external 
institutions in containing elitism and maintaining order (Ostrom, 1990:8-9). Generalising in 
common property governance, as per Hardin (1968:1243-1248), remains unwise as all 
communities are unique and therefore require diverse management arrangements (Ostrom, 
1999:1; 2010:1-9). 
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1.6 MIGRATION 
Although population growth by percentage has declined, absolute rural numbers are still 
significant, rising from 2 billion in 1960 to 3,2 billion in 2000 worldwide. In Africa the rural 
population rose from 225 million to 487 million during the same period. (UNPED, 2001:27). 
As of 2011 the African rural community was estimated at 552 million and it was forecast that 
by 2025 this number will have grown by 98 million. A large number of these people (will) 
live in unfavourable customary tenure conditions (Alden Wily, 2011a:7). 
 
When faced with scarcity, humans migrate to areas that provide better environmental 
conditions than where they are currently resident. This is, of course, counterproductive 
because while it provides relief to the place of origin, it immediately strains the host 
resources. Rural to rural migration is very common in countries with higher rural contingents. 
Natural disasters and environmental degradation have been identified as push factors for this 
type of migration although there is not much empirical evidence to corroborate the claim as 
environmental factors are usually intertwined with socio-economic and religious factors. 
Where rural population growth is prevalent, environmental degradation issues abound and the 
rural population growth, migration and environmental degradation nexus has been around 
since the 1950s (UNPED, 2001:29-34). 
 
 
1.7 RESEARCH PROBLEM  
The study focuses on the evolution of the Swaziland land tenure system and its impacts on 
the sustainable management of common resources namely land. Customary land tenure is the 
norm in most African countries and often possesses cultural and mystical connotations. These 
factors lend to the complexity of land tenure systems. This study investigates how sustainable 
environmental management is enhanced or worsened under the current dispensation. It 
interrogates the land tenure system readiness to deal with matters of population growth and 
socio-economic inequality. Lastly the study gauges the flexibility of the system to evolve into 
a vehicle of sustainability and social justice. 
 
The research problem is that the Swazi land tenure reform does not promote responsible and 
sustainable use of resources.  Therefore, there is a need to do a review or carry out a study 
that will give an insight on the promotion of responsible and sustainable use of resources. 
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1.8 RESEARCH QUESTION 
What has been the impact of land tenure change on the sustainability of common resources in 
Swaziland? 
 
 
1.9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
1. To compare and contrast a communal governance system and traditional governance 
(chiefdoms) and explore how the Swaziland land tenure system has responded to the 
growing population. 
2. To establish whether environmental management concerns inform land tenure 
strategy in Swaziland. 
3. To make recommendations for sustaining common resources under the existing 
system. 
 
 
1.10 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
Hardin‟s theory (1968:1243–1248) on the inability of individuals to collectively self-govern 
their common resource is the point of departure for this study. Ostrom‟s later view (1990:14-
16; 1999: 2; 2008:3), supported by extensive experimental work, challenged Hardin‟s view 
and concluded that common resource governance was not only possible but that it could also 
flourish. She articulated that for that to happen, it was imperative that property rights be 
explicit on whom the owners were so that they could legally keep unintended beneficiaries 
away from the resource. 
 
Land tenure (in) security has been said to affect people‟s relation to the resource, in the sense 
that a secure tenure translates to a meaningful and sustainable relationship between man and 
his environment. Likewise, insecure tenure encourages recklessness in dealing with the 
environment as man wants to capitalise his benefit within an unknown time frame.  
In her conclusions Ostrom (1990:14) admitted that no one governance system surpasses the 
other in resource management. She, instead, admitted to the complexity of resource 
management and encouraged collaborative governance. The study therefore explores 
governance in terms of complexity and the need for collaboration in present times.  
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Lastly the study looks at how livelihoods can be improved and sustained by a secure land 
tenure and collaborative governance. 
 
 
1.11 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design is qualitative. Sampling was non-probability and purposive. Key 
informants were identified – from Central Rural Development Board (CRDB), SEA, Land 
Management portfolio of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), Swaziland 
National Trust Commission (SNTC), Yonge Nawe Environmental Action Group (YNEAG) 
and the University of Swaziland – and in depth individual interviews were conducted using 
structured interview questionnaires. 
 
 
1.12 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
An extensive review of literature predominantly meets the research objectives. It gives a 
theoretical background of the underlying concepts, i.e. common resource governance, 
sustainable livelihood, population growth, migration and customary land tenure in the global, 
African and local contexts. 
 
 Structured interviews with identified key informants gave an indication of the readiness and 
flexibility of the present tenure to respond to the need for sustainable management in view of 
the growing population.  
 
 
1.13 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Because of the uniqueness of the characteristics of land tenure the conclusions of this study 
cannot be generalised to other countries. 
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1.14 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
The chapter outline will be as follows:  
 Chapter 1 is the introduction.  
 Chapter 2 covers common property rights and land tenure systems. 
 Chapter 3 unpacks the policy and institutional framework for land tenure in Swaziland 
(Land tenure in Swaziland). 
 Chapter 4: Findings. 
 Chapter 5: Evaluation and recommendations. 
 Chapter 6: Summary and conclusions. 
 
 
1.15 SUMMARY 
This chapter contends that the reason scholars are calling for defined property rights, 
especially with regard to rural communities, is because this would likely result in responsible 
environmental management of resources. As elaborated, various studies have shown that the 
rural poor become severely dependant on the environment for sustenance of their livelihoods. 
The burden on the environment has increased in recent years owing to population growth, 
which exerts pressure on resources and is exacerbated by such factors as migration. The rural 
poor have no means to effect large-scale consumption, but suffer the most excruciating 
effects of a degraded environment, often residing in marginal lands.   
 
The next chapter unpacks how the poor remain tenants on their indigenous lands and are 
incapacitated from affecting activities going on in their communities because they are not 
owners of the land on which they reside. The commons and the on-going assault meted by the 
State and elite, using slightly modified or fundamental colonial laws to enrich themselves at 
the cost of the rural poor, are reflected on. 
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CHAPTER 2: COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND TENURE SYSTEMS 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives an overview of the composition and property rights in the commons and 
how the land tenure system is weakened to facilitate capture by the State and elite (Stroup & 
Baden, 1983:23), who then lease it to investors at nominal prices. It traces the colonial 
endeavour to dismantle the commons from Europe to Africa. The composition of the elite and 
the way it disintegrates existing communal institutional arrangements, using its (acquired) 
status to influence leadership on issues from which it stands to massively benefit (Brown & 
Wardwell, 1980:1-53; Falk et al., 2003:340; Connell & McManus, 2011:27-28), is also 
discussed. It is argued that indifference to customary tenure propels poverty (FAO, 2002:3; 
Monbiot, 2003:374).  
 
 
2.2 THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
The dried springs and rivers, bare mountains, crowding and extinguished habitats are all 
telltale signs of resource degradation around the world. Forests, necessary for soil binding, 
erosion prevention, water regulation, carbon sequestration, climate stabilisation and 
biodiversity enhancement, are shrinking (UNDP, 1998:4; Ostrom, 1999:1). A larger 
proportion of this deforestation, the report says, is prevalent in developing countries while the 
produce is consumed by first world countries. This trend – that the poor suffer and lose 
livelihoods for the luxury of the affluent – is no longer sustainable. In fact, it defeats the very 
purpose of a morally reliable sustainability defined by Turner, Pearce and Bateman 
(1994:32–33).  
 
Archaic environmental management methods have been overtaken by modern challenges and 
sustainability has become a vital variable to any transformation that seeks to change the 
reality of over two billion human beings already living in dire straits (World Bank, 2007:227; 
Swilling & Annecke, 2012:11). In order to realise the sustainable future hoped for, the focus 
should be on restraint and no longer on technological advance, as has been the norm 
(Swilling & Annecke, 2012:3). Such restraint has not been forthcoming where issues of cruel 
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land acquisition (by foreign companies, domestic elite and governments), much to the 
detriment of the disadvantaged, are concerned. 
 
Land acquisition is not a new thing. It, in fact, started during colonial times, for the 
establishment of forests and rangelands (Alden Wily, 2011a:27). Wildlife protection and 
conservation efforts for the benefit of the affluent soon followed (Khan, 2002:16) and land 
use has evolved to such uses as mining, industrial and military infrastructural projects, 
biofuel production and large-scale agriculture, timber extraction, rubber plantation and oil 
palm plantation (Murombedzi, 2014). Most of this land, about two thirds as per Alden Wily 
(2013), was captured from impoverished and investment-hungry Africa. These land transfers 
are characterised by indifference to community tenure, rent seeking, huge environmental 
costs and conflict as people try to hang on to their only resource (Murombedzi, 2014).  
 
 
2.3 COMMONS 
The term commons loosely refers to vacant public lands (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:249), but 
it traditionally denotes resources owned jointly by specific communities  and comprises 
virgin lands safeguarded by communities for their massive value as forests, meadows or 
swamps (Cousins, 2006:488-489; Alden Wily, 2011a:1). Commons are typically vast and 
whole, and they are about 740 million hectares in Africa alone. This is an attractive feature, 
which makes the commons vulnerable for large-scale investment opportunities by investors, 
the State and the elite (Alden Wily, 2007:43-45; 2011c:733).  
 
Communal domains are a superset of both the commons and individually owned residential 
and farming land. While common property can be tied to the whole community, residential 
and farming land belongs to, and is controlled by, individuals and families (Cousins, 
2006:489; Alden Wily, 2007:45). The distinction between these lands and associated rights 
and prohibitions is deeply entrenched within customary tenure.   
 
Commons derive their integrity from the anchoring customary rules, so the two can never be 
separated. The existence of land rights in the commons system is endorsed and guided by 
communal norms similar to how statutes validate freehold (Elliot, 2004:130; Alden Wily, 
2007:46).  
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Since community compositions are diverse across all regions, it is not unusual to find that the 
norms of one community are not at all applicable or are a variation of the norms practised by 
another (Alden Wily, 2007:46). This serves for a complexity in tenure unappreciated by state 
prescribed abstract solutions to perceived (or real) resource degradation. This is illustrated by 
Monbiot (2003:373-74) in his account of the Masai and Turkwell River hunter and gatherer 
communities in Kenya who were forced to settle by the Government and United Nations, a 
step which inadvertently turned their commons into an open-access area, giving rise to 
environmental degradation and displacement of people into marginal lands. It is lamentable 
that only a small number of countries,  in the whole Sub-Saharan Africa recognise commons 
as community property worthy of protection, namely Tanzania, Ghana and Mozambique 
(Alden Wily, 2011b:3).  
 
 
2.4 PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE COMMONS 
The varieties of rights within a commons as illustrated by Ostrom (2008:3) are listed below.  
People can own just one right or a combination or the whole bundle, depending on their 
status with regards to the resource. These rights set the tone for how the resource will be used 
by establishing who has what rights, for what purpose, during which seasons and for how 
long.  They are:  
a. Access – where people are allowed to enter a bounded property. 
b. Withdrawal – rights allowing collection of products from a resource. 
c. Management – the right to oversee the use patterns of all members and suggest 
improvement.     
d. Exclusion – the right to exclude others from the resource if they do not form part of 
the constituency.  
e. Alienation – freedom to sell or lease any of these rights.  
In her later work with Schlager, Ostrom (1992:249-262) further divided these rights into two 
themes. These are: the operational level, which is the umbrella for access and withdrawal 
rights, and the collective choice level, which comprises the administrative, exclusion and 
alienation rights. They also offer a useful distinction between rules and rights with the former 
being the framework through which the latter are devised. Rights naturally have attached 
responsibilities. 
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2.4.1 Property right holders 
Property rights holders are classified into authorised users, claimants, proprietors and owners. 
Authorised users are the least powerful group and only have access and withdrawal rights, 
which are usually granted by the propriety or the owners. Tensions usually arise between 
authorised users and proprietors or owners as they try to harvest the most they can from a 
resource before access is curtailed. In addition to being authorised users claimants also 
possess management rights, but they cannot sell or lease a resource. Authorised users and 
claimants would be ordinary members of the commons and together they can design 
operational level governance rules (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:249-262). 
 
Proprietors are collective action rights holders who manage resources and are authorised to 
keep aliens out of the resource. Despite considerable power, these are still not owners and 
they are typically chiefs or trustees in a commons situation. Alienation rights are what 
separate the owners from the rest of the users. These rights (alienation) basically mean that 
they can sell or lease the resource if they so wish. It also means that they can be 
entrepreneurial with the access and authorised user rights that they can confer on deserving 
persons. This group would typically be the elite and the State in a commons situation. 
The combination of the alienation and exclusion rights provides its holders with the incentive 
to sustainably manage its resources so as to maximise profits. It has the potential to put 
underutilised resources into productive use. Conversely the threat of overexploitation and 
higher environmental discounts lurk, depending on the owner‟s intentions for that resource 
(Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:256).  
 
2.4.2 De jure and de facto property rights 
Property rights can either be de facto or de jure. De jure rights are the formal and enforceable 
group which resembles the European derived norms. De facto rights are more informal and 
although they can be defensible in a court of law, they are inherently inferior to their de jure 
counterparts. When a government allocates a resource to a group of people, those people 
retain a de jure right to that resource, but the self-organisation that they do independently of 
the State to better manage their resource is de facto (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:254). 
Commons therefore have a combination of de jure and de facto rights and Ostrom‟s (1990) 
work, among others, has found legitimate and vibrant application of de facto rights to 
resources. 
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De jure rights are important because they are an enabling environment for productive, 
efficient and independent self-organisation to thrive. They also grant ownership effectively, 
reducing the panic that often triggers over exploitation due to desperation. Administration 
costs of resources are usually internalised by beneficiaries, significantly reducing 
inefficiencies and possible duplication. On the flip side de jure rights have been used to 
derive sweeping reforms which dismantle vibrant de facto systems (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1992:256-258). 
 
Rights are most useful when they guarantee outright resource ownership (Stroup & Baden, 
1983:7) and, as the theme of this paper suggests, access and not ownership is usually 
guaranteed for millions of rural dwellers. 
 
 
2.5 INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THE COMMONS 
The term indigenous tenure evokes thoughts of ancient and possibly outdated systems and 
people, a thinking which may justify the present predicament of people under the patronage 
of this system. It is, however, not wrong to associate indigenous tenure and communities 
because these have always been intertwined and feed off each other. Indigenous people 
therefore hold rights to land by virtue of historical occupancy and use. For them there is an 
unbreakable bond between livelihood and land (Elliot, 2004:130).  Just like statutory laws 
and regulations, indigenous norms are flexible and resilient owing to their existence, despite 
the lower status afforded to them as compared to the latter. Hence there is a need to recognise 
indigenous communities and tenure as a present-day phenomenon that has been passed from 
previous generations. After all it is no longer the ancestors who guide current people, but the 
present generation continuously customise existing norms to suit the present situation (Cox, 
1985:53; Alden Wily, 2011c:734).  
 
Positively, some first world indigenous people have successfully contested their rights to the 
commons. Land rights and resources were legally reinstated to Australian indigenous 
communities in 1992, followed by Canada in 1997. These judgements set an optimistic 
precedent for the South African Ritchersveld ruling that was handed down by the 
Constitutional Court six years later (Alden Wily, 2007:48). 
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2.6 COMMONS AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS 
The commons are normally the only real asset for the poor and this motivates sustainable 
management as they contribute immensely to rural livelihoods and survival (Stroup & Baden, 
1983:11; Alden Wily, 2011c:739). Prior to the economic decline Zimbabwe‟s 35 per cent of 
the rural poor depended on common woodlands to survive and about 75 per cent of Zambian 
poor shared the same fate.  Over and above the products that people harvest from the 
commons, there is an appreciation of the all-encompassing African culture which is 
accommodating to both the peasants and the wealthy. This livelihood is said to be lost at a 
mean rate of five million hectares per year (Alden Wily, 2007:44) and the poor are most 
affected. This is because they do not possess the economic muscle to make alternative 
arrangements for survival. According to Alden Wily (2007:47) in Africa alone 564 million 
rural dwellers depend on the commons and this figure was projected to rise to 1.3 billion 
people by 2050.  
 
Livelihoods get threatened when people have to contend with erosion, pollution of streams 
and a decline in fish stocks as consequences of mining or logging. Food provision is 
compromised when people are suddenly prohibited from hunting after the establishment of 
protected areas and conservation in their locality (Khan, 2002:18). Shelter and medicines are 
not spared, as are religious and culturally sacred places. 
 
The poor are the ones who experience the brunt of the degraded environment, frequently 
dispossessed and forced to seek refuge in marginal lands (UNDP, 1998:4; Porter et al., 
2000:56). At the centre of this dispossession is the ambiguity of ownership in the commons. 
It is therefore important for any self-respecting land reform to prioritise ownership as the first 
hurdle to get over to ensure that the commons are not vulnerable.  
 
Ignorance of real estate values as can be derived from rentals of the land by mining or 
logging investors or prospective ecotourism and carbon credits in respect of large-scale forest 
privatisation for carbon sequestration through reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation schemes also compromises the livelihoods of locals (Murombedzi, 2014). 
Infrastructural developments, like road construction, which are meant to improve livelihoods, 
can worsen them further by introducing the threats of disease and violence for the locals. 
Uncompensated indigenous knowledge may also be solicited from locals (Elliot, 2004:130). 
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2.7 LAND TENURE 
Tenure simply means landholding (Alden Wily, 2011b:1) or a “bundle of rights to land” 
(Grigsby, 2004:208). It is the relationship, regardless of cultural or statutory orientation, that 
governs individuals and groups with respect to land (FAO, 2002:7). Customary land tenure is 
the system most prevalent in rural African societies and it operates expansively in agrarian 
economies. It is usually unique to its host community because it draws from its norms, often 
leading to the misguided belief by customary residents that user rights conferred to 
community members can be defined as statutory customary freeholds (Cox, 1985:53; Alden 
Wily, 2007:44-48; 2011b:2). It is both a social system and a legal code.  
 
Despite the advent of state making in the continent, customary tenure still dominates rural 
Africa (Alden Wily, 2011c:734-735). In fact, even industrial economies like Italy, 
Switzerland, Spain and Portugal, parts of Europe, North America and Oceania still have 
heavy influences of customary tenure in the rural parts of their countries (Alden Wily, 2011b: 
2). It is because of this historical tie that the lack of statutory recognition of customary tenure 
does not deter residents‟ consideration of themselves as the rightful owners of their domains 
(Alden Wily, 2007:48).   
 
Tenure security is immeasurable and is largely what people perceive it to be; hence it adapts 
contextually. According to FAO (2002:18-20) tenure security is the assurance that a personal 
or a group privilege to a resource is acknowledged by others and is deserving of protection 
should conflicting claims arise, a de facto right. In the absence of this assurance people are 
easily evicted and instantly lose their livelihoods and this has often resulted in conflict, like 
the Sudan civil war which was sparked by disagreements pertaining to land ownership (Alden 
Wily, 2007:43-45). 
 
Membership to social communities defends property rights and promotes social cohesion. 
Therefore, the total security enjoyed by a person or family is the cumulative security 
provided by all sources, be it the State, the community and neighbours. Governments and the 
formal legal systems can weaken community tenure by accepting illegal encroachment by 
foreign enterprise or by withholding some rights from the affected community. Conversely, 
the State may also protect the community from trespassers if it so wishes by providing 
physical security against encroachers. Tenure security may also be compromised when trying 
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to title or secure rights to uses unrecognised by the State. Uneven relationships as embodied 
by the elite and peasantry in communities may also threaten tenure security, with the wealthy 
cordoning off the best pieces of the land for themselves and simultaneously denying the poor 
access (Cox, 1985:52). Lastly, pandemics like HIV/AIDS also lend weight to tenure 
insecurity, particularly for widowed women (FAO, 2002:18-20). 
 
 
2.8 TENURE (IN) SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS 
Land tenure (in) security influences the actions people take based on the anticipated outcome 
of those actions and the incentives available for managing a resource in a certain way 
(Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:256). As Monbiot (2003:373) says, most entrepreneurs are 
interested in getting a return on their investment and environmental issues are not important 
to them. Stroup and Baden (1983:11) reiterate this point, asserting that, “agents with no stake 
in the residuals of the bargaining process have no direct and personal interest in reducing the 
cost of that process”.  This is the opposite of the environmentally sound management likely to 
be practiced by the locals who have strong bonds with the land and related ecosystems like 
coastal regions and streams (Ostrom, 1990:23; Elliot, 2004:130). As investors possess the 
economic resources to reinvest elsewhere, they are free to go when the inflicted degradation 
becomes a liability to their business, leaving behind an infertile and degraded environment 
for the poor to scavenge (Monbiot, 2003:373). 
 
Vague tenure often leads to environmentally unfriendly ways to secure land as people 
scramble to establish a sense of ownership by whatever means, or desperately harvest the 
most they can while they can (FAO, 2002:23; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:252). 
 
There is a correlation between insecure land tenure and the poor land use which accelerates 
environmental degradation. Ambiguous rights remove the incentive to implement long-term 
resource measures. When uncertain of the ability to reap the rewards of restraint and hard 
work, people are less likely to use resources sustainably but may desperately try to harvest 
whatever resource as much as possible while they can still access it (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1992:257). Likewise seasonal investors may look to maximise their returns within the 
allowed time frame. This outlook inevitably employs unsustainable methods and a 
discounting of massive environmental and social costs occurs (FAO, 2002:23; Monbiot, 
2003:373; Elliot, 2004:130). 
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State grab of lands also are to the detriment of the environment and inadvertently induce an 
‟open-access‟ situation. Examples abound where grazing land restriction of pastoralists 
resulted in serious overcrowding of the next available resource as farmers had no indication 
when rights to that resource would also be recalled. An indirect consequence of this is that 
what institutional arrangements there were in the communities tend to fall away as 
degradation worsens (FAO, 2002:24; Monbiot, 2003:373).  
 
 
2.9 THE POLITICS AND COMPLEXITY OF COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS 
According to Müller (1997:114), environmentalism is inherently political because it not only 
leans on social action but looks to governmental involvement to achieve its goals.  Common 
resources, and by extension common property rights, are politicised because powerful entities 
have a vested interest in them. These entities are: the State, which guards its interests and will 
encourage investment in their local communities even when it disenfranchises the majority; 
international financial organisations and the banking magnates, whose strict conditions 
attached to much needed financial aid have driven throngs of people to poverty; the 
conglomerates who are driven by the need to realise profits and will do anything in their 
power to maintain and support a dispensation that guarantees them nominally leased land and 
resources so they can maximise on profits (Porter, Brown & Chasek, 2000:35-78). The State, 
as protector and legislator, often uses the law as a tool to oppress or ignore the plight of its 
people, as do the elite, a cluster of political, professional and social heavyweights who wield 
remarkable influence on all spheres of government (Alden Wily 2011a:41, 47; Murombedzi, 
2014). These roles are elaborated in the section below. 
 
2.9.1 The State 
The organic role of the State is to protect its citizens, resources and frontiers. It is only the 
State that may negotiate with other States on behalf of its people, pledge or adopt regimes for 
its betterment. In their discussion of agents in the environmental arena Porter et al. (2000:35-
78) assert that States also have, at varying degrees, the power to influence global 
environmental matters by either opposing or supporting certain regimes. Another avenue to 
make a State‟s position heard is through protocol memberships. 
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Soberly, Murombedzi (2014) asserts that the colonially induced concept of the inferiority of 
customary tenure is used to dispossess rural people of their rights, resources and democratic 
space of self-actualisation. A prime example is the Malaysian Sime Darby deal which was 
meant for oil palm production. Having been concluded without any community consultation, 
the deal was purported to negatively affect more than a million people of whom 150 000 
would experience this negative impact immediately or within the first five years of the 
development (Murombedzi, 2014). Adverse effects included possible loss of homes, farms, 
cemeteries and sacred sites. Water supply resources and forests were not spared the threat. 
Naturally, communities raised complaints and were rewarded with a visit from the president 
herself (Sirleaf Johnson), who told them that the country‟s Constitution vested land rights on 
the government and that when the government signs any documents with foreign countries 
the communities had no power to change that, affirming Stroup and Baden‟s (1983:8) view 
that governmental control removes decision-making from the owners and bestows it in the 
laps of lawmakers and civil servants. Chastising the community, President Johnson is said to 
have warned them to stop undermining their own government and that such behaviour would 
result in investors leaving and Liberia regressing to days of old. 
 
In the African battle for the commons, it is sadly the State that is most culpable of the 
disintegrating poverty levels and loss of livelihoods (Elliot, 2004:132). This is termed the 
“politics of exclusion”. There remains a wide disconnect between the State‟s interests and 
those of the rural communities and so the degradation of land, a major threat to rural 
livelihoods, continues unabated (UNDP, 1998:6; Alden Wily, 2011c:736). Alden Wily 
(2007:44) and Elliot (2004:132) contend that States have the incentive to maintain the 
prevailing situation regarding the ambiguity of commons ownership. By taking cognisance of 
customary ownership and its implications on the commons, the State might lose on the 
additional revenue that it currently enjoys. It is therefore in the State‟s best interest to 
suppress customary tenure, often overlaying it with remote administrative rules and 
boundaries to extend the governmental authority (Ostrom, 1990:21; Elliot, 2004:132; Alden 
Wily, 2011a:20; 2011c:740-741; Peters, 2013:542, 548-549; Murombedzi, 2014).  
 
In Zambia, Sudan and Nigeria for example, the British indirect rule excluded vast forests and 
pasture resources which were later classified as public lands (Peters 2013:545). Alden Wily 
(2007:44-45; 2011a:8-9, 31,40; 2011b:4; 2011c:733) echoes that governments take undue 
liberties with their citizens‟ resources, labelling them as idle to make way for state ownership 
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so that when governments broker deals with investors, the state officials are the ones who 
assume the leasing roles and not the representatives of the host community. To further 
maximise revenues by avoiding paying compensation and displacement governments 
typically channel investors towards unfarmed land, to nullify any resistance from resident 
communities. In the end it makes no difference to host communities whether these resources 
are sold or leased as lease terms are notoriously long, some going up to ninety nine years, 
excluding up to four generations from meaningful use of the resource.  
 
Current top lessors in Africa are: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Liberia and Mozambique, followed by Madagascar, Ghana and Zambia. Gabon, Congo 
Brazzaville, Cameroon and the Central African Republic are also some major leasing States. 
There is literature that declares that up to 70 million hectares of public land may have been 
leased between 2007 and 2011 (Alden Wily, 2011c:736).  
 
2.9.2 The law 
 A potent tool that States use to cheat their own people from their resources is the law. It is 
already known that land takings rely heavily on and actually worsen the weak legal status of 
communities to land (Alden Wily, 2011a:2). States deliberately live on the precepts of  
colonial masters, which treated unregistered, untitled land as vacant, paving the way for 
governments to lend or sell these lands to whomever they pleased at negligible cost, if any 
(Alden Wily, 2011c:740; Peters, 2013:546). Some domestic governments, like Gambia, 
Madagascar and Benin, slightly revised colonial laws, but left the vulnerability of common 
lands intact (by affording customary tenure an inferior status to its European derived property 
rights counterpart) to carry on unabatedly with plantations and mining activities, among 
others, at negligible cost.  
 
Senegal and Malawi, through laws passed in 1964 and 1965, abolished customary ownership 
altogether and recalled original titles from chiefs, while the Sudanese 1970 law bestowed 
ownership of all untitled land to the government. In 1974 Cameroon, followed in 1975 by 
Nigeria, through law tenanted customary landholders. It is no surprise then that by 1990 more 
than half of Sub-Saharan African nations had more than half their lands nationalised, 
dispossessing their citizens. The law was used as a tool again when introducing wildlife, 
rangeland and forest legislation, which supported and protected the state ownership of these 
resources (Khan, 2002:16-21; Alden Wily, 2011c:742). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Page | 22  
 
 
The law has stubbornly persisted with a dualism that continuously erodes customary tenure of 
any legitimacy. The prevailing attitude that statutory land tenure only applies to European 
property norms and is a misfit to custom still reigns supreme (Alden Wily, 2007:48; 
2011c:733-735; Peters, 2013:549), enabling the demise of customary tenure through the weak 
legal status it currently upholds. Laxity of law can be blamed for the situation in Ghana 
where chiefs, anticipating more demand to meet urban expansion needs, have outright 
declared themselves as owners of the land. Custom dictates that they be trustees. Likewise in 
Kenya, where a land grab is said to have been spurred by the anticipation of law reforms that 
will disallow individual titling on community lands (Alden Wily, 2011c:733-735).  
 
2.9.3 Status of land reform in Africa 
Some African countries have taken steps to change the tide. As will be illustrated below, 
accomplishment varies from country to country, each with its own drawbacks. Alden Wily 
(2011a:44-51) gives the following account on the status of land reform in Africa. Tanzania 
(1999), Uganda (1998), Ghana (1986, 1994), Mozambique (1997), Southern Sudan and to 
some extent the Republic of South Africa can be said to be the leaders in the move for 
statutory recognition of customary tenure. In these countries community engagement is 
mandatory for investors looking to establish businesses. However, the law does not give 
benchmarks on what would constitute acceptable community involvement. As a result no 
significance is placed on majority community participation nor is there a succinct 
requirement for consent to investment by affected communities. The absence of local 
governments or assisted programmes and thrusting disempowered communities to negotiate 
with clever business people have been major drawbacks (Alden Wily, 2011a:44-51).  
 
The South African Constitution (1996) entrenched recognition of customary tenure. Further 
the passing of the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 was meant to fast-track restitution 
processes, but it encountered a setback when it was withdrawn due to its preference for chiefs 
as rightful owners of the commons which was decried as undemocratic.   
 
Southern Sudan passed the 2009 Land Act which for the first time recognised public land as a 
residual category that could only be affixed to areas where customary tenure did not apply. 
Under this law common properties can be registered by individuals, families and even 
communities, and open access are only allowed where a resource has been declared as state 
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property (Alden Wily, 2011a:44-51). Although formal consent from affected communities is 
not a requirement for business establishment, compensation is non-negotiable and is fixed at 
the same rate as statutorily held property. Inefficient community involvement and lack of 
vibrant support structures are the drawbacks for the Southern Sudanese.  
 
For all its aggressiveness Mozambican tenure reform  (the 1997 Land law calls for customary 
tenure to be recognised even when areas have not yet been statutorily registered) law does not 
provide the administration and local level support that would make land restoration a reality 
for displaced citizens (Alden Wily, 20012:23). While Benin (2007), Cote d‟Ivoire (1998), 
Burkina Faso (2009), Niger (1993, 2000), Angola (2004), Senegal (1964, 1996) and Lesotho 
(2010) do acknowledge customary tenure, they do not endow it with the same legal stature as 
private property. Despite Benin‟s law being a result of a vigorous local consultation and 
acknowledgement of land holding, fishing, pasture and involvement in delimiting the 
commons with every right assigned, it still does not constitute full title as per European 
norms. Certificates of ownership can be issued on request and commons are legally accepted 
as collateral for credit.  
 
Countries with mixed support include Botswana (1968), Namibia (2002) and Madagascar 
(2005). Under these countries only houses and farms can be registered under customary 
tenure, leaving the commons still vulnerable. In Botswana this vulnerability has been 
exploited by the elite mainly as cattle ranches. In Namibia, although some schemes have 
devised competitive benefit sharing, the elite has grabbed about 2 500 hectares of the 
commons in respect of boreholes and fencing rights.  Even though Madagascar devolved 
1500 rural communities, the country still confiscated historically owned grasslands for the 
State and it is leased wantonly (Alden Wily, 2011a:44-51). 
 
Uncertainty clouds the Swazi, Malawian and Kenyan efforts at customary tenure recognition. 
Swaziland started a land reform but it lost traction in 1999. Although Malawi‟s 2002 Land 
Policy was set to restore community land, its principles were to privatise and formalise land 
sales essentially extinguishing customary tenure (Silungwe, 2005:1). It did not see the light of 
day, largely due to resistance from chiefs who felt that their powers were being circumvented. 
In Kenya recent strides seem to have triggered a land grab as councils swiftly register untitled 
land in anticipation of a law outlawing this (Alden Wily, 2011a:44-51). 
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Northern Sudan (1984), Cameroon (1974), Mali (1993, 1996, and 1997), Chad (1967, 2000) 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (1967, 1973, and 1980), Gabon (1967) and Somalia 
(1975) have, through laws passed in the bracketed years, shown the least support for 
customary rights recognition (Alden Wily, 2011a:44-51). 
 
2.9.4 International law 
International law remains ineffective as countries are not bound by its precepts and there are 
no mechanisms in place to enforce it because of sovereignty limitations. The prevalent lack 
of political will, manifested by loud political silences, also undermine international law 
(Elliot, 2004:20-21). This is why, despite the Rio Declaration on the legitimacy of indigenous 
people and the call for governments to not only recognise but support their identity, culture 
and interests, a majority of rural residents are just as poor and vulnerable.  
 
2.9.5 The elite 
The elite are a group of individuals who endeavour to manipulate policies in which they have 
a vested interest (Stroup & Baden, 1983:23). Their contribution is crucial for the survival of 
the land expropriation trend prevalent in Africa today. It is usually easier for them to 
influence outcomes as they constitute traditional, political, economic and not unusually legal 
and military influence (Cousins, 2006:506). Such attributes make it easier to facilitate cheap 
leasing or sale of land and result in a combination of persistent self-interested groups that 
exert remarkable control over certain policies. Rights in rural Africa depend on social status 
and identity based on power relations; they are in fact politically entrenched (Cousins, 
2006:506). A common trend in Africa is for people to retain their rural land even after 
relocating to the city or even overseas. Over time urban dwellers gather enough influence to 
annex large farms from the commons, effectively making them statutory private property 
(Alden Wily, 2011b:3). Once privatised, these farms are sold off to investors without any 
regard for communal reaction. Due to improved economic status, wealthy villagers may also 
maintain larger than allowed numbers of livestock which degrades the commons to the 
detriment of the resident rural citizens. 
 
It is worth noting that the elite have been around since time immemorial as per Cox‟s 
(1985:52) assertion that customary tenure evolved with communities and there were the lords 
and peasants. Such segregation has always meant that the wealthy members can hoard more 
resources. After all, they possess the economic power to make this a reality; hence Alden 
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Wily‟s (2011c:737) assertion that capitalism only made a bad situation much worse.  The 
United Nations Human Development Report Overview (UNDP, 1998:4) adds that access 
favours the wealthy at the expense of the poor, that is, the urban residents rather than the 
rural.  
 
The elite yield greater advantage in rent-seeking opportunities afforded by foreign investment 
as seen by chiefs conveniently assuming ownership to harvest these gains. It is much to the 
poor‟s detriment when interests of the local elite and international investors converge, which 
they often do, in for example agribusiness ventures (Alden Wily, 2011c:733, 737-740). In 
short, the better off benefit from abundance of consumption while the poor languish from the 
deprivation arising from environmental damage (UNDP, 1998:4). 
 
The return of wealthier community members who migrated to cities often alters the existing 
institutional arrangements of the community (Brown & Wardwell, 1980:51-53; Falk et al., 
2003:340; Alden Wily, 2011a:41; Connell & McManus 2011:27-28). In Pakistan, for 
example, large property owners have a preference for leasing their farms to wealthy foreign 
investors as opposed to the locals (Alden Wily, 2011a:40). 
 
2.9.6 International financial organisations 
According to Porter et al. (2000:53-58), multilateral financial organisations like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and regional banks are the modern day 
tools used by former colonial masters to retain influence in the  commons. The vast financial 
resources in their possession made it easy for them to attach strict conditions to developing 
countries who were only eager to receive financial backing (Alden Wily, 2011c:739), a 
discourse which saw the least powerful countries surrender control of their financial planning 
for imposed mercantilist approaches (Shah, 2013). Shah (2013) adds that the hard-hitting 
approach of financial institutions to developing countries irreparably destroyed some 
ecosystems and indigenous communities.   
 
Reinert (2009:1-34) blames this move on the “terrible simplification” of solutions derived by 
First World countries for the developing world. There is a tendency of First World countries 
to apply diligent research and resources for domestic policy formulation but to easily impose 
abstract models to distant places like Africa. The shortfall of this approach by the First World 
governments is that they are usually so far removed from reality that imposed solutions end 
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up worsening the problems. An example is how in the 1970‟s the World Bank and its 
structural adjustment dogma drove developing countries into deeper poverty by allowing 
dispossession and therefore inducing migration to marginal lands. Environmental and social 
costs of funded projects were highly disregarded in favour of centralised capital-intensive 
projects. Peters (2007:7) affirms that up to the 1980‟s the World Bank‟s recommendation to 
borrower States was to “replace customary systems with titling and private property rights 
which were posited as necessary preconditions for modernisation and development”. 
 
In a Brazilian abstract theory imposition experience on declining fishery yields the 
government and the Banco do Brasil assumed that newer equipment would improve yield and 
introduced loans for fishermen without familiarising themselves with the strategies already in 
place. The move resulted in the elite - who by the way possessed no fishing experience - 
buying latest technology fishing equipment (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:255). The indigenous 
fishers were marginalised and conflict ensued, resulting in death and equipment losses as 
fishermen abandoned their old fishing strategies and started fighting for whatever fishing spot 
they could get.  Overharvesting ensued and the fishery was eventually abandoned. An open-
access situation was created because of sweeping reforms by the Brazilian government and 
bank that disregarded the historical de facto arrangement that was thriving before the 
invasion the same way that IMF and World Bank solutions refuse to consider local working 
arrangements.  
 
Clay and Reardon (1998:3-7) argue that had the financial agencies applied due diligence and 
measured the implications of tenure insecurity on the poor, considered the commons 
contribution to their livelihoods and the possibilities of an economically inclusive trajectory, 
the reality would be a different and positive one because they would have reached holistic 
strategies. 
 
As a legacy to the abstract approaches employed by the international financial institutions, 
countries like Botswana and Brazil incurred desertification (Porter et al., 2000:53–58). As 
recently as 2002 the IMF compelled the Malawian government to sell its excess grain so as to 
repay a debt. This happened just before a food crisis struck the country, driving 7 million 
people into hunger (Shah, 2013). 
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As it became apparent that prevailing statutory adjustment policies were not stimulating 
economic growth as acclaimed (Silungwe, 2005:38), the World Bank‟s attempt at amends 
after wreaking havoc in developing countries saw the establishment of the Global 
Environment Facility with a mandate to provide supplementary finance to projects with 
added environmental benefits. This effort was watered down by political apathy and 
environmental degradation continued. The Bank further pledged to limit funding on projects 
that could potentially devastate critical ecosystems. Internal constraints to the Global 
Environment Fund were poor staffing and financial limitations. In the end renewable 
resources and loss of biodiversity remained unlinked (Porter et al., 2000:53-58). 
 
Taking refuge in its comfort zone, the World Bank went on to fund 170 loans valued at $24 
billion for governments without commitment for significant greenhouse gas reduction. The 
projects had a collective carbon production forecast of 10 billion tons in their lifetime. The 
excuse offered for this move was that renewable energy was a relatively new field; hence 
there was a shortage of specialists (Porter et al., 2000:53-58). For its part the IMF assumed an 
indifferent stance, pleading duplication as the World Bank was already seen to be doing 
something to turn the tide. Anyway, perhaps conveniently, the IMF efforts at restitution were 
met with resistance by host governments‟ intent on maintaining the status quo. 
 
Ambivalence of the World Bank‟s dealings or in a display of its core political preferences it 
went on to fund the Indonesian government to the tune of $400 million post the 1997 – 1998 
collapse, which was as a result of distorted and corrupt policies in the first place. In the early 
stages of negotiations it seemed the bank would enforce some strict conditions that 
encouraged sustainable management of resources, but the Indonesian government reneged on 
a number of these without consequences (Porter et al., 2000:53-58). 
 
2.9.7  Conglomerates 
Well known for their reliance on their strong economic and political accreditation, 
conglomerates are significant partners in the suppression of customary tenure. They have 
vested interests in environmental regimes that they may perceive as threats to their businesses 
and they are quick to use their connections to ensure that strict environmental regimes are not 
adopted (Porter et al., 2000:71-76). 
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2.10 INTERNAL STRESSORS IN THE COMMONS 
Internally commons may be under threat as growing populations need space for residence and 
food cultivation. Immigration also puts strain on the commons as new residents are allocated 
common land to cultivate. Local chiefs, much like the Ghanaians, assume the role of absolute 
landholder to capitalise on revenue accrued by land leasing. The poor in the communities 
thus remain losers (Alden Wily, 2011a:43; 2011c:45). 
 
2.11 THE LIFE CYCLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMONS 
The advent of common property can be traced back to medieval English times (Cox, 1985: 
49). The tragedy as espoused by Garret Hardin (1968:1243-1248) was a foreign concept for 
hundreds of years while this management style flourished. Its tenets were clear regulation and 
exclusivity guided by community-derived bylaws. Rights to the commons were either as a 
prior claim or a grant by the lord in return for services. Conservation and regulation were 
strong pillars of the commons system. 
 
The institutional frameworks governing the commons were inclusive (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012:317) in that both the elite (lords) and tenants (peasants) could influence 
strategy. In Cox‟s account it is clear that continued agreement of constituents was always 
necessary for maintenance or initiation of certain trajectories. The tenants were never at the 
grace of the lords, but had equal right to share in the profits generated by the commons. 
Claims to the commons were a compulsory condition and their management and 
representatives were democratically elected and involved in the cultivation of the commons 
(Cox, 1985:45). The assembly of cultivators and the manorial court coordinated and regulated 
the seasonal activities for the whole community.  
 
To illustrate the sophistication of the commons system it is necessary to interrogate its 
principle. Commons were varied, for example, pasture, estover (the right to extract wood 
from a forest for repair of farm equipment or gates), turbary (the right to cut grass for fuel) 
and piscary (the right to fish). The right of pasture, for example, was further divided into 
common appendant and common appurtenant. The appendant was the right of villagers of the 
same community to pasture their animals in the lord‟s uncultivated land during the planting 
season. The number and type of animals they could pasture was limited, and as a check a 
villager was not allowed to pasture more animals than he could sustain in the summer, a time 
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when they were expected to use their own land and stored hay (Cox, 1985:53-55). This here 
is a check against overuse.  
 
The common appurtenant was a grant by the lord to a fellow villager or outsider (emphasis 
my own) for undisrupted use of the commons and this right was on occasion extended to 
include animals like goats and pigs. Grigsby (2004:213) refers to this as reciprocity among 
communities. This shows that, contrary to popular belief as per Hardin, the commons were 
never unrestricted just like they were never for public consumption. The communities were 
autonomous, using the manorial court and village meetings to discuss and mediate on 
matters, and where issues spread to other villages all tenants justly represented or present 
would meet and deliberate on issues. Subsequent agreements by neighbouring villages were 
recorded as village bylaws. 
 
After harvest, all commoners were allowed to pasture their livestock and collect timber and 
any other commodities that their resource could afford them. Interestingly, the commons 
were also flexible to immigration. New immigrants were afforded a yearlong probationary 
period after which they were expected to follow rules governing all inhabitants (Cox, 
1985:50-60). 
 
 
2.12 DEATH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMONS 
The English Common Law passed before the Roman invasion, which purposed that some 
natural resources should never be owned by groups of individuals (Cox, 1985:52) and the 
peasants were excluded by the elite under the guise of protecting resources from over-
extraction. Law breaking, which saw some commoners graze immigrants‟ livestock and a 
general fatigue to follow up on misdemeanours also undermined the commons. The 
Parliamentary Enclosures Act of 1770 – 1880 claimed the best land, subjected it to innovative 
agricultural methods and left the already degraded land to the poor. Some writers contend 
that the commons did not die because of innate flaws in its make-up, but because it got 
caught up in a transitional era, battling with the combined pressures of elitist land reforms, 
corruption, innovative agricultural methods and especially the  significant strain of the 
industrial revolution (Cox, 1985:59-62; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:258). 
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2.13 EVOLUTION OF THE AFRICAN COMMONS  
African commons were borne out of the tug between the European colonisers who were eager 
to diminish the native‟s right to the land and African naivety. For the Europeans, the 
primitive State of Africa reinforced mistaken beliefs that Africans were a part of nature and 
therefore incapable of self-governance. This view was catalytic in the ignorance and 
destruction of primitive systems which governed the interrelationships between nature and 
humans (Swilling & Annecke, 2012: 15). African mythical beliefs that only God owned the 
land, that their occupancy was tenantable and that those communities collectively managed 
resources opened an avenue for European exploitation (Alden Wily, 2013). This ambiguity of 
legal status, extent and power of the communal community effectively degraded customary 
tenure in the eyes of the Europeans (Cousins, 2006:502-503), who then assumed ownership 
of the land. Of the five bundles of rights identified by Ostrom (2008:3), locals were only 
given access and withdrawal rights. This move ensured that locals could sustain themselves 
without becoming a burden to their colonial masters (Cousins, 2006: 502-503). 
 
Contrary to this European preference, however, and much like the European commons that 
were destroyed prior to the scramble for Africa, Africans had governed their resources 
communally and in a sophisticated manner for decades. They were characterised by, among 
others, inclusivity and a clear distinction between individual and common property; they 
were community-based with a degree of autonomy even within the community; they were 
acquired by birth, marriage or affiliation; and their hierarchical control was marked by 
decentralised decision-making (Cousins, 2006:490-494). The inherent tie of communities and 
communal governance is perpetual, as Cox (1985:53) asserts that common property rights 
developed alongside nucleated communities. Alden Wily (2011a:5) adds that community 
composition varies by country or circumstance and ultimately by the nature of shared 
resources; hence their resilience despite the onslaught of pre- and post-colonial policies.  
 
Literature points to secure tenure before colonisation even though it was not defined by 
European terms. Land and resources were once so plentiful that people self-allocated their 
land with effective use of appropriated land as the only requirement for continued use. 
During those times land was considered vital for livelihood but of little value in itself 
(Cousins, 2006:488-510). Villages often comprising of lineages were organised in 
communities under the authority of chiefs or elders and the political and social nuances 
influenced these formations. There existed strong mythical beliefs that the land belonged to 
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the ancestors or, as Alden Wily (2013) asserts, God. Rights to land were garnered by 
marriage, birth, friendship, political and social alliances. Marriage linked families and added 
to the complexity of tenure (Alden Wily, 2011a:5). According to Cousins (2006:494), 
anthropological studies reveal that individual and communal tenure overlapped and 
coexisted. Despite the sense of security pertaining to individual rights tenure, whose delivery 
was decentralised to the familial level, this was only assured if the head of the tribe did not 
revoke it. Popular reasons for such evictions were allegations of witchcraft.  
 
 
2.13.1 The role of authority in Pre-colonial Commons 
Kgosi ke Kgosi ka morafe (A chief is a chief by the grace of the tribe) is a Tswana proverb 
that encapsulates the democracy exercised in pre-colonial commons. Traditional leaders‟ 
authority was never absolute and hence they ruled in consultation with inner councils or the 
elders. Flirtations with despotic ideas were rewarded with warnings from the inner council 
and finally desertion. This role was always being reproduced to keep pace with the times 
(Cousins, 2006:493; Alden Wily, 2011a:5).  
 
Although land was said to belong to the chiefs or traditional leaders, this ownership was not 
in the European sense and their scope was primarily limited to frontier protection, regulation 
of resource use, ensuring land fertility and mediation within and with neighbouring 
communities and land allocation was left to the villagers. In Plateau Tsonga, for example, 
men selected their sites and laid claim to that which they had cleared much like John Locke‟s 
creation of property (Cousins, 2006:493; Locke, 2003: 374-377).  
 
2.13.2 Gender marginalisation 
According to Chu (2011:35-39), gender marginalisation has only been afforded fleeting 
mentions in land tenure discussions.  In Africa, women‟s rights have always been understood 
in the broader context of a family; as a daughter or a wife (Cousins, 2006:506). However, 
prior to colonial times and land scarcity, women were free to select their own fields on the 
condition that they did not impinge on another‟s property (Cousins, 2006:507; Grigsby, 2004: 
212). They could keep these fields for life and they would only be inherited by the youngest 
son upon the woman‟s passing.  
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Colonial developments saw males being awarded higher status in issues pertaining to 
inheritance at the cost of women. Even when women had claim to land due to cultural 
reasons, these were constrained as the colonisers viewed them as a hurdle to development 
(Cousins, 2006:506). Widowed or divorced women‟s efforts to lay claim or gain access to 
land are often derailed (Grigsby, 2004:213; Alden Wily, 2011c:737). According to the FAO 
(2002:25), urban migration gives rise to socially disempowered female heads of households. 
These women are typically uneducated, widowed, single parents or wives of migrant workers 
or the elderly, rendering them ineffective in decision-making and they do not influence 
communal governance. Traditional law affords them little or no security. Any attempts to 
have their voice heard can incite conflict. Despite these obstacles the role of women in the 
provision and preparation of food for the household has not wavered (Grigsby, 2004:216). It 
has been worsened by the ever growing population. Even where men are present, food 
production still lies on the women‟s shoulders, producing up to eighty per cent of food stuffs 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. And so the sufficiency of male involvement in recent land reform 
efforts, based on the assumption that women and children are their beneficiaries, is not only 
wrong but continues to compromise women‟s rights to land as well (FAO, 2002:26). 
 
 
2.14 DEMISE OF THE AFRICAN COMMONS 
At the core of colonial rule indigenous people, particularly settler communities were allowed 
occupancy rights and not property ownership as per European norms. The belief or 
assumption that Africa was devoid of ownership prior to state-delivered entitlement driven by 
the Europeans cemented this stance, conveniently ignoring that properties were owned by 
tribes and clans, i.e. communities or villages (Alden Wily, 2011c:733; Swilling & Annecke, 
2012:11). Hunter and gatherer communities became landless by default (Monbiot, 2003:373-
374). Under this regime indigenous people were allowed to occupy and farm and all 
uncultivated land automatically acquired public or state ownership status (Alden Wily, 
2007:44). From colonial times to the present day independent States major land 
appropriations are carried through by governments. 
 
Effects of an expanding population and sophisticated agricultural advances compromised the 
natives‟ hold to the land. A growing scarcity of land, hastened by relocation of natives and 
large-scale protection of areas, further compromised tenure and brought about a 
conceptualisation of rights which saw an emergence of individualistic rights to resources. 
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Communities in land-sparse areas tried to get exclusive control of those areas and so the 
chief‟s role as the land holder was often cemented (Cousins, 2006:500-510). During this time 
natives were prohibited from selling land and communal land was off-limits as well. While 
others chose the individual tenure route, scores of Africans turned to communalism, 
especially common tribes and clans, if only as a “strength in numbers” strategy trying to hold 
on to the land while retaining some level of influence on the administrators, i.e. the chiefs, to 
ensure that personal interests were still looked after. Delimitation ensued after strengthening 
political affiliation to specific leaders and domains, unlike before when domain boundaries 
had been vague. Chiefs graduated to local administrators and their roles became increasingly 
autocratic (Cousins, 2006:500-510). 
 
In South Africa different pieces of legislation meted the assault on the indigenous people‟s 
right to the land: The first was the 1913 Land Act, which lay the foundation for segregation 
that would follow. It detailed the conditions on which natives could acquire land (Cousins, 
2006:511). Tenure security was compromised, bequeathing land limited, fixed sizes of 
property were introduced and how much land a native could be allocated was suddenly a 
prerogative of the colonial masters. Land said to be belonging to the State was used to 
accommodate resettled people. Thereafter, the Natives Administration Land Act of 1927, 
which saw the introduction of domain boundaries over which the chiefs could rule, was 
introduced. It was followed by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1952, which introduced 
authoritarian traditional regimes, eroding the checks and balances that the indigenous systems 
had kept on their leaders. Leaders soon became susceptible to corruption as they were no 
longer accountable to their subjects or inner council. Vast amounts of land were transferred to 
“self-governing territories”, which were in fact governed by the colonial masters (Cousins, 
2006:500-510).  
 
 
2.15 THE CREATION OF OPEN-ACCESS RESOURCES 
Enclosure attempts driven by theories of the hopelessness of people to self-manage only 
served to create the open-access and environmental resource degradation it sought to prevent. 
According to Ostrom (1990:1-32) it is essential that pluralistic approaches be embraced when 
dealing with complex matters such as the commons. The environment can benefit 
tremendously if the State were to treat communities as rational human beings capable of 
divorcing destructive behaviour. This is an attribute that needs not only acknowledgement but 
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one that can be enhanced by collaboration between the State and communities (Ostrom, 
1990:2). While the conventional theory favoured by the state is brilliant in predicting 
outcomes where users do not know each other,  it falls severely short  when it has to predict 
outcomes where users know each other and are able to collectively manage a resource 
sustainably to avoid overexploitation (Ostrom 1999:3).The State therefore needs to avoid the 
tendency to apply conventional theory to all commons scenarios, but should rather work on 
developing a reliable, collective action theory that would encourage emergence of resilient, 
cost-effective property rights regimes for different resources. 
 
The benefits of engaging pluralistic approaches include the gathering of reliable, on-the-
ground data which would result in custom solutions. Ostrom (1990) warns that complete 
autonomy of the commons from the state is also not an answer as communities can only 
benefit from the rich and robust resources that the State has. There is, in fact, an untapped 
opportunity for a rich scientific and indigenous knowledge exchange. Rather, local authorities 
should be empowered to achieve some autonomy and be able to preside over some matters to 
not only legitimise their role, but to avoid overburdening the State with administrative affairs 
(Ostrom 1990:1-32; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:260).  
 
When the elite and the peasantry are similarly affected by the current pattern of use and trust 
each other to keep promises that ensure sustainable management and also have considerable 
independence to self-organise without external influences, common property resources would 
be better managed (Ostrom, 1999:4). 
 
2.16 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Land tenure (reform) is a highly sensitive and complex issue that requires due diligence and a 
great deal of patience from all parties concerned. It is necessary to concede in the face of so 
much poverty and resource degradation that the legacy that many developing countries bear 
today is a direct result of centuries-old practices that entrenched constructs that can never be 
reversed overnight. That said, the very ingredients that delivered the present reality are the 
ones that can work towards a better future. There is still much need for collaboration between 
the State, the elite, local governments and international partners with a changed attitude, one 
that seeks to redress the wrongs of the past. 
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States as leaders and protectors of frontiers should be willing to thoroughly and honestly 
involve their citizens. Land tenure is certainly complex as community composition and 
therefore norms are not homogenous throughout Africa, and some countries are home to 
different tribes. Appreciation of this fact makes it necessary to treat each case (community) 
on its own merits and demerits. Much like the international financial organisations‟ abstract 
and theoretical thinking, States have been too far removed from the community commons 
they administratively owned, controlled and got massive revenue from. It is important, 
therefore, for the State to draw closer to these communities and observe so that all-
encompassing solutions can be reached (Clay & Reardon, 1998:4). The State also, by virtue 
of being custodian to various wings of government, needs to establish links within itself so 
that solutions are holistically made. Active and honest communication between ministerial 
portfolios will better inform policy than when decisions are made in isolation of other equally 
important variables in the poverty cycle and threatened livelihoods. Furthermore the State 
must be willing of itself to curtail corruption as officials may be used to getting incentives to 
ensure that deals go through.  
 
A theme that came through in this analysis is how the law was used to disenfranchise so 
many people for so long, from Europe to Asia to Africa. It is perhaps the very same law that 
is the biggest piece of the puzzle, the one factor that can be changed to assign as much vigour 
to land restitution as was given to expropriating land from the masses. While it is a relief to 
note successful indigenous land claims as recorded for Australia and Canada and their said 
positive precedents for the Ritchersveld community, much still needs to be done. The effort 
and commitment of the Tanzanian people to the land reform discourse is also welcome. 
Tanzania, through their new land provisions of 1999 fully legalised customary tenure and 
bestowed full authority on villages to govern their local areas. As such local communities 
were made custodians of their forests and the country‟s rural titling programme is the most 
advanced in the continent (Alden Wily, 2011a:8, 15, and 16). There is hope that other African 
countries will look up to these countries as they chart their own land reform endeavours.  
 
Even though countries like Tanzania and Mozambique (Alden Wily, 2011a:44) are far ahead 
of their contemporaries, it is imperative that they do not bask in this status and rest on their 
laurels. A case in point is Botswana who, despite having started on land reform as early as 
1968, still has vulnerable commons abused by the cattle ranching elite of the country. Title to 
residential and farming land is not enough for the sustenance of livelihoods. People still need 
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secure tenure in the commons. A salient point also is that it is not enough to legislate if the 
laws are not operational. So the commitment of the State calls for both the provision and 
support structure at local level for reforms to take place. It is imperative that countries adopt a 
continuous improvement approach and see this exercise not as a destination but as a journey.  
Women, children and indigenous people also need to be at the forefront in the agenda for 
land reform. Literature has shown their immense contribution in the household and the 
adversities they face with regard to land ownership. Cognisance needs to be paid to the 
changing demographic: more women are widowed as a result of HIV/AIDS; old women are 
raising their grandchildren; women are choosing to stay single; and countless divorces 
happen (FAO, 2002:26). It is time that the view of women being seen as subservient and 
acknowledged only as wives or daughters, is radically changed. They are after all heads of 
many a household and need to provide and sustain their families just as males are perceived 
to be. 
 
A paradigm shift needs to occur in the way that customary tenure is viewed. As discussed in 
this chapter, customary tenure norms evolve with communities and rural people of today are 
to some extent more modernised than those of yesteryear and closer scrutiny would reflect 
this. Customary tenure needs recognition as an independent landholding system with 
partaking communities afforded the same respect on their resource as the individual or 
company that owns land through titling. 
 
It is necessary that the State and the elite are willing to abandon the extractive economics and 
their heavy reliance on disenfranchising legions of poor people for the benefit of a few. They 
must be willing to start on a different trajectory, one that includes all sectors of the country in 
the economy. Although this may mean reduced revenue to the State and elite, it would serve 
countries well in the long term. And starting on this new trajectory does not have to be a 
radical thing, but rather gradual, with an awareness of the complexity and sensitivity that land 
tenure presents (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012:318, 333).  
 
There still remains a shortfall in the laxity of international law application at local levels. 
Perhaps it can be entrenched by raising the regional voice. Africa, for example, has the 
African Union and for the southern countries the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), organisations which can be used to lobby for improved tenure reforms across the 
region. 
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2.17 SUMMARY 
This chapter has defined the commons and the parties that have a vested interest in them with 
regard to Sub-Saharan Africa. The bundles of rights that exist within a commons and the 
implications for the different groups of holders were also explored. The commons were also 
illustrated as the cornerstone of livelihood sustenance for the poor. 
 
The dual tenures, i.e. formal title and the informal customary norms, and how this duality was 
first created by the combined forces of conniving colonial masters and the gullibility of 
Africans and later encouraged by independent governments to continue benefitting as their 
predecessors, the colonialists, had, was reflected on. 
 
To demonstrate the complexity and politicisation of environmental affairs with regard to 
common property rights and land tenure systems, the State, elites, law (international and 
local), international financial organisations, conglomerates and communities, who all have a 
vested interest in the governance of the commons, were discussed, with the conclusion that it 
is perhaps the combined efforts of this contingent that could turn the tide towards sustainable 
and sound environmental management. 
 
It is also important to concede that it is not just external forces that threaten the integrity of 
the commons. Internal disputes can also wreak havoc; hence collaboration between the 
government and local communities would be a more viable option towards sustainable 
management of resources. Accordingly, the section traced the assault on the commons from 
Europe to Africa. The common method to emerge was the declaration of vast resources as 
idle, then designating them public or state-owned resources and then leasing them to foreign 
businesses or the elite. It also highlighted that the elite is not necessarily locally resident as 
some reside in overseas countries, but maintain ownership of resources in their home 
countries. They independently lease their resources to the highest bidders in favour of 
personal profits. While all these forces are at play, the commons are inadvertently turned into 
open-access resources, a trend sustained by the misinformed observations by external entities 
that are quick to impose abstract solutions. 
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The following chapter traces the land tenure of Swaziland since the State formation in the 
1870s to present times with special reference to how the reform has always favoured the elite. 
The composition of the Swazi elite, the royal family, is also scrutinised, as are specific issues 
relating to gender marginalisation, conflicts and some examples on how livelihoods of the 
poor are continually marginalised in favour of the wealthy few. The laws which the Swazi 
government employs to embed such inequality are explored and lastly the status of land 
reform in the country. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LAND 
TENURE IN SWAZILAND 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter is an overview of Swaziland land relations from its advent as a State to present 
times. The special focus is on land and land relations in the country. As present-day land 
relations are a result of past events, notably colonisation and independence, it is imperative 
that this narrative looks back at the policies surrounding those events. First the commons in 
the Swazi context are discussed together with land tenure. The roles of the State (past and 
present) and the applicable institutions, the land laws of the country, the oligarchy at the 
north and the southern issues of poverty and compromised livelihoods, conflicts and on-going 
gender marginalisation are explored. Attempts and status of land reforms are also discussed. 
 
 
3.2 LOCATION 
Swaziland is a tiny kingdom landlocked by the expansive Mozambique and South Africa 
(Lankford, 2007:7). It is home to about 1 419 623 people, growing at a 1,17 per cent rate 
since July 2013. Its geographic coordinates are 26 30 S, 31 30 E. With a total land area of 17 
364 square kilometres (land 17 204 square kilometres, water 160 square kilometres) it is 
mostly hilly and slightly slanting, offering a scenic view to the nature enthusiast. It is a 
monarchy with an administrative capital in Mbabane. Lobamba serves as the royal and 
legislative capital. The country‟s urban population is 21,2 per cent, with a 1,19 per cent 
“annual rate of change (2010–15 estimates.)”, leaving 78,8 per cent in the rural areas. About 
10,08 per cent of the total land area is good for crop cultivation (Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), 2014).  
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Figure 3.1: Map of Swaziland 
Source:  CIA (2014) 
 
3.3 THE SWAZI ENVIRONMENT  
Swaziland boasts a varied and vibrant ecosystem necessary for game and livestock survival 
(Tefera, Dlamini & Dlamini, 2009:675) with 32 per cent of the total land area covered by 
forests, although they are visibly thinning as an effect of growing livestock and people 
dependent on them for survival (African Development Bank, 2013: 10). A large proportion of 
Swazis rely on subsistence agriculture (Vandome, Vines & Weimer, 2013:1).  
 
Like the rest of the world, Swaziland‟s deteriorating environment caused the government to 
take a bolder stance to protect what is left. The alarming rate of invasive weed encroachment, 
soil erosion, inadequate potable water supply, loss of biodiversity due to extreme hunting and 
overgrazing, and thinning forests point to inappropriate and poor land use (Swaziland 
Environment Authority: Swaziland Report to the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
Report (SD WSSD), 2002:14; CIA, 2014). 
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Since 2006 Swaziland has been an active player in the sustainability arena. To date she is a 
signatory to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) (1973); the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Waste and their Disposal (Basel Convention) (1989); Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 1992, and the Convention to Combat Desertification (1994) (Bray, 2006:527-548). 
 
 
3.4 COMMON RESOURCES IN SWAZILAND 
In Swaziland commons are primarily unallocated land within the Swazi Nation Land (SNL), 
where all community members can extract fuel wood, poles, special grasses, herbs and some 
wild fruits (Stringer, Twyman & Thomas, 2007:388). Chiefs allocate the rest of the land to 
residents on behalf of the King for domestic purposes (Irin News, 2013). Due to the 
peculiarity of the SNL being owned by the King and not the people, the SNL is understood as 
a commons of itself. For example, individual cropping lands are open to all livestock owners 
to graze their cattle and enclosure ensues during the ploughing season, a period where 
livestock is again set on communal rangelands (Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:301; Irin News, 
2012).  
 
The commons have always been treated in a conservatory manner. Traditional conservation 
mechanisms include specified game hunting periods outside which people can be persecuted.  
There is occasional relaxation of pasturing land to allow natural restoration and seasonal 
consumption of certain grasses such as those meant to make sleeping mats (Whelpton, 
2005:154). While these strategies have sustained the Swazi environment for decades, the 
effects of a growing population on the environment can no longer be ignored. The commons 
is presently accountable for 81 per cent of livestock (Mkhabela, 2006:59).  Land has shrunk 
considerably since independence (van Waveren 2007:192-195), as demands for residential 
land mount and by extension reduce cultivable land. The situation is so dire that some 
communities are already saturated while others are approaching the same tragedy. It is 
against this background that several groups and scholars have called for a standardisation of 
customary law, especially with regard to land tenure and tenure security to better meet the 
needs of a growing population in a strained environment. Monadjem and Nkosi (2001:16) 
add that Swaziland is grappling with how to include the rural poor on activities that can lift 
them from poverty and promote sustainable development despite the rising population. The 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2007: 4), van Waveren (2007: 
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195), Dlamini and Masuku (2011:302), and United Nations (2012) make a case for secure 
tenure charging, that it would encourage cautious resource consumption as owners would be 
vested to resource longevity and improvement of their own livelihoods. Additionally, 
ownership comes with the benefit of using land as collateral as people exit the vicious cycle 
of poverty. 
 
 
3.5 SWAZI LAND TENURE 
The history of Swazi land tenure dates back to the 1870s (Mndzebele, 2001:1; Mabuza et al., 
2012:71) when most African countries were colonised. Land in Swaziland is broadly 
classified into three categories. Firstly title deed land (TDL), which constitutes about 25 per 
cent of the land, is bought and independently owned. Secondly, crown land, constituting 
about 0.4 per cent, is reserved for government national infrastructural purposes and, thirdly, 
SNL constitutes about 74 per cent. This portion is held in trust by the King of Swaziland 
(Scott, 2006:168; Lankford, 2007:11; Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:301). 
 
Swazi Nation Land is further subdivided into three categories: about 7 per cent is chartered 
by big companies for agricultural business and forestry, 12 per cent was allocated to MOAC 
and SNTC for cattle ranching and conservation respectively and about 50 per cent of SNL is 
customary and predominantly accommodates rural dwellers. Citizens are either bequeathed or 
acquire this land by pledging allegiance to a chief and the inner council in a process called 
kukhonta (Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:301). On succession of this system the new community 
member is allocated land for utility purposes – to build a house, farm, bury their family and 
bequeath to their family – but they cannot sell or lease or mortgage this property as they do 
not principally own it. Van Waveren (2007:190) states that the traditional land allocation 
process is informed by the Swazi Settlement Act of 1950 – amended in 1979 – in conjunction 
with the Central Rural Development Board (CRDB) and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (MOAC) as advisors, with the clear mandate to principally allocate land for 
agricultural purposes. 
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3.6 STAKEHOLDERS IN THE SWAZILAND ENVIRONMENTAL ARENA 
The following stakeholders are of major interest to the study: 
1. The Swaziland National Trust Commission (SNTC), a parastatal established by the 
National Trust Commission Act of 1972, amended in 1973, whose mandate is to 
conserve national and cultural heritage. Under its auspices are the museums, 
monuments, parks and reserves. It is also responsible for environmental awareness 
and education to the public. 
2. The Swaziland Environment Authority (SEA), instituted by the Swaziland 
Environment Act of 1992, is the overarching arm of government in overseeing sound 
environmental practices, especially with regard to development in the country. It 
monitors trends in environmental activity, advice on environmental issues and is the 
authority on environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in the country. 
3. The MOAC, through its forestry portfolio, has a mandate to conserve forests while 
ensuring optimal yield from the forestry industry. Together with the CRDB this 
ministry also advises on land allocation in Swaziland (Monadjem & Nkosi, 2001:40-
41). 
4. The Yonge Nawe (You too must preserve) Environmental Action Group, the oldest 
and most visible environmental advocacy group in the country, was established in 
1987 and campaigns for sound environmental management of resources. The vision of 
the organization is to realize a Swazi society that not only values the environment, but 
uses the available natural resources sustainably so that all citizens enjoy a good 
quality of life. The group also represents the poor in environmental and socio-
economic justice issues (Friends of the Earth International, 2014). 
5. The University of Swaziland whose vision is to encourage scientific advancement and 
sustainable development through excellent research (University of Swaziland, 2014).  
 
 
3.7 GOVERNANCE IN SWAZILAND  
Swaziland has a dual legal system. Roman-Dutch Law was inherited from colonial masters 
and is responsible for TDL management through the Deeds Registry. Customary law 
administers customary land through chiefs on behalf of the King and is indigenous (United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), 2001-2005: 7; Whelpton, 2005: 
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146; Mkhabela, 2006: 59; Bray, 2006: 528; Scott, 2006: 153; Lankford, 2007:11; Dlamini & 
Masuku, 2011:301; Irin News, 2013; African Development Bank, 2013:2; Dlamini–
Ndwandwe, 2013:332). Customary law of itself is complicated and mired by ambiguous 
tenure rights (Dlamini & Masuku, 2011: 302). Surprisingly this known weakness in tenure 
does little to weaken the resolve of patriotic Swazis who strongly believe that the current 
system is a necessary condition for accord (Whelpton, 2005:157; Scott, 2006:157; 
Wooderson, 2013). Therefore, reasons for such steadfastness must not be blamed on 
ignorance or blind loyalty (Rose, 1993:235). The adage that the devil you know is much 
better than the angel you have never met aptly encapsulates the Swazi view to the matter.  
The duality of law hampers progress in many ways; not least the turnaround for new laws, as 
extensive consultation between modern and customary laws is mandatory. In Swaziland, 
unlike in other (constitutional) monarchies, legislation requires royal assent, making it a 
ruling tool (Vandome et al., 2013:3). For international environmental laws to be enforceable 
in the country they first have to be ratified and made into local statues and bylaws. Despite 
being a signatory to international conventions, this step has not happened in Swaziland partly 
due to lack of infrastructure and the undeniable political indifference (Bray, 2006:527-548). 
 
3.7.1 Land Governance – the King 
The land is vested in the King in trust of the nation (Scott, 2006:156; van Waveren, 2007: 
189; Irin News, 2012; Dlamini–Ndwandwe, 2013:332). It buttresses his rule in the country 
and he imposes his authority through the chieftain system in the rural areas where 70 per cent 
of the population reside. In short, land sustains the King‟s power (Cousins, 2006:493; Irin 
News 2012).  
 
His Majesty, King Mswati III, the legally immune and supreme Swazi citizen, is the State. He 
is the head of the judiciary, legislative and executive arms of government, an absolute 
monarch (Bray, 2006:528; Irin News, 2011; Vandome et al., 2013:28; Wooderson, 2013; 
Halvorssen & Gladstein, 2014). He appoints ten of the seventy five House of Assembly 
members. The House of Senate, invariably the more powerful of the two houses, gets twenty 
royal appointments of the thirty members. He no longer rules by decree as his father, King 
Sobhuza II, had done since just after independence (African Development Bank, 2013:2; 
Vandome et al., 2013:2). 
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He duly appoints chiefs to manage the land on his behalf (Sithole, 2013: 100) and people can 
acquire land by birth or the khonta system. A married male swears allegiance to a chief and is 
granted domestic land and a patch for farming. The land recipient is then expected to show 
his allegiance by performing duties, kuhlehla. This lifelong commitment of servicing the 
newly acquired user rights means demonstrating utmost respect for the host chief at the local 
level and ultimately to the King. Typical kuhlehla activities include but are not limited to 
attending local meetings, donating towards activities organised by the chiefdom, tilling the 
chief‟s land on request and attendance to national duties like Incwala. Individuals who are 
diligent with kuhlehla endear themselves to the traditional court and may receive preferential 
treatment as a result (Scott, 2006:156; Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:301; Mabuza et al., 
2012:73). 
 
3.7.2 Chiefs 
Land is very important to Swazis for subsistence, cultural and ritual reasons, no matter that 
they only access it as tenants, never as owners, as it all (including minerals) belongs to the 
King, as enshrined in the Constitution (Whelpton, 2005:154; The Constitution of The 
Kingdom of Swaziland (2005); Dlamini–Ndwandwe, 2013:332). As Simelane (2012:234) 
asserts, land is not only a productive resource but it is also preferred credit collateral and a 
provisional investment tool.  
 
Chiefs are fitting right-hand men for the King as they have controlled access to him through 
the Swaziland National Council (SNC) (Vandome et al., 2013:4). They allocate residential 
and farming land to subjects on behalf of the King in exchange for sworn allegiance 
(kukhonta) to themselves and to the King. By virtue of being of noble descent royals usually 
receive vast allocations through the khonta system (Whelpton, 2005:150). 
 
Of his own prerogative a chief can expel persons perceived to be troublesome within the 
community. Rampant infidelity, sorcery allegations, murder or theft are reasons that could 
qualify one for banishment. A man may also be expelled as a result of his spouse or 
offspring‟s wrongdoing (Mkhabela, 2006:62; Scott, 2006:156; Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:301; 
Irin News, 2011; 2012; Mabuza et al., 2012:72). Chiefs also act as arbitrators in dispute 
settlement (Irin News, 2012). The chief may also adjust the original allotment made to a 
family to make way for public need. It is through these activities that chiefs command 
significant influence within their communities and among their peers. Chiefs in charge of 
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places closer to urban areas or endowed with fertile soil have more influence as they attract 
wealthier constituents who lavish them with gifts. Conversely chiefs in deeply rural, infertile 
areas are held in lower stature (Mkhabela, 2006:62). In all settings, the general public‟s 
influence is minimal as the views of chiefs and inner council take precedence (van Waveren, 
2007:192-195).  
 
 
3.7.3 The People 
Swaziland is a mono-ethnic country with two official languages, siSwati and English 
(Lankford, 2007:7). This feature provides for commendable cohesion in the country. 
However, when it comes to land affairs the general public often gets the short end of the stick 
through lack of representation in issues that directly affect them. For example, communities 
at the periphery of protected areas are inadequately consulted (Monadjem & Nkosi, 2001:57, 
59, 60). The same marginalisation occurs when chiefs allocate land of their own accord and 
communities remain mute on the rate of new residents. In and of itself this is a double-edged 
sword because on one part there are financial incentives that the chiefs get to keep for 
allocating land and on the other part all people do need a space to live in (van Waveren, 
2007:192-195). Communities are also marginalised, firstly by being tenanted and secondly by 
not partaking in inherent worth of their communities.  
 
 
3.8 THE SWAZI GEOGRAPHY 
Four administrative regions make up the country, namely Hhohho, Shiselweni, Manzini and 
Lubombo. A further classification by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) 
(2014) gives an insight into the country‟s four agro-ecological zones.  
 
The Lowveld covers 6 416.2 square kilometres and is a semiarid climate with a 
predisposition for droughts (IFAD, 2007:3; Tefera, et al., 2009:676; Terry, 2012:13; African 
Development Bank, 2013:9). About 24 per cent of the Swazi population reside in this region. 
UNDAF (2001-2005: 6) reports that this area was hit with a prolonged famine from 1994 to 
1996 and that current overgrazing worsens the problem. Crops that grow well in this region 
are cotton, citrus fruits and irrigated sugar cane (Lankford, 2007:4). Maize, which is a staple 
food for the country, is not suitable for this region as it is dry, but people continue to plant it 
as a mechanism to hold on to the land or risk losing it through expropriation (Dlamini & 
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Masuku, 2011:302; Irin News, 2013). As the population increases, the demand for land grows 
(Irin News, 2012).  
 
Conducive to most crops is the Highveld covering the western parts of the country with a 
total area of 5 029.5 square kilometres. However, high rainfalls often lead to nutrient 
leaching. Soil infertility and soil acidity are prevalent challenges. This part of the country 
accommodates about 31 per cent of the Swazi population (Mkhabela, 2006:58). The 
Middleveld, accommodating approximately 41 per cent of the total population, is a 
subtropical region characterised by a mixed veld on which inedible and edible grass species 
grow. Its total area is 1 606.1 square kilometres. According to Dlamini and Masuku 
(2011:302), the Middleveld produces the highest maize yields although harvests have been 
declining steadily since 2001 due to unstable weather conditions and change in land use.   
The Lubombo Plateau is in the northern parts of the country and accommodates only about 4 
per cent of the Swazi population. It is particularly conducive to maize, and root vegetables 
like sweet potatoes and cassava. Its expanse is 1 312.2 square kilometres (MOAC, 2014). 
 
 
3.9 THE HISTORY OF THE SWAZI STATE FORMATION 
As previously alluded to, the present land trajectory is as a result of a combination of history, 
custom and tradition (Swaziland Environment Authority: Swaziland National Report to the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (SD WSSD), 2002:11). Mabuza et al. (2012: 72) 
assert that the present tenure has been shaped by events dating back as far as 1875. This 
section traces the Swazi State formation with special reference to King Mswati II, the father 
of the nation; Mbandzeni, the king who unintentionally leased all Swazi land; Queen Regent 
Labotsibeni, the formidable regent who fought for the return of Swazi land; King Sobhuza II, 
the charismatic leader who fought for native land on the one hand and put the solid 
foundations of oligarchy on the other, and lastly the current king, His Majesty, King Mswati 
III, who enjoys the fruits of his predecessors‟ labour. 
 
In about 1750, the Ngwane temporarily settled in Maputo under the auspices of the Dlamini 
clan. Ngwane is the alternate name for the Swazi. It is homage to the nations‟ first ruler who 
led the nation from 1745 to 1780 (Gillis, 1999:11-12; Archontology Organisation, 2011; 
SNTC, 2014). Conflict between the Ngwane and the Maputo natives provoked a trek that had 
the nation settling in the northern parts of the Zulu kingdom for just over half a century 
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(1750-1810). The formidable Zulu strength was unmatched by the Ngwane, who again 
migrated and finally settled in modern-day Swaziland between 1810 and 1820. This time the 
Ngwane had the upper hand and effectively consolidated established resident chiefdoms into 
the Swazi nation (US Department of State, 2014).  
 
3.9.1 Mswati II’s Reign 
Mswati II, the nation‟s namesake, expanded the Swazi nation territory by leaps and bounds, 
stretching through the north-west and finally stabilising the south with the Zulus. He enlisted 
the aid of the British against sporadic Zulu raids, which was earlier explained to be a 
powerful nation. It was during these times that some white settlers made Swaziland home. 
After Mswati‟s demise the Swazis went on to negotiate and reach agreements with the British 
on issues such as self-governance, European rights to local resources, safety and 
governmental control. As a result of these agreements South Africa temporarily assumed 
control of Swazi interests for about 8 years (1894–1902) before handing over to the British 
(US Department of State, 2014). 
 
3.9.2 Mbandzeni’s Reign 
According to Rose (2003:126) and Simelane (2012:235) Mbandzeni leased almost all the 
country‟s natural resources to Europeans in a bid to safeguard independence and at the same 
time appease the Europeans in return for support in keeping the ever strong Zulu army at bay. 
Unbeknownst to him the concessions were later converted to freehold title through the Land 
Partition Act of 1907 (Youé, 1986: 46).  The Europeans would later label Mbandzeni a weak 
leader who sold out his people for alcohol. Of course this description is void of the known 
differences between European and customary tenure and the responsibility of the Europeans 
in tricking the then paramount chief into so much loss. They (the Europeans) exploited the 
strong belief of natives that land is not ownable, save by the community (Alden Wily, 2013) 
and the introduction of the Land Partition Act of 1907 forced the King to confront the 
consequences of his retrospectively hasty and ignorant decisions. A 1907 meeting legalised 
(by Europeans norms) the land grab on condition that sacred areas like burial caves and 
graves, and the royal kraals would not be affected (Whelpton, 2005:153). By the end of the 
partitioning between European freehold and native reserves, overseen by appointed Special 
Commissioner George Grey (Simelane, 2012:235-236; Mkhabela, 2006:62; Dlamini–
Ndwandwe, 2013:332), Swazis were given just over a third of the total land with a grace 
period of five years to vacate the European land and move into the designated reserves, then 
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called Swazi Areas (Youé, 1986:57). The term Swazi Areas eventually fell away in favour of 
Swazi Nation Land (Whelpton, 2005:147). According to Simelane (2012:236) this exercise 
immediately rendered 20 000 Swazis landless while the rest were jam-packed in the newly 
established areas. He notes that although the land struggle would remain a contentious issue 
even after the independence of 1968, the control of the SNL gave prominence to the 
monarchy and chiefs.   
 
3.9.3 The Queen Regent Labotsibeni 
Queen Regent Labotsibeni came to the fore of Swazi State making when her son, King 
Bhunu, died suddenly while the heir apparent, King Sobhuza II, was still a little boy (Youé, 
1986:46-47). Before his grandson‟s ascension to the throne the Queen Regent had already 
gotten the ball rolling to recover lost land. As early as 1914 the Queen Regent had devised a 
plan urging Swazi men to seek the employ of South African mines so they could contribute 
an annual £5 to set up the land recovery fund. To prove her commitment she made a personal 
contribution to increase the value of the fund. The 1913 Union Native Land Act, banning 
Swazis to buy land outside the demarcated reserves (without the resident commissioner‟s 
approval), had only served to strengthen her resolve (Youé, 1986:55-71). 
 
In 1915 a proclamation was passed that native land purchases were for national purposes. The 
provisions of this proclamation did not include a need to give title deeds and Swazis were 
given a worthless document as proof of purchase. This led to protests from the natives, 
demanding a better form of ownership and the phrase “vested in the (then) Paramount Chief 
in trust of the Nation” was coined (Youé, 1986: 67-68; Dlamini–Ndwandwe, 2013: 332). 
 
3.9.4 King Sobhuza II’s Reign  
When Sobhuza officially assumed the throne in 1921, the resident high commissioner had 
taken it for granted that the young king would abide by the provisions of the Land 
(Concession) Partition Act of 1907. This proved to be a wrong assumption because the king 
pursued the subject of returning lost land with ardour. Barely four years into his reign he 
challenged and lost a bid to overturn the Unallotted Land Concession of 1907, owned by one 
Allister Miller, at the Special Court of Swaziland. Undeterred he appealed this judgement at 
the Privy Council where his bid endured another defeat on the grounds that the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act of 1890, through which concessionaries were made, was unchallengeable.  
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In 1940, on request of King Sobhuza, the British gave Swaziland £190 000, which he used to 
establish the Inheritance Fund (Lifa), the purpose of which was to recover land from the 
concessionaries (Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:302). The fund resulted in 101 171.5 hectares of 
land being regained by the Swazis so that by 1960 they owned about 52 per cent of the land. 
Crown land was about 2 per cent and the rest, 46 per cent, was still under European 
ownership (Youé, 1986:69). 
 
The journey to Swazi independence from the British began in 1944. In preparation for 
democratic elections King Sobhuza spearheaded the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM), 
a traditionalist political group. It contested and won all parliamentary seats in the 1964 
elections which were scheduled by the colonial government (Vandome et al., 2013:1). 
Swaziland was granted independence on 6 September 1968 (Coppock, Forte, Ncube, Ooka, 
Richards & Vyas, n.d.:2).  
 
Between 16 and 17 May 1972 Swaziland had her maiden post-independence elections. The 
INM once again achieved a landslide victory, securing 21 of the 24 National Assembly seats. 
The rest (3) went to the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) and this victory, 
although negligible, was enough to incite paranoia in the King. The intellect of the NNLC, 
who desired that the monarchy be run in a constitutional manner, threatened him (Freedom 
House Report, 2013:12). Questions about the validity of the citizenship of one of the NNLC 
leaders (Zwane) saw the King declare a state of emergency in the country (Lodge, Kadima & 
Pottie, 2002:38). Zwane was eventually exiled and only welcomed back on the condition that 
he would refrain from politics. This move neutralised the NNLC threat and Sobhuza 
concentrated on endearing himself to his subjects, leaning on his natural charisma and the 
personality cult that embodied him.  
 
On 12 April 1973 the democratic parliament was dissolved (Stringer et al., 2007:388; 
Wooderson, 2013). As conditions of this dissolution three decrees were passed. The first was 
a 60-day detention decree to imprison people seen to propagate dissent in the country and the 
second was the kukhonta decree, which became a norm for citizenship. This move effectively 
separated the Swazis of Swaziland from those of neighbouring South Africa and 
simultaneously increased tenure insecurity for marginal people. The third decree saw the 
King assume all legislative, judiciary and executive power, essentially running the country in 
consultation with the cabinet (EISA, 2008). 
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In September of the same year (1973) Sobhuza commissioned a Constitutional Board which 
later upheld the 1978 Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland Kings-Order-In-Council 
(Vandome et al., 2013:3). This document was actually the 1973 suspended constitution save 
for six important changes listed below. 
1. Political parties remained banned. 
2. The King had new powers to appoint members of the House of Assembly. The current 
King appoints 10 of the 76 members of the House of Assembly. Sixty five are elected 
through the national elections. For the more powerful House of Senate he appoints 20 
and 10 are chosen by the House of Assembly in secret ballot (Vandome et al., 2013:3; 
African Development Bank, 2013:2). 
3. Introduction of the tinkhundla (constituency) level voters who would elect (the 65) 
members to the larger House of Assembly. Members of this House elect members to 
the smaller and more powerful House of Senate amongst themselves.  An inkhundla is 
a traditional meeting place typically accommodating about 10 chiefdoms. In this 
forum local matters are deliberated on (Swaziland Environment Authority: SD WSSD 
Report, 2002:12). 
4. The electoral committee overseeing all these processes were to be handpicked by the 
King.  
5. Candidates would be evaluated by the King. 
6. Campaigning was banned. 
 
As a result of all of these measures the King‟s supremacy over Swaziland was consolidated 
(EISA, 2008). Six years to this date he convened a new parliament largely appointed by 
himself and through an indirect election (US Department of State, 2014). This would set 
precedent on the Swazi political scene and perhaps set the foundation for the despotism 
evident in his son‟s rule. Efforts to improve rural livelihoods through commercialised 
farming by the Rural Development Areas Programme established in 1970 were futile, despite 
receiving funding from the British and the World Bank among others (EISA, 2008).  
On his death in August 1982, after a 61 year reign, Queen Regent Dzeliwe ruled the country 
in lieu of her grandson, Makhosetive, who ascended to the throne on April 25 1986 (US 
Department of State, 2014). On ascent to the throne he quickly abolished the Liqoqo, a 16 
member council which was responsible for crowning him as king (EISA, 2008). 
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3.10 THE LAND LAWS OF SWAZILAND 
The land laws of Swaziland are derived principally from the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Swaziland, 2005; statutory law as set by the King‟s decrees and Acts of Parliament; case law; 
customary law and Roman Dutch law (Scott, 2006:152). Alden Wily and Mbaya (2001:29) 
give the following list of land-related laws of Swaziland: 
1. Forests Preservation Act, No.14 of 1910, which stipulates the conditions for the 
preservation of trees and forest in designated Crown Land and SNL as per the 
Concessions Partition Act. It prohibits harvesting of indigenous or state timber 
without permission from the relevant minister. A 27.432 metres distance separating 
land and forests is also imposed. Collecting wood for fuel is allowed.  
2. Crown Lands Disposal Act, No.13 of 1911. It provides for permits, chartering and any 
other clearance of Crown Land. 
3. Native Administration Act, No.79 of 1950. This Act is so scant in its provisions that 
personal interpretation often takes precedence (Rose, 2003:127). 
4. Swazi Courts Act, No.80 of 1950. This act was set up for the administration of Swazi 
courts; yet it does not preside over customary land areas as may be expected (Rose, 
2003:130). 
5. Private Forests Act, No.3 of 1951. It stipulates the permissions that people should 
seek first, before clearing or cultivating a private forest. It also caters for minors by 
pronouncing that guardians and parents of children found to have committed an 
offence will be held equally liable. 
6. Marriage Act, No.47 of 1964. As one of the contentious pieces of legislation in the 
gender bias argument, Part V, Section 24, of this act articulates that marriage power in 
Swaziland belongs to the male spouse and confers Swazi law and custom as the 
governor of proprietary rights in the union for marriages solemnised in Swaziland 
(Scott, 2006: 159).  
7. Natural Resources Act, No.71 of 1951. It established the Natural Resources Board 
and vests all mineral rights in the King. It also provides for the conservation and 
improvement of natural resources outside of designated Swazi areas. 
8. Land Concession Order, No.15 of 1973. This is the Kings-Order-In-Council which 
provides for all concession land to be vested in the King and prohibits any conversion 
of concession land into freehold title (Vandome et al., 2013:3). 
9. Deeds Registry Act, No.37 of 1968. In combination with the Marriage Act, these 
legislations marginalise women. Section 16 articulates that women married in 
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community of property cannot have joint property registered in their names save for 
personal inheritance or donation. With regard to those married out of community of 
property or out of the country the law still requires that the husband assists the wife in 
any deed-related activities. The prerogative of deciding whether such assistance is 
necessary rests with the Registrar of Deeds. 
10. Land Speculation Control Act, No.8 of 1972. It regulates land transactions among 
non-Swazis. 
11. Farm Dwellers Control Act, No.12 of 1982. This act specifies the rights of farm 
tenants and the conditions of their tenancy. It also outlines restrictions upon their 
eviction and provision for legal redress between themselves and their landlords, the 
farm owners (Mkhabela, 2006: 63). 
12. Draft National Land Policy 1999. This policy was meant to chart the way forward 
with regard to the interface of the dual land systems in the country, enhanced land 
access and land tenure especially where gender equality is concerned (Mkhabela, 
2006: 63).. This did not happen as the policy never got the customary assent it 
required and it therefore remains in an indeterminate state.  
13. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act, No.001 of 2005. 
 
 
3.11 THE SWAZI OLIGARCHY  
The first parliamentary portfolio immediately after independence was a poster for the elite. 
With a prince as the prime minister, a white finance minister (to allay investor fears and 
represent settler interests), aristocrats and professionals, the Swazi government projected a 
conspicuous absence of middle- and working-class representation. Moreover, industry 
interests were protected by the ironclad control on unionism in the country (EISA, 2008). 
Elitism has always been embedded in the royal quest for the state emancipation from former 
colonisers. Notably, the independence campaign was always on the basis of autonomy within 
the constructs of imperialism, not divorced from it (Youé, 1986:72; Stinger et al., 2007:388). 
Land was long identified as the ripe political tool for peasant coercion and control (Simelane, 
2012:249); hence “the ritual power of the sovereign and structure of clan hierarchy remain 
intact” Youé (1986:74). Although land recovery was commendable, it was conveniently 
funded by a population who would never benefit from the fruits of its labour. An illustration 
of early entitlement is seen in the 1916 decision to send a young Sobhuza and offspring of 
Induna‟s to school funded by the Swaziland National Fund. This fund was meant for all 
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Swazis. A notable thing is how the Queen Regent‟s son – Malunge – vetoed the suggestion 
that his mother contribute as the ruler, and suggested that Swazi men be benefactors of that 
fund instead (Youé, 1986:69-70).  
 
In 1968 King Sobhuza II established the autonomous Tibiyo Taka Ngwane by Royal Charter 
for the sole purpose of development stimulation in the young democracy. Forces to be 
reckoned with, Tibiyo and its sister company Tisuka Taka Ngwane not only conduct national 
business, but have invested heavily in private businesses as well ( Lankford, 2007:7; Mabuza, 
et. al., 2012:72). According to the Tibiyo website it holds shares in the agricultural sector (a 
collective 93.1 per cent between the two sugar companies in the country, the Royal 
Swaziland Sugar Corporation (53.1%) and Ubombo Sugar Limited (40%)). People were 
dispossessed of land without reparation to make way for these flourishing sugar estates 
(Freedom House, 2013:16). Tibiyo Taka Ngwane is also a player in the property market and 
wholly owns the Ezulwini Valley Hotel and a number of other upmarket buildings with 
varied share options. Media, through whole ownership of the alternative newspaper, The 
Swazi Observer, is also in their portfolio together with the whole ownership of the Jubilee 
Printing Company (Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, 2014). 
 
Tibiyo‟s success would be a good story to tell if it continued to serve the Swazi nation at 
large, but alas, its beneficiaries are only the aristocrats (Irin News, 2008). By virtue of being 
adequately resourced, it annihilates competition from underresourced would-be entrepreneurs 
(Freedom House, 2013: 10). The Swazi elite, about 10 per cent of the population, is 
accountable for more than half of the country‟s consumption and the inequality gap is getting 
wider (Simelane, 2012:240; Freedom House 2013: 10; IFAD, 2007:1-4). Just 15 years into 
independence Tibiyo Taka Ngwane already owned 23 per cent of the 60 per cent SNL (EISA, 
2008). 
 
 
3.12  PERVERTED SPENDING 
In 2003 the King Mswati III constructed five new palaces for his wives at the tune of $4 
million. Initial reports claim that he had requested $15 million of public funds to construct a 
palace for each of his then thirteen wives, but the coffers could only afford the eventual $4 
million (Clarke, 2011). According to Irin News (2004a) this expenditure was amid an 
earmarked $20 million for construction of luxury homes of the King‟s aunts and his 
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stepmothers. This was in the face of the country experiencing a terrible drought season that 
led to the National Disaster Relief Task Force chairperson, Dr Ben Nsibandze, 
recommending that the situation be declared a national crisis by the government. His call was 
eventually heeded when the then Prime Minister, the Honourable Themba Dlamini, declared 
a national emergency in February 2004. He cited the scourge that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
chronic poverty and nature caused as reasons for this sad state of affairs. The banned political 
parties were not as diplomatic in their response and pointed at the double-edged sword of a 
feudal land distribution which entrenched impoverishment to the masses while giving more 
power to the monarchy, a deficient HIV/AIDS policy and general government negligence as 
the real reasons the country found itself at such a trajectory (Irin News, 2004b). 
 
According to Agence France-Presse News (2014) the 2014 budget for the Swazi King stands 
at $61 million and it is responsible for his salary, the Queen Mother‟s maintenance and 
remuneration of royal aids. This figure is said to also cater for $12 million in respect of 
outstanding construction work on palaces. The country‟s 2014/15 budget was projected at 
15.3 billion Emalangeni (equivalent to the South African Rand) and was funded as follows; 
49 per cent would be from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); about 36.6 percent 
came from unspecified non-SACU receipts; 0.7 per cent was borrowed and the shortfall was 
financed by development partners who had already pledged about 778.2 million Emalangeni 
at the time of the 2014/15 budget speech. The development partners include the European 
Union (EU), the Taiwanese government and the Global Fund among others (Dlamini, 2014:8-
9). The Swazi parliament does not review the King‟s finances as such a move would be 
perceived as undermining the King (AFP News, 2014). 
 
Although the Swazi elite are predominantly of royal blood, there is another class, the 
intellectual Swazis, who bear no ties to the royal lineage. This group either migrates to the 
industrial town of Manzini or the capital, Mbabane (Simelane, 2012: 238), and in some cases 
to neighbouring South Africa to ply their trade. While they remain a beacon of hope for their 
rural bound relatives, it is not unusual for them to secure pieces of land in their place of birth 
for later development for it is endearing to a Swazi to have a stronghold back home. While 
they are growing their money, these secured pieces of land remain fallow while the peasants 
continue to suffer. Upon return, usually with a vastly improved socio-economic status, these 
people can impose tremendous influence on the chief and inner council and duly support 
decisions from which they stand to benefit immensely (Falk et al., 2003:340).  
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3.12.1 Engcayini Grazing Land Rehabilitation Case Study  
A government partnership with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to 
rehabilitate a rundown communal grazing land at the Engcayini chiefdom in the Manzini 
region (Stringer et al., 2007:388-392) also gleaned at the communal elite who uses systems to 
benefit from a virtuous cycle while locking the peasants in  vicious cycles (Terry, 2012:136). 
As 81 per cent of cattle is resident in SNL with no particular feeding routines, it is inevitable 
that the grazing land comes under strain (Tefera et al., 2009:675; Mabuza et al., 2012:73).  
 
The wealthy, who kept large numbers of livestock, a traditional store of wealth and relatively 
larger disposable incomes, welcomed the move for rehabilitation (Tefera et al., 2009:75; 
Terry, 2012:137). Researchers noted that this group also received detailed consultation even 
prior to the community meetings and they latched onto this opportunity to steer the project in 
their own interest. They would, after all, have fat and healthy cows at the end of the project. 
An equal levy was imposed on all households, regardless of whether they kept livestock or 
not. The reasoning behind this move was that they might own some in the future. Also, all 
households were required to send representatives to work on the project, failure to which 
would result in fines proffered against absconding family. Again the rich were in a better 
condition to meet these demands (Stringer et al., 2007:388-392). 
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum were the peasants who, despite owning no livestock, 
were committed to work, as they could not afford the fines. Their time and labour went into 
the project and at the end they were worse off because the rehabilitated commons on which 
they exceedingly depended, was cordoned off and they could no longer extract their needs 
like fire wood, herbs and fruit. This case study displays how pre-existing strata within the 
community were unintentionally reinforced as a result of the project, with the poor emerging 
worse off and the wealthy with even better status. After all, fat cattle may mean more milk to 
sell to the peasants and better prices for butcheries (Stringer et al., 2007: 388-392). 
 
3.13 CONFLICT 
A trade unionist in Swaziland once remarked: “There is peace in Swaziland, but it is not real 
peace if every time there is dissent, you have to suppress it. It‟s like sitting on top of a boiling 
pot” (Halvorssen & Gladstein, 2014). The following issues co-exist in Swaziland and they 
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may explode into the largest conflicts in the history of the country yet: discriminatory access 
to land; gender inequality; overpopulation on SNL; environmental degradation of resources; 
tenure insecurity; illegal dwelling on privately owned farms by the landless; scarcity of land 
and slow socio-cultural reforms (Mkhabela, 2006:58-74). Where conflict exists, it is usually 
an exposé of the defencelessness of Swazi rural dwellers against their local government in 
land control issues, and tenure security is often the contentious issues that eventually result in 
conflict (Simelane, 2012:249-250). 
 
SNL is under pressure to accommodate a growing number of people as Swazi society is 
predominantly rural. As Alden Wily (2011a:7) asserts, actual rural numbers are forecast to 
grow in Sub-Saharan Africa. Land degradation is worsening as farmers continuously graze 
their livestock in compromised land. As established earlier, all rural SNL belongs to the 
King, and through elite contacts those linked to him get all the land they require. This 
exacerbates tenure insecurity and breeds conflict as peasants are dispossessed of the single 
most important asset of their livelihood in favour of a single entitled rich person. Below are 
the two biggest conflicts to engulf Swaziland yet. One happened in 2000 and the other as 
recent as 2011.  
 
3.13.1 KaMkhweli – Macetjeni Case Study  
The hierarchy from household to chief to king would understandably feed the assumption that 
chiefs are totally subservient to the King. However, Chief Mtfuso Dlamini of KaMkhweli and 
Chief Mliba Fakudze of Macetjeni in the Lubombo region displayed that this is not always 
the case. In the year 2000, the King passed out an order, stripping these chiefs of their 
powers. He installed his brother, Prince Maguga, as the rightful chief, alleging that this had 
been the late King Sobhuza‟s wish (Dlamini, 2010; Simelane, 2012:239). The contentious 
area was incidentally a prime cotton farming spot in the kingdom. The communities partook 
in this activity and were able to use proceeds from their toll to sustain their livelihoods. When 
the conflict gained momentum, factions were produced, with one party willing to abide by the 
King‟s order to maintain ‟peace‟. The other faction, who supported the chiefs‟ standpoint, 
were of the view that such last wishes of the late King should have been communicated while 
King Sobhuza was still alive. Moreover, these chiefs were legitimate leaders as they had been 
installed in accordance with Swazi law and custom. To this latter group the King was just 
being a bully and they felt it was his way of gathering land under the royals‟ patronage. At 
the climax of this conflict the King, through the army and police services, evicted about 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Page | 58  
 
between 200 and 400 people by night and dumped them sporadically in other communities in 
the country. The defiant chiefs escaped his wrath and applied for asylum in neighbouring 
South Africa (Independent Online, 2000; Simelane, 2012:232-254).  
 
3.13.2 Ngwane Park/ Kashali Conflict 
Eleven years later, in 2011, another land conflict would play out in the country, this time at 
the peri-urban Ngwane Park/Kashali area at the outskirts of Manzini, where it was said that 
Chief Prince Matatazela had wrongfully allocated to citizens the King‟s land on Farm 126 
(Simelane, 2011). People had built their homes and they watched as government bulldozers 
tore them down at the command of the neighbouring Masundvwini Royal Residence where 
the King had spent part of his childhood. Respondents contested that they had rightfully 
acquired land through the khonta system and had been duly allocated land on which to build 
their homes. They further sought the relief of the law and approached the High Court of 
Swaziland with their grievances, but the traditional court was not frightened by this move. 
Instead the Royal Residence Committee called a meeting with visible police presence to 
intimidate their opponents where a succinct order indefinitely banning any further meetings 
in the area was passed. Furthermore, people were instructed not to voice any opinions or 
concerns as the purpose of the meeting had been to pass on the order and not dialogue. The 
only provisions for a meeting were, ironically, when there would be development issues 
deliberated and even then that process would not be autonomous from the Masundvwini 
Royal Residence Committee as people were expected to get approval from the committee 
first before proceeding. People could only respond with murmurs, unable to voice out their 
grievances for fear of royal wrath (Simelane, 2011). 
 
 
3.14 POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
The 2011 estimates of the CIA (2014) place about 78.8 per cent of the Swazi population in 
rural areas. More recent literature places the number at 70 per cent of the total population 
(African Development Bank, 2013:1). IFAD (2007:1-4) adds that their urban dwellers 
consume twice as much as the rural residents. After all, the urban per capita income is said to 
be quadruple that of the rural population. About 40 per cent are unemployed. This group 
typically comprises of women, the illiterate and the youth (Vandome et al., 2013:31). Of the 
76 per cent rural residents, 69 per cent lives below the income poverty line while 37 per cent 
are in extreme poverty (Terry, 2012:137). The rural Swazis are also undeniably the ones who 
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experience the excruciating wrath of drought, which is a regular occurrence in rural 
Swaziland.  
 
For the rural Swazi subsistence agriculture and by extension land availability is the primary, 
if not only source of income (Lankford, 2007:11; Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:302). Swazis 
grow maize, the staple food of the country (Mabuza et al., 2012:73) and any fluctuation in its 
yield constitutes a crisis (Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:302). Such a crisis has been evidenced by 
a drop in maize yields since 2000. 2012 saw a further 10 per cent decline in maize yield that 
resulted in a 39 285 metric tonnes deficit (African Economic Outlook, 2013). Currently about 
10 per cent of the Swazi population is reliant on food aid. This figure is supplementary to the 
World Food Programme (WFP) support to an estimated 100 000 school-going children (Irin 
News, 2014a; 2014b). The WFP alleges that the Swaziland chronic hunger problem can very 
well be conquered if small farmer empowerment and land use reform policy were prioritised. 
UNDAF (2001-2005, 6) and Wooderson (2013) allege that Swaziland possesses vast 
resources to squash the hunger problem indefinitely. In a March 2014 report, heralding 
another drought and reliance on food aid by the Shiselweni and Lubombo regions (Irin News, 
2014b), some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) went on record saying that the 
availability of food aid bolsters the governmental nonchalance to the plight of the people (Irin 
News, 2014a). This sentiment is shared by some governmental officials who saw the US $1 
billion Sikhuphe International Airport receiving considerable attention as compared to hunger 
mitigation plans. In a perverse move that smirks at inequality the airport is situated in the 
notorious Lowveld, the face of Swazi hunger (UNDAF, 2001-2005:6; Terry, 2012:135; 
Wooderson, 2013). 
 
The general public also aired their feelings in an Afrobarometer survey of which the results 
were released in December 2013 (Irin News, 2014a). The report alludes to dissatisfaction by 
citizens over perceived governmental disinterest in dealing with pertinent issues such as 
prevalent food scarcity, high unemployment and poor service delivery. The respondents also 
felt that government was complacent in as far as narrowing the ever growing wealthy/peasant 
disparities. The survey findings were a vindication for local NGO‟s who bemoaned the 
dismissive and laissez faire attitude of some governmental officials who even went as far as 
blaming NGO‟s for exaggerating the situation on the ground (Irin News, 2013; 2014a). 
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3.15 GENDER AND LAND 
Patriarchal preference for land allocation, a naive stance when considering the fact that more 
and more households are headed by women, is still prevalent in Swaziland (FAO, 2002:23; 
Rose, 2003:123; IFAD, 2007:1; Langwenya, 2012:6;) and both the application of customary 
and statutory law is to blame for this predicament. Customarily girl children are forbidden 
from inheriting land from their own parents in favour of the males within the family. This 
practice becomes a double blow for the widow‟s girl child (United Nations, 2001:3). 
Statutorily women are prohibited from registering joint property through the Deeds Registry 
Act as the Marriage Act sets the stage by vesting all marital powers in the man (United 
Nations, Swaziland, 2012; Simelane, 2014:86). Despite the evolution of various African land 
tenures, women still receive user rights to land and not ownership (Rose, 2003:123; Dlamini–
Ndwandwe, 2013:333). 
 
Table 3.1: Women land ownership status in Swaziland   
Category Ownership Women‟s Status 
 Swazi Nation Land Land held in trust of the 
Swazi Nation by the King. 
Chiefs allocate this land. 
Women need a male 
surrogate for access. 
Freehold Land Privately owned land Single women can obtain 
title of their own volition but 
forfeit such rights when they 
marry in community of 
property. 
Crown Land Government land Women can get allotted 
plots, but married women 
depend on their spouses for 
this allocation. 
Source: Simelane (2014) 
 
In Swaziland the ancient restrictions and attitudes to women and land rights are still prevalent 
despite articulations to the contrary in the Constitution (Dlamini–Ndwandwe, 2013:333).  For 
example, tradition still dictates that only married men are eligible to acquire customary land 
using the khonta system (Whelpton, 2005:150; Mkhabela, 2006:61; Scott, 2006:156; van 
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Waveren, 2007:189; Dlamini–Ndwandwe, 2013:332; Vandome et al., 2013:31). For 
bachelors a father can allocate land within the family plot or be his son‟s emissary to the 
chief if he desires a plot outside the confines of home. None such is in place for the single 
daughter and daughters are often sidelined when it comes to inheriting land from a late parent 
(Simelane, 2014:91).  
 
While Swazis are grappling with the concept of a woman as an independent being (Vandome 
et al., 2013:31), women remain the “productive centres of household economy” (Grigsby, 
2004:216) and they continuously have to rely on their wits to access land to ensure provision 
for their families. It is appalling that throughout the tenure evolution thus far, land laws still 
consider the average women as being the married one. This view does not take into account 
the fact that other women are divorced or widowed while some make a personal choice to 
remain unmarried. Even the married ones occasionally become household heads when their 
partners are absent, often for long periods (Rose, 2003:124; FAO, 2002:25; Grigsby, 
2004:213). At the end of the day this dispensation is dehumanising for women and restricts 
them from gainful participation that could advance personal and communal development 
(Dlamini – Ndwandwe, 2013:329). 
 
Grigsby (2004:207-222) and Rose (2003:123-149) discuss strategies that women have 
employed in Swaziland, Senegal and Malawi to get their hands on much needed land, albeit 
temporarily in the case of the Senegalese. The theme in these narratives is that women are in 
one way or the other at the mercy of the men in their lives (husband, brother, uncle, father 
and even offspring) to either get an audience with the Swazi traditionalist or negotiate for a 
piece of land in the case of the Senegalese and Malawian. Women have learnt to 
manipulatively confront the land tenure trajectories as their needs for land remain. 
 
The widowed woman must contend not only with the in-laws but the community as well. On 
death of her husband a Swazi woman is customarily expected to partake in mourning rites 
that include wearing distinct mourning gowns throughout a specified time (United Nations, 
2001: 8), usually about a year. During this period she can be severely discriminated against 
and often is the recipient of violence from the in-laws. Widows are usually dispossessed by 
their in-laws unless they partake fully in the mourning rites for their dead husbands (United 
Nations, 2001:14; Dlamini–Ndwandwe, 2013:338-339). Even where qualified, mourning 
women are prohibited from holding public office. Despite the Constitution saying that 
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women have the right to refuse to partake in such rituals, they are forced to or risk being 
disowned by the community if those mourning rites were not upheld. This includes refusal by 
the in-laws‟ chief to have the widow eventually buried in his area. It is not uncommon for the 
maternal chief to refuse this as well on the basis that a married woman is catered for by her 
marital community. This puts women in precarious positions and makes them vulnerable to 
unsolicited friendships to maintain their land ownership status and, in the case of widows, 
their freedom of expression is severely curtailed as they have to continually placate  in-laws 
on whose goodwill they can continue to have user rights on land (Dlamini–Ndwandwe, 
2013:329-340; Simelane, 2014:91). 
 
Section 20 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland prohibits discrimination against 
any person based on colour, religion, tribe and especially gender. Section 28 succinctly 
addresses women, saying that they are entitled to the same treatment and opportunities as 
their male counterparts. This section also calls on the government to provide facilities 
necessary for potential realisation and advancement of women. Section 211 addresses land 
directly and its provisions are that land allocation for domestic purposes shall be gender 
neutral (Government of Swaziland, 2005:23, 31-32, 131; Dlamini–Ndwandwe, 2013:329-
345). Despite these articulations by the Constitution women continue to rely on male relatives 
for land (Langwenya, 2012:1–10). The current stand of the law with regard to gender actively 
constrains female participation in land affairs and it inadvertently overlooks a high human 
resource base and encourages unsustainable land use in the rural areas where most 
marginalised people reside (UNDAF, 2001-2005:8-9). 
 
Human rights activist Mary Joyce Doo Aphane made history when she used the Swazi 
Constitution to challenge provisions of The Marriage Act, No.47 of 1964, and the Deeds 
Registry Act, No.37 of 1968, which disallow a woman married in community of property to 
register property in her name. When she won that case, she momentarily became a beacon of 
hope for all women before the realisation that the judgement only pertained to women 
married in community of property and was mute on those married through the Swazi law and 
custom (Langwenya, 2012:1-10). 
 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (2005) also contradicts itself when it 
enshrines gender neutral in Section 211 and a generic form of Swazi Law and Custom in 
Section 252. To reiterate, Section 227 (1) of the Constitution calls for the preservation of 
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customary law (Dlamini–Ndwandwe, 2013:330). This can be rightly viewed as taking 
considerable steps back in the emancipation of women because the very customary law that 
embeds gender-based land access inequality was preserved, leaving its application to personal 
interpretation by traditional authorities. It is not surprising then that wives are expected to 
accompany their spouses to land negotiations at the chief‟s kraal, but their opinions are never 
solicited. It, therefore, remains that women can only gain land through their male relatives or 
offspring (Langwenya, 2012:1-10).  
 
 
3.16 LIVELIHOODS 
The natural ecosystem is vital for rural livelihood sustenance with many, if not all, rural 
dwellers investing their resources in food provision activities (Stringer et al., 2007:388). As a 
result of the conflict of the then ongoing debacle in the KaMkhweli and Macetjeni chiefdoms, 
residents left their fields fallow in fear, on one hand, that the incoming Chief may dislocate 
them and, on the other hand, because their tenure had suddenly become insecure and they did 
not have the confidence to plant produce that they might have to leave behind (Simelane, 
2012:239).  
 
In rural Swaziland it is quite common for the peasantry in the community to sell their services 
to the wealthier community members, ploughing or hoeing their fields in return for paltry 
pay. While the dispute was raging on, the peasants suffered a huge blow before the actual 
eviction. Likewise, the people were displaced to marginal lands to make way for sugar 
plantations when the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation and Ubombo Sugar Mills were 
established as per Freedom House (2013:16). So although customary tenure can be viewed as 
a more inclusive system, it is sadly not always the case in Swaziland. Instead there is a 
sinister being that controls the land through greed and disregard for the plight of the poor 
(Adams et al., 1999). 
 
In the KaMkhweli/Macetjeni debacle, innocent children were the casualties, dubbed “victims 
of state thuggery” by some analysts (Simelane, 2012:244). Some families were separated and 
some school children who were due to write their final external examinations lost this 
opportunity. For some that was their last contact with school. The Swazi government was 
unconcerned and made no attempt whatsoever to either trace these children and, where some 
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were traced by NGOs like Save the Children Fund (SCF) and the Baphalali Swaziland Red 
Cross, the government did not even attempt to pay their school fees. Instead, there were 
reports to the effect that the police and soldiers had vowed to ensure that they never got the 
opportunity to write their exams in their former schools (Simelane, 2012:243). The situation 
was no better for those children lucky enough to have been dumped with their parents. They 
stayed in camps, supported by NGOs, and their lives were characterised by lack of food, of 
clothing, of proper accommodation and their situation became even worse when the NGOs 
could no longer support them due to fiscal challenges. 
 
In hindsight even the decision to not plough that year proved to have been a wise one because 
after the forceful evictions were completed, the King ordered residents not to farm affected 
fields (Simelane, 2012:245). He was at liberty to make that call as, after all, land is held in 
trust by him (Stinger et al., 2007:388). This decision further compromised residents‟ 
livelihoods because some had taken on some children from the evicted families and therefore 
their families had become larger by default. 
 
When civil society protested these atrocities, teargas and rubber bullets were pelted at them 
by the armed forces. Moreover, as is usual in the kingdom, meetings called by the Swaziland 
National Association of Teachers (SNAT) and the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions 
(SFTU) were subsequently banned (Simelane, 2012:246).  
 
 
3.17 ATTEMPTS AT LAND REFORM 
Land reforms have been requested in the country since the early 1990s (Vandome et al., 
2013:28). A land reform policy followed in 1993, but the exercise was put on hold (Mabuza 
et al., 2012:71-80). Ordinary Swazis long for an end to tenancy so that they can participate in 
the economy (Irin News, 2011). This is a controversial topic in Swaziland as it can be viewed 
as dissent by the Suppression of Terrorism Act, No.3 of 2008 through which individuals 
perceived to be criticising the King can be prosecuted (Vandome et al., 2013:29). 
Nationalisation of land would be a precarious choice as it would return all land to the State, 
invariably the King, and privatisation is just as bad, as the majority of people cannot possibly 
afford to buy land. 
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There is consensus that reforms have been stalled due to fierce opposition by aristocracy 
whose legitimacy hinges on the soil (Irin News, 2011; Vandome et al., 2013:3; Irin News 
2012). 
 
 
3.18 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Swaziland has not been spared from the environmental degradation happening in the world 
and since independence she has experienced significant population growth that puts land 
resources under considerable strain (van Waveren, 2007:192-195). Much like continental 
counterparts, the Swazi State continues to disenfranchise its poor members through a host of 
laws and regulations that enrich the wealthy. Swaziland boasts a dual legal system, the 
modern Roman-Dutch Law left by her former colonial masters and the traditional customary 
law that is executed by chiefs in rural areas on behalf of the King (Mkhabela, 2006:59; 
Lankford, 2007:11). The duality of tenure is often blamed for the long turnaround in law 
formation. This is because the traditional structure needs to endorse formal law before it can 
be implemented, an often time-consuming aspect.  The country‟s Constitution declares the 
King unaccountable to any law and the head of all arms of government (Bray, 2006:528; 
Vandome et al., 2013; Wooderson, 2013). Ironically, Swazis are said to prefer the status quo, 
believing that an alternative would compromise the legendary peace and stability of the 
country (Whelpton, 2005:157). 
 
All customary land in the country is effectively owned by one person, His Majesty, the King 
(Scott, 2006:168; Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:301). This peculiarity results in all customary 
land being seen as commons as people never truthfully own even the land they reside on. 
Individual land, such as fields, is treated as commons during winter when all livestock can 
feed on any field until the ploughing season, when livestock feeds in designated grazing 
lands.  
 
An inquiry into the past leaders gives a picture of a resilient elite who first established the 
Swazi State (Mswati II), almost lost it all (Mbandzeni) and a formidable team that recovered 
most land (the Queen Regent Labotsibeni and King Sobhuza II) (Youé, 1986:49-70). It is 
during King Sobhuza II‟s reign that the Swazi elite were properly established. Evident in the 
composition of the first parliament, which excluded representation of the peasantry, to the 
dissolution of parliament a mere five years post-independence, is the rule by decree in 1973 
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and establishment of the contentious Tinkhundla system and the establishment of Tibiyo 
Taka Ngwane by royal charter (EISA, 2008). Through Tibiyo Taka Ngwane indigenous 
people were displaced to make way for two sugar mills (Freedom House, 2013:16). Current 
reports allege that 10 per cent of Swazis account for half the country‟s consumption while 
scores of citizens are ravaged by chronic hunger. 
 
The present king enjoys the plunder that the mechanisations of his forefathers afford him. 
Under his rule, Swaziland has experienced some shocking land conflicts as elaborated in the 
KaMkhweli/Macetjeni and Ngwane Park/KaShali case studies (Simelane, 2011; Simelane 
2012:232-254). The country‟s driest regions – Lubombo and Shiselweni–continue to 
experience regular droughts while the elite lives large. NGOs and some government officials 
have made utterances to the effect that it is not resource incapability that fails Swazis, but the 
irresponsible government priorities (Irin News, 2013).  
 
The Engcayini grazing land rehabilitation case study (paragraph 3.12.1), displays how means 
to uplift citizens from poverty inadvertently reinforce the vicious cycle for the poor while 
entrenching the virtuous one for the wealthy (Stringer et al., 2007:387-393). The three case 
studies showcased the embeddedness of poverty, inequality and marginalisation under the 
current tenure. Gender inequality, which the country‟s dual laws combine to perpetuate or 
ambiguously address, was also discussed. 
 
 
3.19 SUMMARY 
This chapter identified the true Swazi elite and royalty and how past actions ensure them 
perpetual opulence, unless they are willing to engage and share the country‟s wealth with the 
peasants. It also delved into why the King may be reluctant to support land reforms as an 
independent nation threatens his hold. After all, it is through the soil that he feels in charge, 
as seen by the KaMkhweli/Macetjeni evictions. 
 
Sustainable management of resources does not seem to take priority in the country‟s strategy 
as the poor and most reliant on the environment are ignored and the wealthy continue with 
barbaric displays of opulence. Archaic stereotypes that perpetuate reckless use of the 
environment like gender marginalisation are still embedded in the fibre of Swazi society. The 
laws, the reform and implementation of which would herald a new chapter in resource 
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sustainability, remain largely unchanged and emergent ones are for further suppression of the 
citizens. For women neither the Roman-Dutch law nor customary laws offer relief and hence 
they must continuously rely on their wits, and their male proxies, to get some much needed 
land. For the widow the burden is twofold as she has to rely on the welfare of her in-laws for 
continued access to land. 
 
The next chapter is a compilation of the insights from identified interest organisations (SEA, 
SNTC, MOAC, CRDB, Yonge Nawe and the University of Swaziland) on the status of land 
tenure reform, how it affects the sustainability of common resources in the next chapter and 
how it can be customised to meet contemporary needs. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter primarily describes the fieldwork (that was carried out for this research) and 
then offers an insight of the Swaziland environmental management discourse. Pertinent issues 
like the lack of political will, tenure, biodiversity, the emergence of an informal land market 
in the vacuum created by the inability of customary law to adapt to modern times and the 
consequences thereto are discussed. It is argued that the combination of these factors severely 
compromise the livelihoods of the rural poor who depend on the ecosystem for its services 
and products. For emerging sustainable endeavours like the Chiefdom Development Planning 
(CDP), the proposed Land Bill and the recent delegation of traditional leaders to pioneer 
countries (with regard to recognition of customary tenure) political buttressing is important. 
 
 
4.2 FIELDWORK AND DATA COLLECTION 
Primary and secondary data were collected for the study. The primary data was secured by 
means of structured interviews with respondents including the information officer from the 
Swaziland Environment Authority (SEA), the environmental educator from the Swaziland 
National Trust Commission (SNTC), an academic from the University of Swaziland 
(UNISWA) and a soil surveyor from the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), 
who were selected using the purposive sampling method. Copies of questionnaires can be 
found in Annexure A-E. Secondary data collected includes books, reports, research 
documents and media reports on the subject.  
 
Limitations on the field data collection were the lack of maps tracing the evolution in the 
making of the Swazi State (from when the Swazis first settled to when they lost massive 
ground due to concessions to when they brought back the land to the current state) and the 
fact that at the time of the research Yonge Nawe Environmental Action Group, the only civic 
advocacy group on environmental affairs in Swaziland, was defunct. Lastly, due to 
commitments, the agricultural soil surveyor responded for his section and also on behalf of 
the Central Rural Development Board (CRDB). 
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4.3 RESULTS 
According to Swaziland‟s State of the Environment Report (SSER) (2013:35), Swaziland is 
currently on an unsustainable trajectory with detrimental results for the future. This anomaly 
is not due to absence of policy as it is with the poor or lack of implementation of vigorous 
environmental policies. The section below focuses on the various issues that combine to 
deliver unsustainable management of natural resources.  
 
4.3.1 Political apathy 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (2005) does not enshrine a specific 
environmental right although it does imply cognisance of other‟s (people or the environment) 
rights in the enjoyment of one‟s own rights. This provision alludes that rights are conditional 
on consequent duties towards the environment (Faure & du Plessis, 2011:464). The 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (2005), through its directive principles, places the 
onus firmly on the State and citizen to protect the environment for its own sake. However, 
despite such affirmative articulations in the Constitution, the Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEA) Coordination Strategy for Swaziland (2014: v) noted an inadequate 
legislation of some MEAs that the country had rectified. Political indifference to some critical 
issues such as poverty and disease, blurred understanding of the consequences of inaction and 
scepticism over environmental issues was also noted. 
 
Swaziland currently battles such environmental problems as drought and water scarcity 
(MEA Coordination Strategy for Swaziland, 2014:3), pressure on biological resources 
exerted by uncontrolled harvesting of biological resources (environmental educator, 2014: 
pers. comm.), habitat destruction, and uncontrolled land use and unplanned human 
settlements due to the lack of a land policy. Land degradation is also a problem and is caused 
by overgrazing, incapacity to deal with prevalent storms, invasive alien species and 
uncontrolled disposal of toxic waste. High dependence on the environment by the rural poor, 
lack of political will and socioeconomic problems as a result of the HIV/AIDS pandemic also 
feature (MEA Coordination Strategy for Swaziland, 2014:3). It was noted that externally 
funded project dealing with MEAs were the most successful as compared to domestic efforts 
(MEA Coordination Strategy for Swaziland, 2014:12). 
 
Constraints/gaps identified for wanting execution of the MEAs include lack of key policies 
like the land policy and bottlenecks in legislation approval (MEA Coordination Strategy for 
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Swaziland, 2014:19). The SEA information officer (2014: pers. comm.) also noted that the 
need for traditional endorsement of policies, owing to the country‟s dual justice system, 
significantly delayed domestication of international conventions that Swaziland is signatory 
to.  
 
4.3.2 Customary tenure 
According to the Swaziland National Trust Commission (SNTC)  environmental educator 
(2014: pers. comm.) the current land tenure adversely affects the sustainability of common 
resources and wildlife in that it blurs the specific roles and responsibilities of people who 
derive livelihoods from a common resource, in this case a protected area. It becomes a 
predominant problem when the ambiguous influence of traditional leaders is used to obstruct 
access and benefit-sharing efforts. Occasional chieftaincy and community delimitation 
disputes also present with considerable uncertainties. Against the backdrop of such 
uncertainty the rampant consumption of natural resources occurs, for example, harvesting of 
indigenous forests (environmental educator, 2014: pers. comm.). 
 
The Swaziland Environment Authority (SEA) on its SSER (2013:35) reiterates that the 
overexploitation and unsustainable management of resources is not a new phenomenon, but 
rather an old one that is intensified by the combination of the following factors:  
1. The conspicuous absence of a national land policy which would provide for a 
holistic management of common resources;  
2. Failure to enforce existing legislation;  
3. Unsuitable land use patterns;  
4. Poor environmental awareness in the nation which leads to poor planning;  
5. The current land tenure system;  
6. Lack of accountability especially on Swazi Nation Land (SNL);  
7. Conflicts over land and natural resources; and  
8. Incapacity to integrate land use planning and landscape management.   
 
The SEA information officer (2014: pers. comm.) added that the current insecure land tenure 
is still seen as a driver behind loss of biodiversity, depletion of critical ecosystems and 
destruction of wetlands as it perpetuates free-for-all scenarios, where no one is held 
responsible for their unsustainable actions. Another issue was that the currently unregulated 
allocation of land to residents by traditional authorities often counters SEA efforts in that 
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sensitive areas could be apportioned by uninformed leaders when they should in fact be 
protected. Land being unregulated on SNL also means that there is no uniformity in the scale 
of land being allocated to land seekers. As a result the country currently battles with 
infestation of alien invasive species (SSER, 2013:33).   
 
4.3.3 Elite 
Youé, (1986:74) and Simelane (2012:249) have already argued that the power of the Swazi 
elite has always been buttressed by their firm hold on the land. In spite of the shameful 
Macetjeni/KaMkhweli debacle, which culminated in the displacement of two chiefs and 
numerous families at the dawn of the century, the thirst of Swazi royals for land ownership 
remains unquenchable. As recently as 15 October 2010 residents of Bulunga area in the 
Manzini region were served with threatening letters alerting them that the area was suddenly 
under Prince Mangaliso‟s jurisdiction and they were instructed to swiftly change their graded 
tax details to indicate that he was their rightful chief and not Chief Mafamba, the resident 
chief at the time (Dlamini, 2010). Conveniently the directive was issued when the King was 
in seclusion in preparation of the sacred Incwala ceremony and the community could not 
have an audience with him to air their grievances (Dlamini, 2010). Seclusion is a period of 
traditional cleansing observed by the King ahead of the Incwala, which is regarded as the 
Swazi national prayer. During this period the King virtually disappears from the public 
sphere and does not partake in any official duties (Lee, 2011). 
 
Prince Mangaliso‟s claim was hot in heels of another claim made earlier in the year (July 
2010) by the former minister of home affairs, Prince Sobandla. He was controversially 
appointed as chief of Sankolweni area in the Manzini region. Prior to that, another prince, 
Matatazela, had attempted to lay claim on the Mbekelweni area although his efforts proved 
futile (Matse, 2010). 
 
Again in 2010, the then Prime Minister, Sibusiso Barnabas Dlamini, nine members of his 
cabinet and four members of the royal family questionably purchased former crown land at 
deflated prices of up to 50 per cent discount. Due to the controversy that the issue generated 
the King was asked to intervene and the last time the issue was spoken of the then minister of 
housing, Mrs Lindiwe Dlamini, was quoted as saying that the King had issued a directive that 
the matter should not be discussed. The land was never returned (Magagula, 2011). In the 
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same year top government officials passed a law entitling them to large allowances and big 
retirement packages just before the financial crisis happened (Polgreen, 2012). 
 
The most recent case happened in the Nkilongo chiefdom close to the Lavumisa border post. 
Close to 200 families faced eviction after their custodian, chief Mvimbi, declared that he had 
earmarked the area they were residing on for business. Residents of the area were said to 
comprise old widows who had been in the area since they were resettled for the Ubombo 
Sugar Mill about 30 years ago. At the time of the report there was no allocated alternative 
settlement area and their livelihoods were once again compromised (Magagula, 2014). 
 
4.3.4 Population growth 
It is often easier for fewer people to be more sustainable than a larger contingent. According 
to Hardin (1968:1245), the earth finds it easier to renew itself when it carries less than 
optimum people. With growing populations continuously exerting pressure on resources the 
earth is unable to recharge. According to the July 2014 estimates CIA World Fact Book 
projects the current Swazi population to be about 1 419 623 people, who all rely on the 
environment for needs such as shelter, food and water.  The SSER (2013:26, 35, 44, 47,202) 
notes population growth as the main driver of unsustainable land use change. Deforestation, 
for example, happens largely as a result of population growth as people clear land for shelter 
and subsistence farming. The Swaziland National Trust Commission (SNTC) has 
encountered problems with regard to the growing population. Notably that is when people 
encroach on protected areas in search of living space. As a result the organisation spends 
considerable effort consistently engaging with the neighbouring communities to clearly 
define boundaries and also encourage the conservation of natural resources. These 
engagements typically involve traditional authorities and the community (SNTC 
environmental educator, 2014: pers. comm.). 
 
4.3.5 Biodiversity 
According to the African Health Observatory (2010-2014) Swaziland‟s ecosystem health is 
threatened by lack of protection and land conversions. The SNTC asserts that about 30 
mammal species in the country face extinction and are currently confined to protected areas. 
Of the 56 tree species listed in the Swaziland Plant Red Data Book 19 are not found in any 
protected area. Remmelzwaal (2006:2) adds that overexploitation of resources and loss of 
habitat accelerates biodiversity decline. According to the soil surveyor from MOAC (2014: 
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pers. comm.) deforestation is increasingly becoming a major problem and one can see forest 
wood being sold alongside the pavements of many a Swazi road. 
The effects of climate change were also visible on land and projections from the current trend 
point towards the ecosystem adaptation at an accelerated pace from 2010-2020 (SSER, 2013: 
xvi). Adaptation of land for agricultural purposes and then grazing land after which it would 
be rehabilitated back into the ecosystem is expected to decrease. The conversion of land from 
grazing to protected areas is expected to either increase or remain the same. The salient point 
is that the ecosystem will continue to be degraded although it is set to be compensated by 
converting ranching land into conservation land and some measured conversion back from 
agricultural crop land (SSER, 2013:28).  
 
4.3.6 Informal land market 
The rural elite who work in the cities wants land from the Swazi Nation Land and often do 
not have the time to follow the laborious khonta process. There have been reports of chiefs 
selling SNL not only to Swazis but foreigners as well (Comesaria, 2013; Gwebu, 2013).  It 
then becomes easier to do what is the norm nowadays: identify someone who needs to 
dispose of land, approach that person and negotiate a price for the land. The land disposer 
then assumes the role of an emissary and approaches the traditional leaders, notifying them 
that he has some land to offload, usually fallow fields at his disposal, and that there is already 
an interested party. Now, in the traditional process any community member who feels 
overwhelmed by the amount of land they possess could always forfeit it back to the care of 
the chieftaincy so that the chief could allocate it to new arrivals or alternatively give it to 
families who may have had smaller allocations and due to growth of family size then require 
more (Simelane, 2010). The land seeker is then allowed an audience with the inner council 
(libandla) where he is expected to host them as he is formally given the land. To complete the 
process he has to give a cow to the royal kraal, as is the case with the traditional khonta. In 
addition to those costs he still has to pay whatever amount agreed between him and the 
person who has land to dispose of, typically from E5 000 to E80 000 or more (Simelane, 
2010). 
 
An undesirable consequence of this emerging trend has seen the rise of unscrupulous sellers 
who target desperate land seekers, showing them plots and processing their sales without 
approaching the traditional leaders. The land seller duplicates this transaction with many 
others for the same piece of land and then disappears. In some cases you find that the land 
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does not even belong to him at all and it is only when a land seeker is going through the 
traditional processes that conflict ensues. Most are left in the cold as they cannot openly 
approach chiefs for redress as this is not an official activity (UNISWA Academic, 2014: pers. 
comm.).  
 
Other people also see this as a profitable business, so they buy plots on SNL, subdivide them 
and resell them. This is unwise and unsustainable use of common resources because it is 
unregulated and also because it is an attack on the little arable land that the country has as 
people turn to their fields to sell (Simelane, 2010). 
 
A significant point to be made here is that although chiefs are the traditional leaders and are 
conventionally responsible for allocating land, they cannot be solely blamed for altering the 
community landscape. It is clear that residents are in fact very active in bringing new blood 
into the community and should therefore take some of the blame when such new people are 
not of sound character. Although this is at the expense of those community members who do 
not partake in this activity, and who therefore have no benefits accruing to them, the rural 
dwellers are not innocent in all of this and the consequences thereto (Simelane, 
2010;Comesaria, 2013).  
 
4.3.7 Livelihoods 
The livelihoods of the poor remain severely threatened by the growing commercialisation of 
the SNL trend. Firstly, because they are already poor, they can be tempted to partition and 
sell their land for instant gratification. Secondly, once the land is sold, the likelihood of 
buying it back is close to nil as they would not have money for the increasingly expensive 
traditional khonta process. An University of Swaziland (UNISWA) academic (2014: pers. 
comm.) estimated the khonta fee to be around E11 000 (the Swazi Emalangeni (E) is 
equivalent to the South African Rand (ZAR)), including the customary cow to be given to 
libandla (inner council). The figure is not inclusive of the actual cost of the land that one has 
to pay separately. As about  69 per cent of rural Swazis live below the income poverty line 
and about 37 per cent of those in extreme poverty, it is clear that loss of arable land, their 
only livelihood resource, is detrimental regardless of whether they forfeited it willingly or 
under duress (Terry, 2012:137).  
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The other casualties of the new land for sale regime are orphaned and vulnerable children 
(OVC), a group that has grown phenomenally owing to the scourge of HIV/AIDS. The World 
Fact Book (CIA, 2014) estimates that the HI virus was prevalent in about 26,5 per cent of the 
Swazi population in 2012. Minor children, too young to stake their claim on their parents‟ 
land, often rely on the goodwill of their older relatives who may also decide to sell land to 
land seekers without any consultation with the surviving offspring of their relatives 
(Simelane, 2010). This loss is pronounced for widows with only female children as 
customary law remains patriarchal.  
 
The issue of uncontrolled livestock (particularly on SNL) which then compete with humans 
for products or overgraze on pasturelands is still rife. This is reinforced by the fact that Swazi 
society views possession of livestock as the ultimate measure of wealth. The soil surveyor 
(2014: pers. comm.), also conceded that the situation reached a hopeless point due to a lag in 
monitoring, a service which is supposed to be offered by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives‟ Rural Development Areas (RDAs) extension services. He affirmed that it was 
not the role of chiefs to control livestock numbers, but that of the agricultural officials 
deployed in the RDAs in consultation with traditional leadership. In 2006 Remmelzwaal 
(2006: 29) noted a host of undesirable environmental trends that were a result of 
unsustainable resource management in the country. These are: the decrease in natural 
resources; alteration of the ecosystem; a decline in natural products; decline in affordable 
energy sources; decrease in arable land; land fragmentation; water shortages; compromised 
capacity to cope with natural disasters and a rise in food insecurity. The combination of these 
factors severely impact livelihoods, especially those of rural dwellers on SNL.  
 
4.3.8 Integrity of the Traditional Swazi Community 
This advent of the informal land market is severely deteriorating the integrity of the 
traditional Swazi community. Yesteryear‟s khonta process would not be complete until the 
receiving chief sent a delegate to the land seekers‟ chief to inquire on the character of the 
land seeker and ascertain whether he was leaving that community under healthy 
circumstances (UNISWA academic, 2014: pers. comm.). In this way the new community 
would to all intents and purposes be welcoming a worthy member, fit for integration into that 
community. With the new trend of selling land this integrity check no longer occurs and this 
may result in undesirable people being afforded land they otherwise should not have been 
(Gwebu, 2013).  
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4.3.9 Gender 
It seems the issue of gender equality still takes the back burner in environmental affairs in 
Swaziland. It is enough to just mention it without going into detail to provide for the 
conditions that such rights can be fulfilled. In the proposed Land Bill to be discussed below 
the only mention is that all citizens are eligible to receive land allocation. This is a mute 
statement when considering the hold Swazi law and custom has on SNL. The Land Bill also 
recognises both spouses in cases where they own property and provides that they should both 
be signatories to any decision taken regarding said property. While this move would be most 
welcome, it still does not address the woman married in Swazi custom and resident in the 
rural areas where there is no title, and in-laws can stake a claim on the family property in the 
event that her husband dies (The Draft Land Bill, 2013). The proposed Land Bill calls for 
equal recognition of spouses who own property and are married in community of property. It 
also makes provision that polygamous relationships retain the same stature as monogamous 
ones.  
 
4.3.10 Communal capacity 
When quizzed about the ability of communities effectively advocating for their cause, 
especially in the conservation of the environment, the Swaziland Environment Authority 
(SEA) information officer (2014: pers. comm.) conceded that the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) was not enough. He added that the vacuum left by the closing down of the 
only active environmental advocacy group, Yonge Nawe, was most regrettable and exposed 
incapacitated communities. He added also that actively advocating for communities fell 
outside the scope of the SEA as it could not be seen as playing and refereeing environmental 
issues at the same time. He, however, added that the level of active participation in such 
processes depended on how informed the community members were. He provided examples 
whereby the Ezulwini residents (an urban settlement between Swaziland‟s biggest towns) 
successfully lobbied and rejected plans by the Swaziland Water Corporation (SWC) to 
construct a sewerage plant in their community. The said plant was eventually constructed in 
Nhlambeni, a peri-urban area in the outskirts of Manzini, without as much resistance. Both 
the UNISWA academic and the SEA information officer (2014: pers. comm.) were of the 
view that the calibre of the community was the determining factor in terms of active 
participation and capacity to question decisions taken during EIA processes. 
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The SEA information officer (2014: pers. comm.) reaffirmed that the EIA is founded on the 
maximum public participation premise and the belief in giving interested and affected parties 
enough opportunities to influence any decision taken. So as an authority the organisation‟s 
interest is in whether all affected parties were represented in the public participation process 
and they unfortunately cannot measure how capacitated the community may be.  He noted 
that the technicality, the typically large size and language used in reporting (English), could 
be a hindrance to effective public participation. As a result the authority now requires that 
public notifications not only appear in the country‟s newspapers, but are also advertised on 
radio to maximise outreach and that non-technical summaries be availed in vernacular 
language. 
 
4.3.10.1 Umbane development saga 
In 2009 a company formed by employees of Swaziland Electricity Company (SEC), aptly 
called Umbane (lighting), announced plans to convert Portion 13 of Farm No 670 in 
Malkerns into a  fully-fledged residential area complete with a business area to support the 
residents (Shongwe, 2009). Malkerns is an area situated about 25 km southeast of Mbabane, 
the Swazi capital. It boasts of an irrigation canal that was constructed to irrigate widespread 
farmlands for commercial agriculture after independence in 1968 (IRIN News, 2009). The 
proposed township was set to accommodate only the members of the company. This decision 
attracted a lot of criticism and objections from the general public. According to the IRIN 
News (2009), main objections to the development were on the grounds that Portion 13 was 
prime agricultural land and commencing with the project would not only remove fertile soil 
from the already drought-prone country, but that it would have a disastrous domino effect on 
the extensive agricultural infrastructure in the area. Traditional healers were up in arms as 
most of their medicinal supplies were endemic in the area (Nhleko, 2009). They enlisted the 
help of Big Game Parks who cited such laws as the Flora Protection Act, No.10 of 2000 and 
the Environmental Management Act, No.5 of 2002 in their opposing claim. Yonge Nawe, 
then operational, also expressed their disagreement to such plans, citing detrimental 
consequences to the country‟s efforts to realise food security and sustainable development 
(Faure & du Plessis, 2011:475).  
 
During this time Umbane were of the view that since they purchased the land in question, 
they could do with it as they wished as they possessed the full bundle of rights as explained 
by Ostrom (2008:3). Contrary to this belief, the opposition was just as formidable and the 
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minister of tourism and environmental affairs was required to set up a tribunal to look into the 
matter. In the tribunal a judge or magistrate presides over the case and makes 
recommendations to the minister. The minister considers the tribunal‟s recommendation and 
makes a final decision on the matter. In this case the decision was to withhold the permission 
due to the public outcry and Umbane could not commence with their plans. In 2010 they 
announced plans to abandon sugar cane farming on their land and consider alternative crops 
as they were not realising profits. Of the 495 hectares of land in their ownership they 
proposed to dedicate 451 hectares for the new endeavour and the remaining 44 hectares to 
their housing project (Vilakati, 2010). No development has happened so far. 
 
This case illustrates a community which mobilised and successfully objected a major land use 
change in their area. One can infer that the community had the capacity to take on the 
developers because they were informed and knew to enlist a reputable organisation such as 
the Big Game Parks and Yonge Nawe whose advocacy helped their course. This reiterates the 
point by the information officer (2014: pers. comm.) and the academic (2014: pers. comm.) 
that it is often the calibre of residents in an area which determines their ability to actively 
participate and influence decisions on the sustainability of their common resources. 
 
4.3.11 Land reform 
The interviewees confirmed the views expressed in the previous chapter by Irin News (2011; 
2012) and Vandome et al. (2013:3) that the royal family is reluctant to sanction land reforms 
as fruition of such an exercise may threaten their legitimacy. According to a soil surveyor 
(2014: pers. comm.) the Land Policy that was instituted in 1998 was revived in 2008 with 
modifications to potentially sensitive parts and was sent to the royal house for endorsement. 
It has never seen the light of day since then. The SEA has since decided to initiate public 
dialogue by presenting a Draft Land Bill the provisions of which will be discussed later. This 
is obviously a regrettable situation as land reform proponents have never challenged the 
monarchy. In fact, they revere it as a powerful symbol of their culture and tradition although 
they view the King‟s unchecked power as an outdated concept in modern times (Polgreen, 
2012).  
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4.3.12 Conflict 
Conflict over land resources will start at the family level (Simelane, 2010). The UNISWA 
academic (2014: pers. comm.) agreed with this assertion. He predicts that this will be caused 
by the widening gap in the application of Swazi law and custom and contemporary living. He 
thought it highly likely that when minor children come of age they could challenge previous 
sale of land by their parents or relatives on the constitutional premise that Swazi Nation Land 
is not for sale. Without receipts to prove purchase, a land owner may be threatened. Even the 
poor may fight amongst themselves owing to differing views on whether to hold on to or 
dispose of land for temporal relief.   
 
On resources, the Chiefdom Development Planning (CDP) project noted that recent 
developments in the Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project (LUSIP) area may attract 
people from neighbouring communities to settle in the hope of reaping the rewards. If that 
process is not properly managed, it may also result in conflict; particularly as existing scheme 
members already forfeited some of their land in support of the project (IFAD, 2012). The 
SSER (2013:36) also mentions conflict and competition of natural resources as a deterrent to 
sustainable management of land.  
 
On the international front, Mundi (2013) reports that the King unsuccessfully attempted to 
recover land from the Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal provinces of South Africa in 2006. 
Such efforts may be revived to accommodate the expanding population. 
 
 
4.4 COULD THERE BE WINDS OF CHANGE? 
Not all is doom for the sustainability of common resources in Swaziland. The issues below 
describe what could possibly be a strategy to embrace proper environmental management and 
sustainability by the traditional authorities. The Chiefdom Development Plan and the 
recurring visits to Tanzania by the chiefs are discussed next.  
 
4.4.1 Chiefdom Development Plans 
According to IFAD (2012), the Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project (LUSIP) started 
a new project called the Chiefdom Development Planning (CDP) in 2004. Through this 
ingenious tool increasingly scarce resources like land and water were availed to resident 
smallholder farmers. To secure land, participating homesteads were requested to forfeit some 
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of their land for the purpose of the project, thereby fostering communal inclusiveness. IFAD 
offers training and capacity building to the participating communities. Production resource 
maps are produced and members partake in a participatory community resource assessment 
and the beneficiaries also design their own development plans. As a result of this project 
subsistence farmers have been commercialised, significantly improving their livelihoods. The 
project is unique in that it works with the existing traditional governance structures, as its apt 
name suggests.  It also integrates such issues as public health, potable water supply and 
sanitation and gender equality. Among its successes the project has seen 1 184 homesteads 
access irrigated land through the 40 irrigated farms in its care. Financial institutions have also 
been reeled in to support the project and there are talks of legislation to legalise the operation 
of the CDPs (IFAD, 2012). 
 
Other initiatives run by the MOAC include „climate-smart agriculture‟, a concept described 
by FAO (2011:1) as dependent on increased agricultural productivity, improved 
socioeconomic status, better livelihoods and ecosystem resilience and a reduced agricultural 
carbon footprint. The ingenuity encourages the use of nearby resources with minimal 
disturbance to the environment like, for example, people starting food gardens next to the 
rivers. Communities like Mpuluzi in the Hhohho region have already benefitted in such 
techniques as gravity-driven irrigation systems and minimal use of pumps in cases where the 
terrain is disagreeable. Examples of climate-smart agriculture techniques currently being 
promoted in Swaziland include “conservation agriculture, irrigation, rainwater harvesting, 
agro-forestry and new crop variants” (Manyatsi & Mhazo, 2014:13). 
 
4.4.2 Delegation of Chiefs in Tanzania 
The Chiefdom Development Planning (CDP) exercise has been so successful that the 
government considers rolling it out to other impoverished communities to improve their 
plight. To properly implement this next step the government saw it fit to send a delegation of 
chiefs and princes to Tanzania – a country Alden Wily (2011a:44; 2011b:3) hailed as a 
pioneer on the recognition of the commons as community property – on a fact-finding 
mission. The decision to expose chiefs and princes to the Tanzanian way of sustainable 
resource management shows that chiefs are pivotal in the Swaziland environmental 
management strategy. After all, they are the traditional leaders and port of entry in SNL. 
According to the Swazi Observer (08 July 2014), the trip was sponsored by IFAD and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) through the Lower Usuthu Sustainable 
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Land Management Project. The purpose of the trip was to expose traditional authorities to 
sustainable land management and agricultural productions approaches that simultaneously 
address the poverty problem engulfing the country. The main issues discussed were 
participatory forest management, agro-forestry and the sustainable administration of land 
management. These were apt topics considering that deforestation, land degradation and 
climate change are issues Swaziland grapples with. On sustainable land management the 
issues of how communities develop village maps and how land allocated is mapped and 
registered allowing for households to secure start-up loans from financial institutions were 
addressed. 
 
4.4.3 Proposed Land Bill 
The Draft Land Bill (2013), Section 4 (2), is guided by such principles as fair access to land, 
security of tenure, sustainable and productive management of land resources and 
transparency in land administration. It also seeks to eliminate gender discrimination and 
marginalisation of vulnerable groups by either the law or customs related to land. The 
proposed Land Bill also calls for participative, accountable and democratic decision-making 
by the public and government (The Draft Land Bill, 2013). 
 
In line with existing Swazi legislation, the bill vests all SNL in His Majesty, the King. The 
bill recommends that the khonta process be formalised. Under the proposed regime a land 
seeker would submit an application which contains his/her full details and area of current 
residence. If the applicant has never khontaed before, then they would submit an affidavit 
attesting to the fact. Those applicants who had been previously allocated land would be 
required to submit evidence that they surrendered the old place to the resident chiefdom (as 
per Swazi custom) prior to being allocated new land. The khonta process would be rendered 
complete when the land seeker is issued with a certificate which has their particulars, the size 
of their allocation and the land surrender procedure in case they want to leave that area in the 
near future (The Draft Land Bill, 2013). If and when the bill becomes law it shall be an 
offence for a person to have more than one plot on SNL throughout the country. As a 
deterrent the bill provides for a E20 000 fine or a two-year jail term for people assisting 
others to illegally remain on SNL and a E50 000 fine or five-year jail term for selling SNL. 
The bill also acknowledges the issue of SNL commercialisation and attempts to curb and 
somewhat regulate the procedure. It reaffirms that SNL is not for sale in Section 106, but 
relents by allowing for the compensation of people who may have started developments in 
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their plots prior to the decision to leave them behind. In what may be viewed as an attempt to 
democratise the residence of community members, the bill also provides that community 
members facing expulsion from an area be allowed a maximum period of three months to 
remedy the situation. Furthermore they are allowed to appeal such a decision. Under the Bill 
the role of chiefs would include prescribing the conditions of land allocations and 
spearheading land use development and infrastructural development of their respective areas. 
 
4.4.4 The National Environment Fund 
There has been the establishment of a National Environment Fund where all monies 
(penalties and fines) are available to the public to apply for grants to finance environmental 
projects on the ground by the Swaziland Environmental Authority. The fund benefactors are 
environmentally noncompliant establishments whose fines finance the fund (SEA 
information officer, 2014: pers. comm.). There are community projects that support 
environmental protection and resilience of livelihoods like, for example, the protection of 
wetlands and regeneration of special grasses (e.g. grass for making hats and mats). Such 
projects have been funded in Lawuba, Sigwe and Kutsimuleni chiefdoms in the Shiselweni 
and Manzini regions. Despite this initiative the respondent felt that it was not nearly enough 
and that there was a need for a more coordinated and holistic approach to environmental 
sustainability issues across government policies, e.g. a poverty reduction strategy in all 
government policies (SEA information officer, 2014: pers. comm.). 
 
Figure 4.1 & 4.2:  A rehabilitated Lawuba wetland (Left) and various products made from 
the grass (Right). 
Source: Hlophe  (2012) 
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4.5 THE FUTURE 
According to the environmental educator at the Swaziland National Trust Commission 
(SNTC), the organisation currently runs environmental education and community outreach 
programmes to facilitate awareness and active oriented learning to capacitate stakeholders for 
sustainable livelihoods. SNTC allows neighbouring communities access to harvest some 
resources found within protected areas. Engaged communities provide ecotourism-related 
activities like cultural performances for visiting guests (environmental educator, 2014: pers. 
comm.). 
 
On the issue of tenure all respondents, i.e. the information officer, environmental educator, 
soil surveyor and the UNISWA academic (2014: pers. comm.), concurred that, despite its 
present shortcomings, drastically altering the tenure of Swaziland would be more detrimental 
than beneficial, especially with regards to the plight of the poor and the marginalised in 
society. The SNTC environmental educator (2014: pers. comm.) volunteered that such a 
move would result in delimitation disputes which are already a cause for concern. The SEA 
information officer added that Swazis view Western tenure as a threat that disenfranchises the 
poor. So, in this way secure tenure becomes fundamentally problematic in the Swazi context. 
He added that secure tenure on its own is no panacea for the sustainable use of common 
resources and that it can, in fact, worsen the situation because of the commercialisation and 
environmental irresponsibility that is sometimes a consequence of secure tenure. Conversely 
one person may have portions in a number of chiefdoms and exert the same pressure 
repeatedly. 
 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Much like the rest of the world when it comes to environmental affairs and sustainability 
issues, Swaziland comes short when it comes to exerting the necessary political pressure to 
realise a sustainable future for the country (SSER, 2013:296). Customary tenure as it is, 
remains a sore point although it understandably still accommodates the poor in society. Given 
the emergence of SNL commercialisation, this privilege may soon be lost among the poor, 
either of their own volition by disposing of their land or involuntarily by being unable to 
afford the ever rising khonta-related costs.  
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Biodiversity continues to be under threat and with the poor primarily depending on 
ecosystem services and products; their livelihoods are severely compromised by the current 
trajectory (Remmelzwaal, 2006:29). Gender issues also seem to lurk in the shadows of the 
environmental arena. In a welcome move the proposed Land Bill recognises both spouses 
where they own joint property and further goes on to recognise polygamous relationships 
which are a norm in Swazi society. Unfortunately, it does not outline the customary 
provisions under which these rights may be realised. Another worrisome trend is the constant 
reminder to ordinary citizens as to whose family owns the land, as seen in intermittent land 
claims by members of the royal family. 
 
Positively, it was noted that some communities in Swaziland have the capacity to effectively 
participate in environmental impact assessment as seen by the Malkerns community, although 
it was not on SNL which is the focus of this study. The success of the CDPs and subsequent 
traditional leader missions to Tanzania also offer a ray of hope.  
 
 
4.7 SUMMARY 
The salient point in this chapter has been that Swazi institutions are aware of the 
shortcomings of their tenure, but they remain steadfast in the belief that meaningful solutions 
have to be charted in the context of the existing customary tenure system and not an overhaul. 
The premise for that is that any foreign system like the titling of land would disadvantage the 
poor who are already suffering. Constant reminders of the insecurity presents with the 
sporadic land claims – often laced with eviction threats – courtesy of the royal family 
members.  
 
There also seems to be a gap between customary law and the society that it is supposed to 
derive its norms from. That gap could be closed by modifying the customary law to reflect 
the current situation, especially with regard to women and the marginalised. While it made 
sense yesteryear to think of women under the confines of spouse, evidence abounds that 
women are no longer governed by those labels, choosing instead to remain single or to be 
divorced or, sadly, widows. Customary law can only remain vibrant and relevant if it adapts 
with the times. 
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While it is reassuring to see traditional leaders embark on fact-finding missions, it reveals 
that the traditional authorities intend to retain their firm hold on the land, which is not 
necessarily a bad thing provided that they include the peasants in the sustainable management 
of common resources on which a larger population solely depends. 
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CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is an evaluation of the findings of this research study. In the sections below it 
will be argued that political commitment is necessary to steer environmental management 
towards a more sustainable trajectory. This assertion is made on the basis that when there is 
visible commitment to policy, challenges would be tackled better. The challenges that 
Swaziland currently faces with regard to ensuring sustainability of common resources are: the 
administration of customary tenure; inadequate conservation of natural resources; emergence 
of an informal land market; compromised livelihoods; the adulteration of the traditional 
Swazi community; ongoing gender marginalisation; communities not effectively participating 
in issues affecting their livelihoods and a delayed land reform. The level of political 
commitment dedicated towards the tackling of these issues will determine the intensity at 
which these issues are undertaken. 
 
 
5.2 POLITICAL COMMITMENT 
Various authors have made reference to the lack of political will being an impediment to 
environmental management globally (Alden Wily & Mbaya, 2001:89, 99; Monadjem & 
Nkosi, 2001:75; Elliot, 2004: 8, 23; Bray, 2006:530, 533). The contention by Müller (1997: 
14) that environmentalism is inherently political is true for Swaziland. In this country the 
oligarchy has a vested interest in land ownership and therefore the current state of affairs 
regarding environmental management is (indirectly) linked to a lack of commitment 
politically.   
 
Firstly, environmental protection is not explicitly preserved in the Swazi Bill of Rights (Bray, 
2006:546; Faure & du Plessis, 2011:464), but is implied by other rights such as the right to 
equality before the law. This stance proves the intention to realise sustainable environmental 
management in the country. It is, however, not enough to intend for something to happen, 
especially at the rate that environmental degradation is said to be happening (e.g. by the State 
of the Environment Report, 2013). It is an unfortunate position to be adopted by the State as 
its organic role primarily is that of protector and legislator on environmental issues, among 
others (Porter et al., 2000:37-78). It is imperative that environmental issues take centre stage 
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in the Swazi landscape, and for that to happen there needs to be a strong political will in 
favour of that development.  
 
Secondly, Swaziland has been noted to have two separate legal systems in place, the 
customary and the statutory law, stubbornly persisting with a dualism that has stalled 
progress since colonial times. Although Alden Wily (2011c:733-735) and Murombedzi 
(2014) are of the opinion that this dualism weakens customary law, the opposite is true in 
Swaziland. It can, in fact, be inferred that in Swaziland customary law supersedes statutory 
law, because all statutory law can only be passed after endorsement by the traditional leaders.   
Of itself this feature does not seem to be much of a hindrance until the extended delays it 
causes on passing laws by cabinet. Incidentally the laws that take long are the ones that are 
seen to potentially compromise the oligarchy‟s hold on the land.  For example, the Land 
Policy which was drafted in 1998 went through the statutory process, was then submitted to 
the traditional authority for endorsement and has not seen the light of day since. The delay is 
especially surprising when considering that oppressive laws like the Suppression of 
Terrorism Act, No.3 of 2008 are operational and have been since 2008. This is, in fact, a 
show of a state intent on guarding its own interests by whatever means necessary (Porter et 
al., 2000:37-78) while the environment in which it is sovereign deteriorates further under its 
watch. The absence of crucial laws like the Land Policy emasculates efforts by the 
instruments of government (e.g. Swaziland Environment Authority, Swazi National Trust 
Commission, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives) to effectively control land resource 
use and this has been identified in the reports, e.g. the State of the Environment Report 
(2013) by the Swaziland Environmental Authority. As a result the infamous free-for-all 
scenario that Hardin (1968:1243-1248) posited is perpetuated with no people held responsible 
for any gross exploitation of resources and none of the people of the ground having the 
incentive to protect a resource that they might even be removed from through customary law 
provisions. At the end of the day all efforts, no matter how sophisticated, get watered down 
and so the unabated natural resource exploitation goes on.  
 
The government is the chief protector of the environment and incidentally has in its custody 
the vital institutions to realise the reality of sound environmental management of common 
resources. These instruments are: Parliament for passing local environmental law or ratifying 
international conventions and domesticating them; government ministries that are there to 
implement the laws passed by government and, lastly, the judiciary whose duty is to uphold 
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the environmental laws and chastise detractors as appropriate (Bray, 2006:523). This is where 
opportunity lies for the Swazi government to display their strong will to see environmental 
management and sustainability issues prioritised. Worth noting also is the fact that technical 
skills and expertise of government officials and administrators are invaluable for proper 
implementation and enforcement of environmental law. To adequately train and develop staff 
in the government institutions and give them the resources necessary to fulfil their mandate 
also depends on how vested the country is in accomplishing that reality. The salient point 
made here is that without the necessary political commitment a lot of plans are as good as 
dead because their success would be jeopardised from the onset, be it by inadequate resource 
provision or inconsequential apathy from the appropriate institutions. 
 
Political commitment remains the most potent ingredient that can steer the nation towards 
protection of environmental resources and ensure social justice. Visible political commitment 
would mean that efforts by the government and its instruments and civil society are not in 
vain. It is not expected that at the advent of political commitment sustainable management 
challenges would disappear into thin air, but it is understood that an administration which not 
only talk but walks the walk will in time garner support from its citizens. It can be expected 
that a more productive interaction between the two classes of law applicable in Swaziland 
(customary and statutory) can be realised and the grey areas in the cleavages be ironed out.  
For a country like Swaziland political will can be best expressed by the King in his capacity 
as the supreme person in the country. He can display this by appointing environment-
conscious people into the houses of parliament (Senate and Cabinet) and the numerous 
boards in which he commands a level of influence. He could also share this mandate with his 
appointees so that they are not afraid to make radical decisions where necessary. And just like 
he has on occasion called for people to stop discussing certain issues, e.g. dubious land 
purchase by ministers, he would well be within his rights to not only call for but initiate 
vigorous discussion of environmental affairs. Such dialogues double as opportunities to 
include all sectors of society under one roof so that various knowledge types can be shared. 
This would encourage productive interactions within the population and the policies to result 
from there would likely be more appropriate than the current ones.  If the King can make 
these bold strides, it would be easier to get the government and its instruments to deliver on 
the mandate. Lastly, civil society would be empowered to conserve the environment around 
them. Under the current dispensation these propositions are unlikely to happen unless the 
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King makes the conscious decision to take on a different trajectory than is the norm and 
actually follows through with it. 
 
 
5.3 CUSTOMARY TENURE 
In Swaziland both statutory and customary law dictate that Swazi Nation Land (SNL) 
belongs to His Majesty, the King. This is in line with the ancient colonial preference for 
awarding the state ownership of land as the people were deemed unfit for such an honour 
(Alden Wily, 2011c:733; Swilling & Annecke, 2012:15). As a provision of customary tenure 
the chiefs administer the SNL on his behalf.  
 
The celebrated strength of customary tenure is probably also its greatest weakness, the fact 
that it is not documented anywhere. The strength is that it has proved its resilience and 
tenacity by being passed on from generation to generation through custom and practice. This 
attribute, however, also means that interpretation is left to be the interpreters‟ prerogative, 
usually the chief and the traditional council. It is also this interpretation that is usually to 
blame for the continued marginalisation of women who find it difficult to acquire land 
without a male proxy.  
 
Customary law has also been conveniently quoted by the Swazi elite when forcefully taking 
land from rural Swazis. With the installation of Prince Maguga as double chief of Macetjeni 
and KaMkhweli chiefdoms, nuances of customary law were quoted by referring to the (also 
undocumented) wishes of the late King Sobhuza II. This was a failure on the part of 
customary law to display to all and sundry what it provides when it comes to fulfilling the 
dead kings‟ wishes. Its contemporary, the statutory law, would for instance have had a will 
which would have been verified as authentic and then executed. Customary law could also 
not be interrogated to find out what should then have happened to the incumbent chiefs who 
ended up as asylum seekers in the Republic of South Africa. Prince Matatazela‟s claim to the 
Mbekelweni chieftaincy could have been attributed to customary law just as the Prince 
Sobandla claims to the Sankolweni chieftaincy. Disappointingly, as recently as 2014 
residents in the Nkilongo chiefdom were facing possible eviction by the chief as he had 
earmarked the place for development (Magagula, 2014). Prince Mangaliso could also as 
easily install himself chief over the Bulunga constituency overnight because of customary 
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law regardless of the fact that the area already had an incumbent chief. To drive the point 
home he told the community that those who did not want to recognise him as chief were free 
to vacate the area. All these instances show the misuse of customary tenure to mercilessly 
rule the people. It also serves to instil fear among all Swazis as non-royal Swazi chiefs seem 
to be unsafe from later claims that they must absolve themselves of all power and become 
subjects to a prince or vacate the area. This pays homage to the assertion that rights in rural 
Africa are very dependent on one‟s social life and identity based on power relations (Cousins, 
2006:506). Although chiefs are just as powerful, it is apparent that the Swazi pinnacle is 
reserved for royalty as they can easily depose a chief to install one of their own with no 
consequence to them. 
 
To add to the intrigue, the same Prince Matatazela was later, in 2011, implicated in 
wrongfully allocating people land in a farm belonging to the King. The matter was concluded 
by having bulldozers tear down houses as people once again became landless. The important 
thing to note here is that the people who later had their homes demolished had acquired land 
through Swazi law and custom. To all intents and purposes they therefore had tenancy to that 
land in perpetuity and they duly started constructing their homes. Surprisingly the very 
customary law was quoted when bulldozers were authorised to demolish their homes. From 
this instance it can be concluded that customary law does not really exist, but can be quoted 
to satisfy the whims of the elite in Swaziland.  
 
As usual when customary law is quoted by the elite, it is to use the King‟s name to get their 
way.. Even when they do not explicitly use the King‟s name, it is always implied. It holds 
then to look to him as the one to steer political will towards the revival of sound 
environmental management of resources. It is also the King who can get the organs of State 
to start working on documenting customary law for ease of future application. 
 
As the large majority of Swazis reside in rural land, they can be said to be familiar with 
customary law by default. This christens customary law as the ultimate vehicle with which to 
sway the attitudes and activities of the people regarding environmental conservation. 
Customary law is also a powerful agent as seen by the insistence that it be applied 
unadulterated by the Constitution and the Draft Land Bill. It would be beneficial to document 
it so that all citizens can have it as referral. Documented customary law can also be used to 
contain the powers of the chiefs, creating a check and balance on their powers. Documenting 
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it would also help the nation to identify weaknesses and amend them as appropriate. 
Aggrieved members of society (usually women, widows) would then also have a basis on 
which they could challenge decisions taken against them. It is also the modern era and 
customary law has to evolve as well and be documented. After all, it owes its tenacity and 
resilience to its ability to move with the times. Customary law needs to also highlight and 
address the issue of women empowerment instead of being used as a tool of oppression.  
 
 
5.4 INFORMAL LAND MARKET  
The Schlager and Ostrom (1992:252) and FAO (2002:23) prediction that ambiguous tenure 
invariably leads to unscrupulous ways to secure land as people scramble to establish a sense 
of ownership by whatever means, has in Swaziland manifested itself in the emergence of an 
informal land market. This trend can squarely be attributed to the disjuncture between 
statutory and customary law. This assertion is made because although statutory law states that 
SNL is not for sale, chiefs have been said to knowingly participate in the exercise although 
they would never publicly consent to this. The far-reaching effects of this new development 
shall be experienced by the poor when they are stripped of their last dignity by losing their 
land. Even the new communities that are being created may prove to be a sore spot in the 
near future. Therefore there is urgent need to regulate if not prohibit this exercise in order to 
avoid colossal ramification in the near future. Swazi nation land is the only safe haven for all 
Swazis, rich and poor alike. The casualties of the emerging trend will be the poor as they are 
the ones with the incentive to sell land for temporal relief and, secondly, because after the 
sale of land they may become destitute as they might not afford the ever rising khonta costs.  
Ownership favours the wealthy (UNDP, 1998:4) and the working class (Alden Wily, 
2011a:40) of Swaziland have certainly enjoyed the land ownership that their money can 
afford them. Although expensive for the rural unemployed, Swazi SNL can be said to be 
considerably cheaper than what one could pay in regulated title deed land. In this process 
though there is the danger that indigenous people could also be permanently displaced as a 
result of the booming land sales and one way or the other this will eventually become a 
housing problem for the government when multitudes of people end up without shelter. It 
also serves to mask the real problem from government because at the time people are filling 
up the land haphazardly and when it is finally saturated, government may not have leeway on 
which to navigate the challenge. After all, land is finite and cannot be created to 
accommodate more people.  
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As commons derive their integrity from the anchoring customary rules (Elliot, 2004:130; 
Alden Wily, 2007:46), the arrival of people without following the widely accepted and 
customary channels also immediately alters the prevailing institutional frameworks at 
community level (Brown & Wardwell, 1980:51, 53; Falk et al., 2003:340; Alden Wily, 
2011a:41, Connell & MacManus, 2011:27-28). By having been inducted differently in the 
community new members may not feel the need to follow the same rules as everyone else. 
Additionally as most of these people generally work in the urban areas, it can  be expected 
that they would miss a lot of the traditionally sanctioned activities. Such activities are viewed 
as important for cohesion among community members. 
 
The other factor is that it is arable land that is under attack. Without arable land most citizens 
would have to rely on welfare. The question then is whether Swaziland has the resources to 
become a fully fledged welfare state. The answer is a resounding no. It is in the government‟s 
interests to nip this activity in the bud or risk the likelihood of having many people it cannot 
afford to support.  Land has been known to result in conflict in Swaziland; so in the interest 
of conflict containment it is also in the interests of the government to prohibit the sale of land 
in SNL or at the very least provide strict and transparent regulations to be met before one can 
alienate land. 
 
 
5.5 BIODIVERSITY LOSS 
As long as the insecurity of tenure is still the norm the following can be expected to go on:  
accelerated biodiversity loss on SNL, wetland destruction; degradation of sensitive areas with 
no consequence whatsoever to the perpetrators; chiefs will also continue relying on their 
prerogative in apportioning land instead of following certain guidelines that ensure 
sustainability.  Unsuitable land use planning resulting in habitat destruction and accelerated 
biodiversity losses, occasional conflicts over land and boundaries and inability to combine 
land use planning and landscape management will therefore continue to be sore points in the 
near future. 
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5.6 INEQUALITY 
Inequality continues to be a problem in Swaziland. Disappointingly it seems that the elite are 
completely out of touch with the plight of the rural poor. An example can be found in the 
legislature passing laws entitling them to large retirements and later the greed was manifest 
when members of the cabinet unfairly profited by buying former crown land at severely 
deflated prices. Although these can be viewed as completely unrelated incidents to 
environmental management, it can also be argued that that money could have been used to 
fund environmental initiatives like the ever threatening food scarcity that regularly ravages 
the country. In fact, these actions are what Porter et al. (2000:37-78) refer to as the State and 
elite guarding their own interests. It is also an expression of the politics of exclusion (Elliot, 
2004:132). As discussed, it is when the poor are desperate that they degrade the environment 
the most. There remains a need for the elite to want to include the poor in developing the 
country sustainably and that would mean sharing the resources instead of defending them for 
the select few. This defeats one of the tenets of sustainable development which is fairness. 
Moreover, the elite also got the backing of the King when he issued a directive that such 
issues should not be discussed further, effectively silencing any people thought to be 
detractors.   
 
There is a need for Swazi policy to be inclusive and to bring together the bureaucrats, elite 
and civil society at a round table so that they can together chart the way forward in what 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:317) refer to as inclusive institutional frameworks. The ideal 
result of such frameworks is the marked influence of both the rich and poor on policies 
affecting their lives. For this to happen, there needs to be commitment and willingness, 
especially from the part of the elite and the bureaucrats who own or access the resources that 
can be used to reverse the current reality. The current state of environmental management and 
sustainable management of current resources remains largely unequal and is not a morally 
defensible sustainability as it is not inclusive of the poor in society (Turner et al., 1994:32). 
Culture is where Swazis across all walks of life converge to celebrate their heritage. The 
Swazi society is incredibly steeped in it and it may be exploited for the purpose of providing 
a renaissance of the Swazi society, a rebirth that recognises the role of nature in sustaining 
human life and the mutual benefit that can be extended back to nature through responsible 
environmental management. 
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5.7 GENDER MARGINALISATION  
Cousins (2006:506) claims that gender marginalisation is one of the constructs of colonial 
times that have been embraced by many post-independence African governments. And Chu 
(2011:35–39) decries the fact that gender marginalisation is usually just glossed over in land 
tenure affairs. Swaziland has in some respects attempted to prioritise gender issues although 
the commitment to really shift the paradigm is still not there.  
 
In what could be viewed as a future victory for women the proposed Land Bill tackles the 
issue of property registration by ordering that both spouses appear on the title deed of a 
jointly owned property. It also requires both partners to sign any documents relating to the 
property versus only the male signing as per previous provision of the Marriage Act, No.47 
of 1964, and the Deeds Registry Act, No.37 of 1968. While this appears to be a step in the 
right direction, the first disappointment is that the bill in question is still in draft form and as 
such may be tied up in the dual law conundrum for more than a decade as well (if the still to 
be endorsed Land Policy is anything to go by).  
 
Secondly, while it boldly attempts to play advocate for all women – e.g. by providing that 
polygamous relationships be treated as civil ones – it still falls short because it does not detail 
how the customary law should be applied in such cases. Thirdly, although the bill quotes the 
Constitution when asserting that all citizens are eligible to be allocated land; such 
articulations are voided by the expectation to administer customary law without modification 
when it is known not to recognise women as independent individuals. In gender issues 
customary law‟s biggest weakness is that it does not recognise women outside their roles as 
wife, daughter, sister or mother and as such still requires the male proxy for any land 
allocation to happen. The second problem with customary law will be reiterated: It is not 
documented, ultimately leaving it to the chief/traditional council‟s prerogative to allocate (or 
not) land to female land seekers with no guiding standards in place. 
 
The plight of women can be improved by the collective actions of a strong political will, 
revision of the customary law provisions that marginalise women and also the realisation and 
appreciation of the roles played by women in upholding society. Instead of laws saying “No 
discrimination according to gender...” they perhaps need to be clearer and say “Women are 
entitled to...” and further make the conditions conducive for them to access and exploit those 
resources. 
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5.8 SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS 
The livelihoods of many rural Swazis remain highly unsustainable. On one hand they contend 
a resource scarcity. On the other hand the sporadic land claims and threats meted by princes 
and other members of the elite, seeking either to be chiefs (princes) or to move them to make 
way for business (Nkilongo chief), often means that they cannot unreservedly call a place 
home. They not only  lack the assurance that as personal entities or groups their rights to land 
are acknowledged by all prevailing institutional frameworks, but that those rights are 
deserving of protection also (FAO, 2002:18-20). The study has shown through isolated 
incidents how the oligarchy often threatens the people‟s right to land, as with Prince 
Mangaliso‟s directive to the Bulunga constituency. From that situation a conclusion can be 
drawn that residential rights are only assured when communities accept royal orders with no 
question whatsoever. It must be noted that rural people are typically less rich, so moving 
house from the only area you call home would be understandably costly and the commons are 
usually the only real asset they own (Alden Wily, 2007:43-45). Besides the assured financial 
setback, rural people generally have a strong bond with their land (Elliot, 2004:130) which is 
then forcefully severed. On the other hand the Nkilongo constituency is awaiting their fate 
which, if history is anything to go by, may just resemble Murombedzi‟s (2014) Malaysian 
Sime Darby deal which went through despite protests to the contrary and dislocated scores of 
people. Swilling and Annecke (2012:3) assert that the contemporary sustainability test is 
whether ruthless exploitation of resources can be slowed down to ensure a fair future for all. 
Such a challenge is lost in the mind of the Nkilongo chief who threatened to spearhead 
development that would compromise his subjects. In terms of common resources 
sustainability, people who live under such conditions would not have any incentive to 
preserve anything because they never know when their last day may be in that area and hence 
will tend to maximise their benefit while they still can and therefore rampage on the 
environment. Schlager and Ostrom (1992:257) actually declared that there is a correlation 
between people living under an insecure tenure and poor land use that hastens environmental 
degradation. Reports like the State of the Environment Report (2013:35) also corroborate this 
viewpoint. 
 
The government needs to devise new strategies for policy formation to ensure that maximum 
public participation is garnered to maximise on support of that policy. Although rationing of 
resources could offer relief to the country‟s environmental resource base, it comes with a host 
of institutional arrangements that need to be in place before such can take place. And the 
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government needs to be willing to put those institutional arrangements in place, not only for 
implementation but for on-going monitoring and evaluation to ensure sustainability. 
 
Although a „peaceful‟ nation, Swaziland had better gear for full-blown conflict in the near 
future if things do not change. Already there have been forceful evictions, occasional threats 
of eviction on unwilling subjects and the usual chiefdom disputes which comprise of 
boundary issues and sometimes inheritance. As land becomes scarcer it can be expected that 
all royal family members  and the elite will have the incentive to be chief or have their 
desired candidate as chief to ensure that they can benefit perpetually from the generosity of 
community members through kuhlehla. 
 
 
5.9 SHRINKING ARABLE LAND 
According to the World Factbook (CIA, 2014) only 10,8 per cent of total land area in 
Swaziland is arable. The advent of the informal land market places this valuable resource in 
jeopardy as citizens are selling fields to land seekers. In a few years the country may face the 
hardship of not having any land to farm on, especially for the less fortunate who rely on the 
fields for subsistence farming and whose socioeconomic status does not allow them to buy 
food from the shops. A reduction in arable land is the worst thing that a poor person may 
have to contend with as subsistence farming may just be the only activity keeping them 
going. If uncurbed numbers of people eventually sell their homes when the arable land is 
finished, they will end up being displaced and may end up creating an informal settlement 
problem for the government. 
 
 
5.10 CONFLICT 
If customary land continues to be unregulated then it can be concluded that Swaziland is well 
on its way to conflict. And it would not be the first country to be embroiled in resource 
disputes. It has been said that the Sudanese civil war was ignited by difference of opinion 
regarding land ownership (Alden Wily, 2007:43-45).  The fact that arable land is so little and 
is the very land that is sold places the country in a precarious position. Chieftaincy disputes 
are already the norm in Swaziland and it certainly will not take long before the disputes 
escalate into something bigger, especially as the land resource becomes scarcer. On one front 
it may be families embroiled in disputes with the bone of contention likely to be land sold 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Page | 97  
 
without proper family consultation or consent or land belonging to a widow with offspring. 
On another front disputes are likely to escalate between chiefdoms over boundaries. At the 
largest scale it may be country against country. As noted, the King of Swaziland has in the 
past instituted claims to reclaim land from the Mpumalanga province of South Africa. When 
the land becomes scarcer as more people occupy it, his request may gain urgent momentum 
and South Africa may not be willing to cede the land to him. This may very well culminate 
into the first international and the biggest conflict Swaziland has ever seen.  
 
Conflict between neighbouring communities and statutory bodies like the Swaziland National 
Trust Commission (SNTC) over boundaries is likely to intensify as people have nowhere else 
to go but to encroach on protected areas. Deviating from the traditional khonta system may 
also in the long run alter the cohesion that Swaziland is famous for. And the more people in 
the commons have no trust among each other and lose the kinship that is usually cultivated by 
the sharing of common resources the easier it will be to sow seeds of dissent amongst 
communities. 
 
 
5.11 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATISATION 
Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration reads: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, 
at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate 
access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, 
including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and 
the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely 
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including 
redress and remedy, shall be provided. 
 
From the little that can be gleaned of Swaziland it is obvious that civil society is not 
encouraged to actively participate in decision-making, but are also often threatened with 
eviction, highlighting their insecurity of tenure. The downside of this stance is that 
bureaucrats tend to make and rely on assumption-based policies or conventional theory.  
They are usually so far removed from the actual reality that they rely on abstract models to 
derive that policy and such solution ends up worsening the problem. There is need to avoid 
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this terrible simplification of environmental problems (Reinert, 2009:1-34) and the propensity 
by government to remotely administrate the commons (Ostrom, 1990:2; Elliot, 2004:132; 
Alden Wily, 2011a:20). The more democratized public participation approach to ensure that 
close to accurate information is used as a starting point to bolster the chances of making 
relevant policy for the problems the country faces is a better approach. Otherwise there is 
always the risk of duplicating Ostrom‟s Brazilian fishery experience and with such an 
approach a government can always be assured that their policy will wreak havoc and leave 
the people who depend on the resource worse off (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:255).  As with 
the Brazilian experience, this action unfortunately weakens any citizenship and likelihood 
that the people can engage with the government to reach sustainable solutions. It means, 
therefore, that any environmental management decisions taken remain autocratic and are 
imposed on the populace. Imposed decisions are less likely to hold for long as the recipients 
may feel that their own interests are regarded as unimportant and pretentious. And when 
people feel this way they are less likely to practice caution when harvesting from the 
environment. In fact, they may be tempted to express their anger by destroying the 
environment as it is the only thing that they can take out their frustrations on.   
 
The weaknesses of shutting out civil society include the lost opportunities of exchanging 
experiential and expert knowledge which can help them in policy formation and in getting 
rural residents to adapt their habits accordingly. They would be more receptive to mutual 
dialogue as opposed to merely executing orders from people perceived to be out of touch 
with their plight. Lastly, the more the livelihoods of the poor are compromised, the more they 
will become a burden for the government to provide them with basic services which they 
ordinarily would harvest from the environment.  
 
The presence of such laws as the Suppression of Terrorism Act, No.3 of 2008, in the public 
domain is welcome as terrorism is a valid threat that all countries need to envisage and 
protect its citizens against. However in the case of Swaziland this may mean that public 
opinion on environmental affairs is not only unsolicited but prohibited as well. It is also likely 
to erode any remnants mutual trust between the State and civil society as it can be easily 
misused to punish perceived detractors. It is only when all society members see themselves as 
being similarly affected by the current pattern of use and trust each other to do their 
respective part in ensuring that sustainable development is a reality and are also allowed a 
certain latitude to self-organise without external influences that commons will be better 
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managed (Ostrom, 1990: 4). This Act is said to be so ambiguous that utterance can be said to 
constitute dissent and people can be prosecuted as a result. Although not an environmental 
law, the act discourages discussion on land reform or tenure issues as these go to the core of 
Swazi governance because the firm hold on the land buttresses royal rule. It can be expected 
then that people will shy away from public discussion in fear of being seen as challenging the 
King‟s rule in the country.  
 
Even if the Suppression of Terrorism Act, No.3 of 2008 Act was repealed there is also much 
required from the side of government to assure people that their views are not only valid but 
are considered as well, especially with the level of mistrust that exists between the two 
parties. There is need also to realise that it is only through robust public participation that 
meaningful strategies can be undertaken in facing the poor environmental management 
debacle. It is also through public participation that all stakeholders can confront their own 
weaknesses as individual entities and as a group and anticipate them on time. Importantly, the 
benefit of attacking the complex problems that society currently has from varied points of 
view can only prove beneficial in the long run. Actively involving the public also means that 
they will not be disillusioned by any articulations made by the bureaucrats and will instead be 
receptive and also have a will of their own to see strategies succeed. By advocating for active 
and robust public participation and democratisation it is not the study‟s assertion that 
challenges will then vanish.  
 
Soulé and Lease (1995:162) assert that bureaucrats and elite are city people and therefore are 
prone to arrive at city-friendly solutions. That is why Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:317) 
call for inclusive institutional frameworks that would result in both the elite and the peasantry 
influencing strategy. Even in medieval times the commons started unravelling when the elite 
started to systematically exclude the peasants from the running of the commons (Cox, 
1985:52). It is imperative therefore that the rural and the city people merge for the purpose of 
synthesising strategies. Appropriate strategies can only be arrived at when the rural people, 
armed with experience, are allowed to influence the process. It is a fact that government 
cannot do that alone; even if they had all the resources they would still lose out on the 
invaluable advice that experiential knowledge can add to policy. And the way to tap into that 
knowledge bank is inviting the indigenous people who live in the situation. Science can only 
hypothesise it is necessary that those people are brought to the table. 
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5.12 POPULATION GROWTH 
The growth in Swazi population is not projected to slow down. The World Factbook (CIA, 
2014) predicts a 1.14 per cent growth rate (as per July 2014 estimates), meaning that the 
problems that have manifested as a result of a growth in population are not going away. 
These are deforestation, encroaching on protected areas and exaggerated use of resources. 
The government and its instruments therefore have a responsibility to plan for the future 
under an increasingly complex state of affairs that this development is likely to bring about. 
This would probably start with addressing the current pertinent issues like the insecurity of 
land tenure to ensure that the projected population increase does not overwhelm governance 
of the country, potentially resulting in resource conflicts as previously stated. The increase in 
population growth has also increased the value of land. Cousins (2006:488-510) says that 
when people were fewer, land itself was of negligible value since it was in ample supply. 
Population growth has also meant that there is far more withdrawal of ecosystem services and 
products than the earth can afford to replenish to continuously meet the ever growing demand 
exerted on it. As there are more people, the demand for land has grown and unfortunately it 
cannot be stretched to accommodate the needs of an ever growing population. 
 
 
5.13 CHIEFDOM DEVELOPMENT PLANNING (CDP) 
The emergence of the Chiefdom Development Planning (CDP) in the Lower Usuthu area is 
commendable as is the success drawn from it. It was particularly inspiring that these plans 
were tailor-made for the Swazi situation in the sense that traditional presence has been sought 
from the beginning. As mentioned in earlier chapters, Swazis are steeped in their traditions 
and a plan that does not alienate those traditional frameworks stand a better chance at 
sustainability. 
 
The initiative showed rural Swazis the possibilities that exist in their midst. In fact, the 
success of the CDP reiterates Ostrom‟s conclusion that it is the combination of effort rather 
than advocating a single dispensation that would result in a sustainable management of the 
commons. By having the community pool their resources by contributing some of their fields 
to the project to create the farms instilled commitment on the part of the community. It is also 
worthwhile to note that the fields donated to the farms were not sold, meaning that the 
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involved families‟ subsequent generations would also benefit from the initiative. This should 
satisfy a tenet of sustainable development.  
 
The CDP is a display of local authority and community empowerment to achieve some 
independence ability to manage their day-to-day local matters without overburdening the 
State (Ostrom, 1990:1-32, Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:260). It has also shown that even with a 
degree of independence local authority still needs the support from government as seen by the 
visible presence of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in guiding the community 
with regard to what products to be farmed and what methods to be used,  i.e. climate-smart 
agriculture. It also reveals that the State is willing to develop reliable and robust collective 
action theory that promotes resilience and cost-effective property rights administration for 
communal resources as advised by Ostrom (1999:3). 
 
The rural farmer support offered by the International Fund for Agricultural Department 
(IFAD) in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) is also a 
commendable collaboration. The training does not only empower the community, but it 
increases the likelihood that the project will be a sustainable one long after the initiators have 
left. The fact that community members also partake in participatory community resource 
assessments and are empowered to design their own development plans is also a step in the 
right direction. That is to empower people and let them self-manage. As a show of 
sustainability the project has evolved to include public health, potable water supply and 
sanitation for the community, all factors that positively affect livelihoods. Importantly, it 
simultaneously addresses gender disparities as women are also active and have benefited in 
having their socioeconomic status (and by default those of their families) uplifted.  
 
The sobering thought that comes to mind though is that under the current tenure residents 
may also be forced to leave at the whim of the chief due to the unregulated and 
undocumented customary law. Notwithstanding this potential weakness the entire project 
looks like a great prototype for the country to build on and spread to the other communities. 
Of course, there are other institutional considerations like the pending registration of the CDP 
operation in Swaziland as proposed and most importantly ensuring that communities do not 
become indebted to financial institutions and end up losing their land and their livelihoods to 
them. 
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5.14 TANZANIAN FACT-FINDING MISSIONS 
In yet another move that could signal a strong commitment from Government to move 
towards sustainable environmental management of common resources, chiefs and princes 
were sent on a fact-finding mission to Tanzania, a country regarded as one of the pioneers of 
customary tenure recognition in Africa. This move is strategic on the part of Government and 
it also affirms that the Government expects the chiefs to still play the pivotal role as the 
King‟s administrators on SNL in any future dispensations. This betrays the King‟s intent to 
keep his grip on the land. This is not a bad thing because Swazis (as per interviews) see more 
benefit in improving on the current system instead of a complete overhaul that would result in 
a complete upset of the status quo. The fact that the Tanzanian counterparts shared with the 
Swazi contingent was that the work was still cut out for them in terms of getting the 
institutional instruments behind the resolution to chart an environmentally sound and 
sustainable future for the country. The extent and willingness of the Swazi oligarchy is 
unclear at this stage, but there is hope that the investment on these missions starts to bear fruit 
sooner rather than later. 
 
 
5.15 DRAFT LAND BILL 
Although the articulations made in the Draft Land Bill are refreshing for the most part, they 
are still empty if the Bill will stay in its embryonic state like other laws before it, i.e. the 1998 
Land Policy. It, however, stands as an aggressive way forward, attempting to contain land 
sales without commercialising SNL. The position of women married in polygamous 
relationships is superficially dealt with as it is governed by customary law which, as 
discussed earlier, is not straightforward in its administration. The salient point with regard to 
environmental law would be that without unnecessarily rushing the process it needs to be 
dealt with the urgency that it deserves. Much of the ecosystem is degraded and habitats 
destroyed every day that the laws are not passed. Moreover, rural people continue to survive 
under unspeakable conditions. In short, the delay in passing environmental laws is in fact a 
delay to humanity and the poor are paying that price with their lives. There is a need for 
better interaction between the customary and statutory laws of the country that will result in 
timely passing of laws. 
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5.16 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has identified political commitment as the single most important factor in 
steering the nation towards environmentally sound management of resources. In particular it 
is its lack in reconciling the precepts of statutory and customary law, especially in passing 
new laws in the country, in explicitly enshrining environmental protection in the Swazi Bill 
of Rights and in ensuring a holistic approach towards environmental management by the 
various instruments of government. Lack of political will is also blamed for the emergence of 
an informal land market in the cleavage. It is because of this lack of reconciliation that 
perpetrators cannot be brought to book because they are committing travesties in the realm of 
customary law which is administered and punished in traditional courts. Unfortunately, as 
chiefs are also privy to this activity no one would have the incentive to bring people to book. 
Statutory law, on the other hand, is applied in title deed land and therefore has no jurisdiction 
in SNL and therefore the issue infiltrates the Swazi commons unabated.  
 
Older results of the insecurity of tenure are the loss of biodiversity and habitat destruction 
which also continues at an accelerated rate. Gender marginalisation is still rife although the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (2005), and the Draft Land Bill (2013) attempt to 
tackle it. The attempts are seen as half-baked because they only allude to gender equality 
without delving into how the nation can possibly address the disparities.  
 
Livelihoods remain unsustainable and so the assault of the commons remains. They will 
become severely compromised in the near future when people suddenly do not have arable 
land on which to farm. This eventuality will be brought about by the continued ignorance of 
the thriving land sale on SNL and the fact that the land on sale is the cultivable part. Constant 
articulations by the elite are also compromising rural livelihoods, for people should remain 
oppressed by reminders that they could be vacated at any time or the ad hoc installation of 
chiefs. 
 
If the country continues on the same trajectory then conflict is definitely inevitable, from the 
family unit, to chiefdoms and the country. Population growth is also projected to remain on 
an incline, meaning that in the near future there will be even more people contending for the 
shrinking resources. The picture of the Swazi sustainability trajectory is not all bleak though 
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as welcome developments like the successful Chiefdom Development Planning (CDP) and 
the recent oligarchy trip to customary tenure pioneers like Tanzania serve to revive hope that 
the country can get onto a sustainable trajectory sooner rather than later. 
 
 
5.17 SUMMARY 
This chapter foremost confirms the premise that the current land tenure does not support the 
sustainability of common resources as embodied by the glaring lack of political commitment 
to implement environmental strategies. The lack of political commitment is seen the clearest 
in the delays in passing environmentally crucial laws like the Land Policy, which would offer 
a framework for land management affairs. As a result unsuitable land use is not curtailed and 
people on SNL remain unaccountable for their actions. It has been argued that political 
commitment together with documentation of customary law and active participation of all 
citizens are necessary ingredients in charting a new future.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter provides a summary and overview of the study. It also includes the 
recommendations that were drawn from the study. Theoretically the study starts off from 
Hardin‟s (1968:1243-1248) assertion that humans are inherently atomistic and that in 
commune situations they would always seek to maximise their individual gain at the cost of 
the community they are part of. This view has informed many a policy as governments 
sought to sustainably manage resources remotely. The problem with this approach is that it 
inadvertently created the very open-access situation it sought to prevent. While Hardin 
(1968:1243-1248) encouraged privatisation of rights, many governments resorted to using 
conventional theory to formulate policies for resources and people they had not taken time to 
know. Needless to say, such policies often backfired and resulted in resource depletion and 
disintegrated local institutional arrangements instead of the opposite. Intensive research on 
the subject of commons by such people as Ostrom (1990:1-55) later birthed alternative 
conclusions to Hardin‟s. It provided that as a starting point it should be realised that 
communities are diverse, as are their norms and communal arrangements. Appreciating this 
fact allows for the realisation that there can never be a blanket policy to deal with issues of 
sustainable resource management across communities, but that each had to be tailored 
according to the merits and demerits of that specific community. This is unfortunately where 
most governments have failed. Ostrom added, from extensive study, that the more cohesive a 
community, the more likely that each member would treat the common resource with caution. 
Ostrom also deduced that a strong sense of community is not the panacea for collective best 
interest (Ostrom, 1990:8-9). She therefore concluded that for true sustainable management 
the combined efforts of the community, the local authority and the government will always 
be a necessity. The local community and authority could work together and unburden the 
government while the government would always be needed to restore order from time to time 
and, importantly because of its institutions, the government could also offer ongoing support 
and capacitate the communities for self-management.    
 
Property rights and their administration have increasingly come under the radar due to such 
factors as population growth, migration and the growing perverse consumption in the world. 
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Population growth exerts a lot of pressure on the environment and as such resource depletion 
is on the rise. Perverse consumption, on the other hand, has meant that although many 
resources are depleted to provide luxury goods it is only a select few, the wealthy, who 
benefit from it (UNDP, 1998:4). Meanwhile multitudes of poor people have to contend with a 
compromised environment when they are not responsible for the large-scale resource 
destruction that compromised the environment in the first place. Because of their poverty 
status and desperation these people severely depend on the environment for ecosystem 
products (fuel wood, grass and wild fruit) and services (water reticulation offered by a 
wetland, for example).  
 
A healthy environment is a triumph for both dependent communities and governments in that 
it alleviates the governmental welfare burden when the poor in society are provided for by 
their immediate environment (Monadjem & Nkosi, 2001:3).  It is therefore discouraging to 
note that the commons have been under attack from the combined efforts of the two groups 
that should have the greatest incentive to protect them. Dependent communities often wreck 
the commons because they do not have alternatives. In the free-for-all scenario that is usually 
perpetuated by lack of relevant policies people are stripped of the incentive to care about 
tomorrow and therefore respond to their immediate need for that resource and if they can 
capitalise on it they do so. Governments, on the other end of the spectrum, do not engage how 
and as much as they should with dependent communities to enable appropriate policy 
formulation Reinert (2009:1-34). They also display a preference for blanket policies when in 
fact communities are different and therefore require not only case-specific policies but 
varying degrees of implementation as well. 
 
The study sought to consider how customary tenure affects sustainable environmental 
management of common resources in Swaziland. Tenure is the relationship governing 
individual and group relations with regard to land and it can either be secure or insecure.  
When it is secure its recipients can expect that their rights to a particular resource cannot only 
be acknowledged but that they would be protected as well. Conversely the tenure insecure 
people have no certainty or confidence in the acknowledgement of their rights to a resource. 
It is not unusual for the latter group to use resources excessively as they try to maximise 
personal benefit before others. It is for this reason that insecure tenure has been widely 
associated with unsustainable environmental activities. 
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The study adopted a qualitative approach and a purposive sampling method. Experts were 
identified from the organisations that deal with environment and land issues in Swaziland. 
These are the Swaziland Environment Authority (SEA), the Central Rural Development 
Board (CRDB) in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) 
and the Swaziland National Trust Commission (SNTC). The University of Swaziland 
(UNISWA) was engaged to offer an objective view as all the other organisations are either 
governmentally owned or government affiliated. The Yonge Nawe Environmental Action 
Group was chosen by virtue of being the oldest and only environmental advocacy group 
looking after community interests in the country. It was, however, found to be defunct at the 
time of the interviews. There is currently no entity that has taken the baton from them. In-
depth interviews using prepared questionnaires (Annexure A – E attached) were carried out.  
 
The underlying concepts of sustainable livelihood, migration, population growth, customary 
land tenure and common resources governance were explored extensively through literature, 
first in the global, then African, and finally Swazi contexts. Customary law derives its 
resilience from its host community as norms adapt over time. This quality then means that 
customary law application and nuances vary from one community to the next. This is the 
limitation of the study: it cannot be applied elsewhere as it focuses on a specific country – 
Swaziland. 
 
The low status afforded customary tenure by many governments is a critical poverty 
propellant. In a commons the inhabitants have bundles of rights which determine their status. 
The bundle consists of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation rights 
which can be further classified into the operational level rights (access and withdrawal) and 
collective level rights (management, exclusion and alienation rights) (FAO, 2002:8). 
Resource users are classified into authorised users (who enjoy the access and withdrawal 
rights), claimants, proprietors and owners (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:249-262). As the less 
empowered group authorised users have been known to overharvest resources in an attempt 
to maximise their gains against uncertain access withdrawal conditions.  
 
In terms of legality property rights are either de facto or de jure and a communal setting 
combines these rights. When a government awards people exclusive rights to a resource it 
bestows de jure rights on them. The arrangements and rights devised by the community of its 
own accord on how to manage the resource are de facto rights and are informal (Schlager & 
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Ostrom, 1992:254). Commons are not unique to the African continent. Australia and Canada 
has them and awarded them their property rights and resources in 1992 and 1997 respectively 
(Alden Wily, 2007:48). They are typically inhabited by indigenous people whose claim to 
them is historical tenure and use. Commons sustain the rural livelihoods and this has in recent 
years come under threat from environmental disasters like erosion, pollution and 
overharvesting. Commons also offer sanctuaries and sacred places to its inhabitants and are 
usually the only real asset some people will ever have in their lifetime. 
 
Commons often endure internal and external attacks.  Internally trends like population growth 
can exert enormous pressure on the resource as does immigration (Hardin, 1968:1243-1248; 
Clay & Reardon, 1998:1; UNPED, 2001:16-18; Cousins, 2006:448-510; SSER, 2013:26, 44; 
Wenner, 2013.). All people require shelter and land to build it on just as they require 
nourishment and some more land to farm on. The ecosystem products and services suddenly 
have to cater for a larger contingent and sometimes it falls short of the requirements expected 
from it. There are also other factors like personal greed exhibited by commons administrators 
which result in unsustainable land location. When an administrator stands to gain personally, 
he/she can allow an undesirable activity on the commons or give the best portions of land to 
people who are of a greater socioeconomic standing and leave out the undesirable bits to the 
peasantry. 
 
From the outside the commons are attacked by the lethal combination of the State, the law 
(local and international), the elite and conglomerates (Porter et.al, 2000:35-78; Elliot, 
2004:132; Murombedzi, 2014). These are powerful groups whose main driver is self-interest. 
They incidentally control or, in the case of elite and conglomerates, influence policy and they 
use this advantage to sway it to fit their preferences at the cost of the rural poor. Commons 
have been attacked the world over, from Europe to Asia to Africa. The main tenet has always 
been systematically excluding the poor by declaring individual title on large pieces of lands 
for the select few (wealthy) while large numbers of the poor have to make do with marginal 
lands and scarce resources. The same method used in medieval England was used as a 
prototype for the African scramble by colonialists. The African belief in communal 
ownership and the land essentially belonging to some mystical beings made it easier for the 
colonialists to impose their ‟superior‟ and formal land ownership system that systematically 
disposed lots of Africans of their natural resources (Alden Wily, 2013). A host of laws were 
passed to ensure that the takeover was legal and could not be challenged. At the same time 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Page | 109  
 
customary tenure assumed the informal de facto status that could not be readily enforced in a 
court of law.  In the assault large tracks of resources were often assigned state ownership and 
then exploited as the state saw fit.  
 
The dismantling of the commons saw chiefs who had been mere administrators prior to the 
attack gain influence by being made paramount chiefs by the colonialists. Their roles became 
increasingly autocratic and less people-centred (Cousins, 2006:500-510). Local people also 
banded together, believing that there was strength in numbers and also trying to ensure that 
they could at least influence the chiefs who now were the go-betweens for the colonialists 
and locals. Other consequences were gender disparities which were embedded to ensure that 
women remained subservient to men despite their significant role in food production. Culture 
was ignored to ensure that men were the recognised heirs to land and that construct still 
remains. 
 
African States would later gain independence from their colonialists and the new 
governments demonstrated a tendency to fill their former masters‟ shoes rather than liberalise 
their countries. Where benefit had previously accrued to the colonial masters the states and 
elite were the new beneficiaries. They not only maintained colonial laws, but in some cases 
new laws were passed to cement the status quo. Post-independence bureaucrats and elite 
usually have business interests that converge with those of international conglomerates and 
they use their influence to ensure that these proceed despite any difficulties that accrue to 
local society and the long-term environmental destruction. Not all is lost, however, as some 
African countries have attempted to institute land reforms. The common trend is that 
customary tenure remains inferior to titling although it is variably recognised and some 
resources and rights have been returned to communities. Tanzania, Botswana and 
Mozambique are among the African countries that have made significant progress in 
customary tenure restoration (Alden Wily, 2011a:44-51). 
 
International financial organisations like the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund have also been culpable in commons degradation (Porter et al., 2000:53-58). In a way 
these organisations could even be viewed as an evolved colonialism. Their preference for 
policies that benefited a few while local communities languished always left a lot to be 
desired. Moreover, the entities that usually benefitted the most from these were the very 
conglomerates whose roots are in former colonial countries. Although there have been 
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attempts to adopt more environment-friendly laws by supporting environmentally sound 
policies, the organisations have time and again tended to fund perverse projects.  
 
The focus of the study was on a small landlocked country of Swaziland. Home to almost one 
and a half million people, it is surrounded by the larger South African and Mozambican 
States (CIA, 2014). It is presently ruled by His Majesty, King Mswati III who ascended the 
throne in 1986, four years after the demise of his father, the late King Sobhuza II. The 
citizens of this beautiful, scenic country are extremely dedicated to their traditions and 
culture. They are committed to their customary system even though it is riddled with 
inconsistencies, believing that it is the necessary condition for the pseudo-peace in which 
they take much pride (Scott, 2006:157; Wooderson, 2013). Like all present day countries, 
Swaziland contends with environmental problems despite having a vibrant ecosystem. 
Population growth has resulted in overexploitation of environmental resources as land 
shrinkage and the visible thinning of forests (people fell tress for various domestic purposes) 
indicate. A host of other environmental resource problems, including alien weed infestation, 
scarce drinking water supply, soil erosion as a result of overgrazing and loss of biodiversity, 
have been noted (Swaziland Environment Authority: SD WSSD, 2002:14). 
 
The country is administratively divided into four regions, namely Shiselweni, Lubombo, 
Manzini and Hhohho region. The capital city is in Mbabane while the legislative capital is in 
Lobamba, an area nestled between Manzini and Mbabane. Climatically the country comprises 
of the Lowveld, which has a semiarid climate and is drought prone, the Highveld, which has 
high rainfalls that often induce nutrient leaching, the Middleveld, which is mixed veld and 
home to various edible and inedible grass species, and the Lubombo plateau, which is 
conducive to maize and other root vegetables (MOAC, 2014). 
 
A large portion of the Swazi population relies on subsistence agriculture despite having a 
small portion of arable land (about 10 per cent). Swazi tenure is divided into three: title deed 
land (TDL), Swazi nation land (SNL) and crown land (Scott, 2006:168). In TDL people can 
buy land and receive a title to it through the Deeds Registry Act and they are fairly 
independent in terms of how they manage or even alienate their property. Crown land 
belongs to the government of Swaziland and is reserved for governmental infrastructural 
purposes. SNL is the largest portion of the country and is predominantly rural. It is the 
commons of Swaziland. Although rural Swazis live in SNL, communally administered by 
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chiefs, they do not own it. They are tenants land lorded by the chiefs, with the King as the 
owner of all SNL as provided for by all land laws of the country. Rural Swazis are tenure 
insecure. 
 
People acquire land on SNL through the customary system called kukhonta and enter the 
lifelong kuhlehla custom, which is a system of paying homage to the local traditional 
councils (Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:301). Most Swazis like kuhlehla as it enhances cohesion 
and strengthens communal relationships. Chiefs, the SNL landlords, are a powerful entity 
with controlled access to the King and they have the prerogative to purge undesirable persons 
from their custodian communities. They also retain the indigenous role of dispute mediation. 
The level of influence an individual chief commands collates with the status of the 
community where he is custodian. Those in charge of communities comprising significantly 
wealthy members and fertile land typically have more clout than their counterparts in charge 
of poor land and less rich members. Status also varies on whether one is a royal or not with 
the royals taking precedence over the common chiefs. As has been seen, sometimes royals 
decide to claim land and depose of incumbent chiefs who are then demoted to being in the 
new chief‟s advisory bodies. 
 
There has been a significant consumption of SNL since independence in line with an 
expanding population (van Waveren 2007:192-195). A larger population of Swazis are rural 
based (about 79 per cent). Poverty is also rife in rural Swaziland where about 69 per cent of 
residents live below the poverty line with about 37 per cent existing in chronic and extreme 
poverty. To make the situation even worse the country also experienced dwindling of its 
staple food production – maize – since the year 2000. Government instruments have been 
trying to integrate the rural poor in activities that would simultaneously emancipate them 
from poverty while promoting sound and sustainable management of environmental 
resources. The country also battles with high unemployment as about 40 per cent of Swazis 
are unemployed. 
 
Conservation has always been practiced in traditional Swaziland (Whelpton, 2005:154). For 
example, pastoral land used to be rested periodically to allow it to rejuvenate and contain soil 
erosion, hunting in game reserves was only carried out on specific times when the King 
issued an open season and it would be strictly prohibited when the given time lapsed and 
special grasses were only harvested when the King gave the go-ahead. Population growth has 
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continually undermined these strategies. Livestock is the ultimate symbol of Swazi wealth 
and the more people there are the more livestock there is to feed on a fixed pasture. This has 
resulted in soil erosion as most pastures lie bare. This is worsened by the fact that people tend 
to adopt the free-for-all scenarios where no one takes direct responsibility for their growing 
livestock and would rather feed it in the rundown pasture like everyone else, as per Hardin‟s 
(1968:1243-1248) analogue. 
 
Over exploitation of resources in Swaziland is catalysed by the combined factors of a lack of 
a land policy to provide overarching land management regulations; failure to enforce existing 
legislation; unsuitable land use patterns; poor environmental awareness countrywide which 
results in poor planning; lack of accountability on SNL; conflicts over land resources; 
incapacity to integrate land use planning and landscape management (SSER, 2013: 35). 
 
Customary tenure blurs resource responsibilities and the undefined scope of traditional 
leaders often results in problems. It also hastens biodiversity loss, critical ecosystem 
depletion and wetland destruction. Although the 30 mammals that currently face extinction 
are in protected areas, 19 of the 56 tree species listed in the Swaziland Plant Red Data Book 
are not found in all the country‟s protected areas (SNTC environmental educator, 2014: pers. 
comm.). Not all chiefs have the environmental knowledge and sensitivity that would 
empower them to allocate land sustainably. 
 
In the gap that exists in the application of customary and statutory law there has emerged a 
new culture of selling land in SNL, something considered taboo in Swaziland. Residents 
often sell portions of their fields, something which reduces arable land in the country. This 
activity will in the long run negatively affect orphaned children who rely on the welfare of 
their uncles to look after their interests. It also entices the poor to dispose of some land which 
they would find difficult to recover when the need arises. This could eventually result in a 
welfare burden for the government. The customary khonta system has also become 
increasingly expensive. Introducing community residents outside the realm of the khonta 
custom also alters the community composition and cohesion.  
 
It is against this backdrop that there have been widespread calls for securitisation of 
customary tenure for Swazis with the main tenet being that granting ownership would also 
transfer the incentive to adopt environmentally sound and sustainable management of 
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environmental resources, i.e. land to the local communities. As poverty alleviation strategy 
land could be used by communities as collateral for start-up finance, although this 
undertaking could also backfire when people get dispossessed of their only real asset due to 
defaulting in payments to financial institutions.   
 
Swaziland has a dual law system. TDL is managed through the Deeds Registry under the 
auspices of Roman-Dutch law and SNL is managed through customary law. The global 
consensus is that customary law is inferior to statutory law but the opposite is true in 
Swaziland. Although statutory law seems to supersede its counterpart in application, 
customary law remains superior because its assent is always necessary when a statutory law 
has to be passed.  Decisions made under the precepts of statutory law are also oftentimes 
overturned by customary law in the country, entrenching the monarchy in the day-to-day 
running of the country. The preference for a customary stronghold in the country was evident 
as far back as when the Swazi oligarchy fought for independence. They wanted it not to 
liberalise all Swazis, but that it should be granted on the basis of the imperialism blueprint.  
 
Post-independence this was evident when the then ruler, the late King Sobhuza II, dissolved 
the parliament that was as a result of the second election and the first since independence 
(Stringer et al., 2007:388; Wooderson, 2013). He panicked when the opposition party, which 
consisted of intellectuals who were critical of the significant role the monarchy had in day-to-
day running of the country, won 3 of the 24 seats to parliament. In the first election the 
opposition had not secured any seat. Three proved a threat enough for the King to speedily 
dissolve parliament and institute the 1973 decree which banned all political parties for 
leadership to be left to the King and his advisors. Once the resultant disturbance had died 
down the King relied on his charm and the personality cult he had cultivated to rule the 
country.   
 
To buttress royal stronghold all laws vesting land and minerals in the King were not changed 
and post-independence laws reiterate this. Moreover, the King is the head of all the arms of 
government (judiciary, legislative and executive). He is the supreme Swazi citizen and legally 
immune. 
 
Swazis owe their name to their ancestor, King Mswati I, who established them as a nation 
when he settled in present day Swaziland after trekking extensively from parts of Maputo and 
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Zululand. His need for military backing against the strong Zulu army led him to ask the aid of 
the white settlers. In exchange for their help the white settlers were awarded rights to certain 
resources. The relationship between the Swazi leadership and white settlers continued well 
after King Mswati I‟s demise and resulted in a significant loss of Swazi territory during King 
Mbandzeni‟s reign. In trying to secure Swazi independence King Mbandzeni unwittingly 
signed off environmental resources to the whites under the impression that it was a lease. To 
the whites, however, it was equivalent to title transfer. The results of the toxic exchange 
resulted in the Land Partition Act of 1907 where Mbandzeni was forced to confront the 
consequences of his actions. Upon his death Mbandzeni was succeeded by King Bhunu, who 
ruled for a short time before his demise, leaving the then infant Sobhuza as heir apparent. 
Because Sobhuza was still young, his grandmother, Labotsibeni Mdluli, became the Queen 
Regent and embarked on the journey to recover the lost land. Strategies included sending 
Swazi men to South African mines to seek employment so that they could contribute to a 
fund dedicated to buying land. The recovered land was called Swazi Nation Land and was 
vested in the King for all Swazis. Inheriting his grandmother‟s passion, King Sobhuza also 
pursued the land recovery programme with fervour.  
 
The Swazi elite have been conspicuous since before independence although the vulgar 
opulence displayed by their descendants is unparalleled. The first post-independence 
parliamentary portfolio made no attempts to include middle-class or working-class 
representatives and instead had a prince for a Prime Minister and a European for a Finance 
Minister to represent settler interests in the new government (Youé, 1986:72). Not long 
afterwards King Sobhuza established Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, Swaziland‟s corporate giant. This 
organisation was established in trust of the Swazi nation although it only really caters for the 
royal house. The elite have been entrenched in Swazi society with the royalty accounting for 
the prime spot. Perverted spending by the elite is rife, a regrettable thing in view of the large 
inequality disparities in the country. Millions are spent refurbishing royal palaces, purchasing 
motor vehicles and indulging in shopping sprees while a significant number of Swazis are 
ravaged by persistent hunger and poverty (Irin News, 2004a & b; Clarke, 2011). 
 
The elite easily influence policy to safeguard their interests. Even in rural settings, like in the 
Engcayini pastoral rehabilitation programme, (paragraph 3.12.1), the local elite were not only 
able to alter the policy before the rest of the community, but they also ensured that the 
peasantry would put in the work by insisting on fines for absentia even though some of them 
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did not have cows at the time (Stringer et al., 2007:388–392). The reasoning for insisting that 
even households who did not have cows partake in the activity was that they could have them 
in future. This was of course beneficial to the elite because they spread the effort while 
individualising on the benefit. The poor were forced to abandon their own projects to 
concentrate on the pastoral for communal good. However, on completion the revamped 
pasture was demarcated and the poor could no longer access it for products like fuel wood, 
wild fruits and grass. On one hand their poverty was entrenched while the rich raked extra 
benefits in terms of well- nourished cows which could produce more milk for sale and also 
attract handsome prices from butchery owners in the event that they were sold.  
 
As in other parts of the world, a majority of Swazi homes are headed by women and 
regardless of this fact Swazi laws still display a strong patriarchal preference for land 
allocation. Women are still viewed in light of their extended roles as wives, something clearly 
out of tune with present trends. More and more women are staying single, some widowed and 
some divorced with yet another group of married women who run the home because their 
husbands are working away from home (FAO, 2002:26; Simelane, 2014:91). Owing to the 
scourge of HIV/AIDS there are also old women who raise their grandchildren because their 
own children are deceased. One would think that cognisance of these challenges would 
justify a shift in policy to allocate land easily to women, yet they still struggle to do so. 
Divorced or single mothers have to present a male proxy to the traditional councils to be 
considered for land allocation (Rose, 2003:123-149; Grigsby, 2004:207-222). Even though 
widows may have had access to land while their husbands were alive, that access hinges on 
them maintaining good relations with their in-laws; otherwise they lose their claim to that 
land. Single women often rely on their fathers or uncles to negotiate for land allocation on 
their behalf. Because women increasingly have to rely on their wit to devise strategies to get 
land, they can often be compromised by the very male proxies they depend on. 
 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (2005) offers an interesting view on land 
relations. In one part it upholds gender-neutral land allocation, meaning that women are 
equally entitled to land as their male counterparts. In another part the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland (2005) enshrines organic customary law when it is known that it is a 
patriarchal system and therefore maintains the subservience of women. Other land laws that 
marginalise women include the Marriage Act, No.47 of 1964, which vests marital power on 
the male spouse and grants Swazi law and custom control of marriages officiated in 
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Swaziland. The Deeds Registry Act, No.37 of 1968, on the other hand strips women married 
in community of property of the right to have their names appear on a title deed to jointly-
owned property. Those married out of community of property are still required to seek their 
husbands‟ assistance on any deed-related services and the prerogative of deciding necessity 
of assistance rests not with the spouse but the Registrar of Deeds. Doo Aphane, the human 
rights lawyer who successfully challenged these pieces of law, offered a beacon of hope for 
many Swazi women married in community of property.  
 
Notwithstanding the Doo Aphane victory (Langwenya, 2012:1-10), gender disparities in 
Swaziland are still inadequately addressed, especially for women married through Swazi law 
and custom. The proposed Land Bill, if it miraculously overcomes the customary assent 
hurdle and gets enacted, could offer some headway in addressing the glaring issues. This bill 
proposes that married women be afforded the same status as their male counterparts in terms 
of deeds registration. It also shows sensitivity to the country‟s customary polygamous 
marriages by proposing that women in those arrangements have their marriages afforded the 
same status as of those married in civil rights.    
 
Swaziland has also had her fair share of land-related conflicts, something that can be 
expected when considering the fact that the land resource is becoming increasingly valuable. 
The most colossal one yet has to be the 2000 KaMkhweli and Macetjeni debacle where the 
royal house forcefully installed the late Prince Maguga as a double chief in these areas 
despite remarkable resistance from the then incumbent chiefs (Independent Online, 2000; 
Dlamini, 2010). There were claims from the royal house that the late King Sobhuza had 
intended for his son, Prince Maguga, to administer those chiefdoms and as such the 
incumbents were to accept demotion to allow the Prince to rule (Independent Online, 2000). 
Those claims were a shock revelation to two chiefs who had been installed rightfully by 
Swazi law and custom. They challenged this order and refused to abdicate their positions. 
The royal house, through state instruments (police and defence forces), launched an attack on 
the area targeting the chiefs and their supporters. Many people were carried away on trucks 
and dumped in various parts of the country. The stubborn chiefs escaped and sought asylum 
status from neighbouring South Africa (Independent Online, 2000). In the aftermath 
remaining residents could not farm as the royal house issued an order prohibiting such until 
after the new chief had been installed. School-going children missed their opportunity to 
write end-of-year exams that year and many were separated from their families. Some 
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remaining families had an additional burden as they took some children whose parents had 
been evacuated, therefore meaning an increase in family size. The order not to farm when 
most Swazis rely on subsistence farming resulted in food shortages. 
 
In another incident people of the KaShali/Ngwane Park area had their homes demolished 
after it came to light that they had been erroneously allocated land on a farm belonging to the 
King even though they had acquired the land through the very Swazi law and custom 
(Simelane, 2010). These examples show that even though unaffected Swazis may assume that 
their tenure is secure, it really is not. And for the one who is aware of this truth it holds that 
they would seek to maximise their gain while they can. Regular conflict compromises rural 
livelihoods severely. As rural Swaziland is dependent on subsistence farming, this activity is 
also a means of employment for the peasants. Surprise evacuation and homes being 
demolished also places financial burdens on the rural people of whom most are already poor 
and cannot afford to be constantly moving. 
 
As if to prove that the elite remain unaffected by the compromised livelihoods of rural 
Swazis princes still occasionally lay claims on land with chiefs in place. For example, Prince 
Mangaliso totally disregarded Chief Mafamba when he issued a directive saying that the 
people should acknowledge him as chief from then on (Dlamini, 2010). He conveniently did 
this when the King was in seclusion so that he could not be approached by the aggrieved 
community members for redress (Lee, 2011). The former minister of home affairs followed 
suit when he laid claim in the Sankolweni chiefdom. Prince Matatazela unsuccessfully tried 
to take over the Mbekelweni chiefdom and was responsible for the KaShali/Ngwane Park 
confusion that resulted in demolished homes (Matse, 2010). After this shameful act people 
were banned from holding meetings and were told to heed the orders to just leave the area. 
 
As recently as 2014 a commoner chief threatened to evict people in the Nkilongo chiefdom 
because he had earmarked the area for development. The people in that area had been 
resettled there an odd thirty years ago when the Ubombo Sugar Mill was established. This is 
still unsustainable development if it does not consider and involve the affected parties. It also 
highlights how unsafe tenure in Swaziland really is when one man can just issue an order 
with no regard for other people‟s opinions (Magagula, 2014). 
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Conflict also abounds when people encroach protected areas and the Swaziland National 
Trust Commission (SNTC) has to spend considerable effort warding them off. It is 
noteworthy that the country has a plethora of land-related laws from both the pre- and post- 
independence eras and that neither group of laws securitises tenure for the common Swazi 
citizens. The Constitution also does not enshrine a specific environmental right, but implies it 
by placing the onus on the State and citizens of Swaziland to conserve the environment 
(Faure & du Plessis, 2011:464). None of the laws have ever been enforced to allow for 
proactive development and proper environmental planning in the country.  As a result 
progressive Swazis have attempted to call for land reform since the early 1990s, but have 
always been met with fierce opposition from the royals as they fear that a secure tenure for 
the commons would threaten the legitimacy of royal rule in the country. The government has 
been accused of being indifferent in dealing with pertinent issues such as food scarcity and 
high unemployment in the country (Terry, 2012:135; Irin News, 2014a&b). Indifference was 
apparent also in the aftermath of the KaMkhweli/Macetjeni debacle when children were left 
to fend for themselves in the sudden royal-induced absence of their parents. 
Nongovernmental organisations have also decried the laissez faire attitude displayed by 
bureaucrats regarding the poverty levels and glaring inequalities in the country.  Meanwhile 
rural people attempt to hold on to their only real asset, land, by farming even if it is infertile 
as they fear that leaving it fallow may trigger repossession by traditional authorities to give to 
new members of the community (Dlamini & Masuku, 2011:302). 
 
On a brighter side the country has seen the successful implementation of community 
development planning (CDP), which is a joint initiative between International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), local 
authorities and the community. This programme is the first that vindicates Ostrom‟s position 
on the conditions for success in communal governance (Ostrom, 2010:6).  As opposed to 
imposing the community participates and is involved in the project. It has been so successful 
that it might be done in other areas. Chiefs and princes were also taken to Tanzania to 
observe how their transition to secure tenure has been, the challenges to anticipate and how 
best they can apply the process in Swaziland. The National Environment Fund, which is 
beneficiated by among others fines from noncompliant businesses, has also been able to 
rejuvenate numerous places in the country including the Lawuba wetland, which is 
commendable (SEA information officer, 2014:pers. comm.). If the proposed Land Bill is 
passed, it would be a triumph for sustainability and environmental management in Swaziland. 
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For one, it would offer the overarching principles that the country is seriously lacking. It is 
not without its weaknesses, but charting the way forward was never going to be easy and 
straightforward and getting on the road to success is much better than holding out for the 
perfect time. 
 
 
 
6.2 SUMMARY 
The customary land tenure in Swaziland does not promote sustainable environmental 
management of common resources. The absence of a land policy which would provide 
overarching support and guidance for institutions to undertake sustainable use of resources is 
a glaring shortcoming. As a result there is a gap in environmental planning and proactive 
development in the country. The death of civic institutions like the Yonge Nawe 
Environmental Action Group also dealt the environment a blow. Without knowledgeable and 
informed people to sensitize rural people on the implications of their actions the opportunity 
to conserve the environment is lost. In this vacuum Swazi National Land (SNL) then remains 
the free-for-all with the grim consequences that Hardin foretold. Swaziland seems to be at the 
dawn of constructing significant sustainable development. The emergence of the Chiefdom 
Development Plans is a ray of hope as they embody the proper environmental planning and 
proactive development that the country should adopt. The chief visits to Tanzania are 
encouraging as they seek to empower the very people responsible for land allocation in the 
country as is the rehabilitation that is funded by the National Environment Fund. However, 
even with the success of the first of such programmes the country should not rest on its 
laurels since environmental problems are increasingly complex.  
 
Political apathy will never be a useful ingredient in the sustainable use of common resources 
particularly as people are inherently self serving. It is therefore necessary that political weight 
is pulled behind the plight of the vulnerable in society i.e. the poor, women and children. 
Population growth also means resources shrink and therefore there is a demand for creativity 
in the management of common resources to ensure sustainable livelihoods for all. The poor in 
society are the ones that need protection from the growing informal land markets on SNL.   
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6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Document customary law to ensure standard application across the country and also to 
provide reliable and objective reference for application purposes. 
 Government should identify all arable land and institute communal farming so as to 
prevent the land resource from going extinct. 
 Ration common resources and empower communities to replenish products as they 
harvest from common resources, e.g. tree planting after felling older trees. 
 Swaziland should rely on its strength as a mono-ethnic society to institute 
inclusiveness in its policies. 
 
 
6.4 RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
The following are future research other scholars can embark on deriving from this study: 
1. This study sampled purposively with the intention to speak to organisations which are 
involved in land tenure studies. Another approach could be to target communities to 
hear what the people on the ground are saying and hoping for. 
2. The recommendation that customary law should be documented warrants its own 
study to determine how this exercise could be carried out and the potential benefits to 
such an endeavour. 
3. Another study could assess the level of environmental awareness within the rural 
Swazi population versus the efforts that are made by the affected organisations to 
spread it. 
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Annexure A – Central Rural Development Board Questionnaire 
1. Please discuss the role of chiefs in customary land affairs. 
2. There have been reports of land sales in customary land, an exercise considered 
illegal in Swaziland. The reports allege that some chiefs take part in this activity. 
Is the CRDB aware of this? If not, why? Comments on the issue. 
3. How do chiefs encourage sustainable management of environmental resources in 
their various chiefdoms? 
4. Excessive livestock have also been said to contribute to overgrazing and soil 
erosion. How do chiefs control the number per household, especially within the 
wealthier members of the community? 
5. How are intercommunity relations managed with regard to resources which other 
communities may lack? 
6. Do existing community members influence the rate at which people migrate into 
their communities? If yes, how extensive is this influence? 
7. Do community members yield any influence regarding communal environmental 
resources? Please elaborate on response. 
8. There have been articulations made that communities were becoming saturated as 
the rate of incoming people is incessant. Has this been identified by the Board as a 
challenge. If yes, what mitigation is in place for yet to be saturated areas?  
9. When and under what conditions do chiefs reduce original family allotments? Are 
affected families engaged in the allotment reduction process? What are the 
consequences when the affected families disagree with the traditional council‟s 
decisions? 
10. Comments on the halted land reform policy of 1999. 
Thank You!!! 
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Annexure B – Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (Land Use) Questionnaire 
1. What gave rise to the abandoned 1999 Land Policy review? Why was it stopped? Are 
there plans to revisit the process? If yes, please elaborate. 
2. How is population growth, a factor that has already been blamed for saturation in 
some communities, anticipated and mitigated for in the land management portfolio? 
3. What percentage of cultivable land is actually farmed? Why? 
4. Would you say that there are any benefits to secure land tenure? Explain. 
5. What proportion of SNL is currently leased to big companies and at what cost? How 
do indigenous people benefit as a result of these transactions if there are? 
6. How much land is idle in the country? 
7. Please elaborate on how the leasehold system on Swazi Nation Land works. 
8. What measures and what progress have been made to provide long-lasting relief to 
people in drought-prone areas? 
9. Rural people are said to contribute to deforestation as they harvest trees for shelter 
and fuel wood. Is this a problem in Swaziland? If yes, to what extent? 
10. How extensive are mineral deposits in the country? What has hindered the mining of 
such minerals as gold and diamonds that the country possesses according to the 
media? When mining eventually occurs, do neighbouring communities stand to 
benefit? How? 
11. How vast are the Swazi commons? 
 
 
 
 
Thank You!!! 
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Annexure C – Swaziland Environment Authority Questionnaire 
1. The 2001 Swaziland National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan identified secure 
tenure as a means of a sound conservation. Please elaborate on what informed this 
standpoint. 
2. Please elaborate on how tenure can improve and sustain Swazi rural livelihoods. 
3. How has the land tenure landscape, with regard to biodiversity protection, been since 
2001? 
4. Rural residents are said to be excessively dependant on natural resources and 
ecosystem services for survival and therefore exert considerable pressure on the 
environment. How does the SEA influence this if at all? 
5. An important tool used by the SEA in establishment of businesses is the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). This also represents a tool for vocalisation 
of community concerns. What level of community involvement is considered 
adequate by the SEA for rural projects, if any? 
6. Rural people are typically less literate in comparison to urban dwellers. How does the 
EIA factor this to ensure that people are fully aware of what projects they are 
welcoming to their communities? 
7. Are rural residents empowered through the EIA, among others to veto projects that 
they may feel do not appeal to their communities, for example, a threat to 
biodiversity? If yes, how?  Please give examples of projects that were denied 
certification because the community said so. 
8. Since 2006 Swaziland has been an active player in the sustainability arena. To date 
she is a signatory to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (1973), the Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal (Basel Convention) 
(1989), the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) and the Convention to Combat 
Desertification (1994). 
Has this legislation been endorsed in Swaziland? If yes, when?  
9. Comments on the land tenure policy reform halted in 1999. If passed, would it have 
improved the agenda of the SEA with regard to common resources? Please elaborate 
on your response. 
10. Which stakeholders does the SEA liaise with regarding biodiversity conservation? 
Thank You!!! 
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Annexure D – Swaziland National Trust Commission Questionnaire 
1. Does the SNTC have a role in common resource governance?  
2. How does the entity encourage sustainable management of common resources? 
3. How vibrant is the Swazi ecosystem? 
4. Are there any red data species in Swaziland? If yes, what is the rate of extinction 
since 2006?  
5. Does tenure insecurity affect common resources or wildlife conservation? If yes, 
how? 
6. The Game Act and other legislation govern the use and conservation of resources. 
Would you say that those practices, pastoral resting, controlled hunting (butimba) are 
still effective? Please elaborate. 
7. Swaziland contends with a growing rural population, where the protected areas are 
incidentally situated. How has this growth affected protected resources so far? Is it a 
sustainable trajectory? If not, what measures does the SNTC propose to sustain 
common resources? 
8. Is there any ongoing engagement with surrounding communities (When did it start, 
spurred by what and what tangible benefits since)? 
9. How do protected areas benefit from an involved community, if they indeed do? 
10. In your opinion would a change in land tenure regime affect the sustainability of 
common resources? Please elaborate. 
11. A land tenure reform policy was instituted and halted in 1999. Any comment on this. 
12. Who are the SNTC stakeholders in the management of the protected areas 
(complexity)? 
13. Since 2006 Swaziland has been an active player in the sustainability arena. To date 
she is a signatory to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (1973), the Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal (Basel Convention) 
(1989), the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) and the Convention to Combat 
Desertification (1994). 
Has this legislation been endorsed in Swaziland? If yes, when?  
Thank You!!! 
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Annexure E – University of Swaziland Questionnaire 
1. Please explain the Swaziland land tenure reform. 
2. Community involvement in EIAs, how significant is community concerns? 
3. The role of chiefs in land management? 
4. Does the current land tenure provide for sound environmental management of 
common resources? Please elaborate. 
5.  Please comment on the inferiority of customary land tenure versus statutory tenure in 
Swaziland and how it affects the sustainability of common resources in the country. 
6. Composition of the Swazi elite. How do they guard their interests? 
7. Among the powerful players in land matters are the elite who in the case of Swaziland 
have been identified to largely comprise the royal family. In other countries like 
Pakistan, for example, the elite also leave their home country and reside overseas 
while retaining their land. Could this also be true for Swaziland? If yes, to what extent 
are these elites allowed to retain their land? 
8. Would you say that chiefs/traditional structures gain personally from land leases or 
land allocation through the traditional khonta system? Substantiate the claims. 
9. Influence of international financial organisations in the country, especially with 
regard to land tenure. 
10. Insecure land tenure has also been punted as the cause of conflicts. For her share, 
Swaziland has experienced such conflicts as at KaMkhweli/Macetjeni and Ngwane 
Park KaShali, which saw scores of people being evicted. What would you say 
considering that more and more people are increasingly desperate for land?  
11. Trends of land sales in customary land have also emerged. How does this affect the 
cultural connotations of customary land and are these sales legal where there are 
receipts as proof of payment? 
12. Since the passing of the Constitution and such cases as the Aphane vs. Government, 
would you say that her victory improved the plight of women with regard to land 
ownership? 
Thank You!!! 
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